

## **NEGOTIATING ISLAMIC AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS AND RELIGIOUS CONTESTATIONS IN YORUBALAND, NIGERIA**

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### **Abstract**

*The modern Islamic thoughts are essentially influenced by transnational Islamic movements with their diverse inclinations. Such an influence wielded by these movements differs from one location to another. Against this backdrop, this paper studies the influence on Muslims in Yorubaland of Nigeria, with specific focus on religious polemics introduced by the advent of these movements in the region under study. Descriptive method of research was adopted. The study shows that though there are different transnational movements in Yorubaland, the most controversial and popular in contemporary time are the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafyyah groups. The religious polemics evoked by the advent of the transnational Islamic movements in the region under study include the religious controversy between the traditional Muslims and adherents of these movements as well as the polemics that exist among the various movements against one another. The study recommends display of high level of ethics of disagreements among the traditional and the revivalist Muslims in Yorubaland as well as statutory regulation of religious practice by the concerned authorities in order to forestall the turning of religious polemics to physical crisis in the region.*

**Keywords:** Transnational, Islamic Movements, Polemics, Yorubaland, Nigeria, Influence

### **Introduction**

The modern history of Islam following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate has been shaped by the emergence of transnational Islamic movements that seek to redefine Muslim identity and reform religious practice across different societies. These movements have developed beyond national boundaries

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and represent a variety of ideological orientations and reform agendas. In this study, transnational Islamic movements are understood as networks of religious actors whose ideas and activities influence both global and local Muslim contexts. Within this framework, Yorubaland in Nigeria provides a distinctive setting to explore how such movements interact with established Islamic traditions and generate new patterns of religious debate and polemics.

The fall of caliphate, colonization of Muslim nations and the rise of Israel nation on the soil of Muslim land-all happened in the 20<sup>th</sup> century-catapulted the evolution of modern revivalist Islamic movements beginning from the second decade of the terminal century of the second millennium.<sup>1</sup> Though these religious movements shared the common mission of reclaiming the lost glory of Muslims, they differed in approach and method to be used for the realization of their mission. Some of such movements include Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jama'at Tabligh in the then Indo-Pakistan, modern Salafism of the Saudi Arabia, Ahmadiyyah Muslim Jama'ah in the British India, Jama'at Islamiyyah in Pakistan, etc.<sup>2</sup> The aforementioned Islamic movements are characterized by spread across Muslim countries with variable influence and adherents that transcend the boundary of their founding location.

Nigeria, a country with dominating Muslim population also hosts the high presence of some of these Islamic movements. Ahmadiyyah group is the first transnational Islamic movement that penetrated Nigeria, with high patronage of Muslim elites from the Yoruba Southern Nigeria.<sup>3</sup> From the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century which marked the beginning of significant presence of Muslim

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<sup>1</sup> Nafiu Ahmed Arikewuyo, "A Comparative Study of Revivalist Da'wah Approach of Salafiyyah and Muslim Brotherhood Oriented Groups in Yorubaland" (ProQuest, 2019), 2.

<sup>2</sup> G Imtiaz, "Transnational Islamic Networks," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 880 (2010), 902.

<sup>3</sup> Musa Adeniyi, "Islamic Movements in Yorubaland" (University of Ilorin, 1992), 57.

Brotherhood orientation and Saudi's Salafism preachers, the influence of Ahmadiyyah in Yorubaland began to diminish to the barest minimum.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the most popular and dominating transnational Islamic movements in Nigeria including its Southern Muslim part, Yorubaland, are the modern Salafism and Muslim Brotherhood. It is worthy of note, that Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism are not available in the country as a registered name, it is apparent they significantly influence the orientation of modern Muslims in the region. However, its arrival occurred within an already active Islamic landscape characterized by existing religious and intellectual connections across the region. Earlier Islamic orders and scholarly exchanges had long created cross-border ties that linked West African Muslims through learning and pilgrimage. The Ahmadiyyah movement introduced a new organizational form and reformist outlook that distinguished it from earlier networks, reflecting the growing influence of modernity and education among Yoruba Muslims. Its emergence thus represents a continuation and transformation of transnational Islamic engagement rather than its absolute beginning.

Against this background, this study assesses the influence of transnational Islamic movements over religious polemics among Muslims in Yorubaland of Nigeria. The study is limited, due to the divergence of Muslim movements in the region, to Salafism and Muslim Brotherhood oriented groups in Yorubaland.

Previous studies have heavily focused on the influence of transnational Islamic movements across the world. Imtiaz traces the network of Islamic movements with a submission that, transnational factors essentially determined the evolution of Islamic thought over the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>5</sup> Oliver argues that the transnational Islamic movements are all motivated by political factors; hence, their labeling as political Islam by Western

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<sup>4</sup> Arikewuyo, "A Comparative Study of Revivalist Da'wah Approach of Salafiyyah and Muslim Brotherhood Oriented Groups in Yorubaland", 212.

<sup>5</sup> Imtiaz, "Transnational Islamic Networks", 902.

researchers.<sup>6</sup> He also classified all the contemporary transnational Islamic movements into three geographic and cultural tendencies, namely the Sunni-Arab Middle East movements, the Sunni Indian Sub-continent movements, and the Irano-Arab Shiite.<sup>7</sup> Karen on his part focused his research on the influence of these movements in the Muslim West.<sup>8</sup> In the same vein, Gonda and others situate their research scope on the transnational movements in Indonesia, with a conclusion that, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood, Jama'at Islamiyyah and Shiism are the dominant movements with feature of rivalry and grudges.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Ridwan accounts for the negative influence of Salafi transnational movement in souring the peaceful relation that has long existed between Muslims and non-Muslims of Papua locality in Indonesia.<sup>10</sup>

Coming down to Nigeria, previous studies have addressed some areas concerning the present attempt. For instance, Adeniyi submitted that transnational Islamic movements have to a very large extent influenced the establishment and activities of virtually all the pioneer Muslim organizations in Nigeria.<sup>11</sup> Oladimeji traces the evolution and development of Jama'ah Tabligh in Nigeria.<sup>12</sup> Arikewuyo studies the development of Salafism and Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups in Yorubaland of Nigeria.<sup>13</sup> In another study, Arikewuyo examines the impact of Salafism and

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<sup>6</sup> Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1994), 31.

<sup>7</sup> Roy, 42.

<sup>8</sup> Karen Leonard, "Transnational and Cosmopolitan Forms of Islam in the West," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 8 (2009), 176–199

<sup>9</sup> Yumitro Gonda, Elfatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam, and Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri, "Proposed Development Models Of Islamic Movements In Post Reformation Indonesia," *Al-Tabrir* 20, no. 2 (2020): 231–50.

<sup>10</sup> Ridwan, "Transnationalism and Transnational Islam In Indonesia With Special Emphasis on Papua," *International Journal of Interreligious and Intercultural Studies* 2, no. 2 (2019): 44.

<sup>11</sup> Adeniyi, "Islamic Movements in Yorubaland", 67

<sup>12</sup> L F Oladimeji, "Jama'atu Tabligh in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective," *Ad-Dirayah International Journal of Islamic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2012), 67.

<sup>13</sup> Nafiu Ahmed Arikewuyo, "Emergence and Development of Islamic Revivalist Trend in Yorubaland of Nigeria," *Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities* 7, no. 2 (2022), 145.

Muslim Brotherhood on Muslims in Nigeria.<sup>14</sup> Adeyemi studies the development of Shiism in Nigeria, with emphasis on its threat to security situation in the North Central region of Nigeria.<sup>15</sup>

The present study aims to focus on a specific area of influence wielded by transnational Islamic movements over the Muslims in Yorubaland, which is religious controversy and polemics. The methodology adopted is qualitative and descriptive, whereby the outcome and results of the study will heavily rely on actual phenomena and occurrences documented through personal interview and observation, and also through published works produced by the concerned figures in the discourse.

### **Transnational Islamic Movements: An Overview**

Sequel to the fall of the Islamic caliphate, the Muslim *Ummah* was traumatized for the first time in its history by losing the universal umbrella under which shade it got comfort. The Caliphate means a lot to the *Ummah* for the great roles it played in preserving and defending the dignity of Islam. It also served as the official representative of the *Ummah* in international relations. It was also the umbrella under which the unity of Muslim *Ummah* was preserved. With its fall, the *Ummah* remains without a spokesman and acceptable representative; Muslims also experienced unprecedented disintegration and disunity because of the absence of a universal leader as represented by the Caliphate, and most unfortunate, the *Ummah*, as a result of this incidence, was exposed and subjected to humiliation and hullabaloo. The attempts by Muslims to reclaim the Caliphate gave birth to the Islamic movement.<sup>16</sup>

*Al-Harakat al-Islāmiyyah* also used interchangeably for *Al-Jamā'at al-Islāmiyyah* (Islamic societies) are movements that emerged

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<sup>14</sup> Arikewuyo, "A Comparative Study of Revivalist Da'wah Approach of Salafiyyah and Muslim Brotherhood Oriented Groups in Yorubaland", 278.

<sup>15</sup> Waliyullah Adeyemi, "A Critical Study of the Shiite Doctrines and Practices in North Central Nigeria" (Kwara State University, 2024).

<sup>16</sup> Arikewuyo, "A Comparative Study of Revivalist Da'wah Approach of Salafiyyah and Muslim Brotherhood Oriented Groups in Yorubaland", 70.

after the loss of the caliphate. They are aimed at returning the Muslims to their lost glory.<sup>17</sup> Qardāwī has given a wide and technical definition for the Islamic movement when he asserts that, 'Islamic movement is a popular, collective and organized struggle aimed at bringing back Islamic values to the fore of leading the society and influencing all spheres of human endeavours.<sup>18</sup> One of the major areas of disagreement between revivalist groups and traditional Muslim scholars in Yorubaland concerns the use of talismans and spiritual objects. Revivalist groups often regard such practices as religious innovations that contradict Islamic principles, while many traditional scholars view them as part of established cultural expressions of faith and healing. This divergence illustrates not only a theological disagreement but also a broader contest over religious authority and interpretation. The tension between these perspectives reveals how local customs and reformist ideals continue to shape the expression of Islam in Yoruba society and how religious authenticity becomes a subject of ongoing negotiation among believers.

Historically, the genesis of the Islamic movement was traced to Jamāl al-Dīn Al-Afghānī (d. 1897CE), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905CE), and Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935CE) through the efforts of *'al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā* Magazine issued in Paris in 1884, which was followed by Rashīd Riḍā's *Manār* Magazine. The aims of the organized struggles of the aforementioned scholars were to combat the reigning colonialism, return Muslims to their lost glory, and actualize political reformation.<sup>19</sup> It is noteworthy that the foregoing struggles were before the total collapse of the caliphate. The full-fledged Islamic movements evolved soon after the fall of the *Khilāfah*. These were The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, *Al-Jamā'at al-Islāmiyyah* of Mawdūdī in Pakistan, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* (Liberation

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<sup>17</sup> Arikewuyo, 71.

<sup>18</sup> Yusuf Qardāwī, *Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn*, ed. 1 (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1999), 14.

<sup>19</sup> Māniū Al-Juhaniy, *Aṣ-Ṣaḥwat Al-Islāmiyyah* (Riyadh: Najo Commercial Printing Press Co, n.d.), 9.

Party) of Taqīyyudeen Nabhāni, and the revolutionary groups after the death of Sayyid Quṭb in 1968.<sup>20</sup> It is possible to group the contemporary Islamic movements into the following categories.<sup>21</sup>

- i. **Reformative Tendency Movements:** These include those Muslim groups whose intent is to reform the current state of Muslims by making effort at installing Islam in the spheres of human lives. The Muslim Brotherhood, *Al-Jamā'at Al-Islāmiyyah*, *Jamā'at Anṣār as-Sunnat al-Muhammadiyyah* and *Al-Jamā'at as-Salaḥiyyah Al-Kuwaitiyyah* are all examples of this category.
- ii. **Revolutionary Movements:** These are the groups that, through the aid of arms and revolution, believe that their missions can be accomplished. They include all *Jihadist* movements such as HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement), ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and TALIBAN (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan).
- iii. **Da'wah Group:** This represents *Jamā'at at-Tabligh* whose aim is majorly to call people to spiritual upliftment.

Roy in his division classified the transnational Islamic movements into three geographic and cultural tendencies, namely the Sunni-Arab Middle East movements, the Sunni Indian Sub-continent movements, and the Irano-Arab Shiite.<sup>22</sup> The common goals of the transnational Islamic movement, according to Imtiaz are: a call to fundamentalism to cleanse the society; anti-colonialism; anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism.<sup>23</sup> The modern Islamic movements have been credited with outstanding achievements, notably among them are the emergence of Islamic awakening and resurgence, a threat to autocratic rulers in Muslim nations, mobilization of youths for *Jihād* in Palestine, Afghanistan, and a

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<sup>20</sup> Al-Juhaniy, 23.

<sup>21</sup> Awad Qarni, *Aṣ-Ṣaḥwat Al-Islāmiyyah*, ed. 1 (Jeddah: Dārul Mujtama'i, 1990), 30.

<sup>22</sup> Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 57.

<sup>23</sup> Imtiaz, "Transnational Islamic Networks", 903.

threat to the western conspiracy.<sup>24</sup> The aforementioned achievements have subjected the Islamic movements to the campaign of calumny, molestation, and infringement on freedom of action by the mostly oppressing Arabia rulers and western governments.

It is worth of mentioning that there is confusion among Muslim writers about the *Salafyyah* being considered among the Islamic movements or otherwise, most especially in the contemporary time, when the majority of *Salafyyah* flag bearers are launching attacks on all Muslim societies and movements. The answer to this poser can only be premised on the notion that the concept of *Salafyyah* connotes an ideological trend that embraces various group heavily funded *Mandūbūn* (missionary) and philanthropic services.<sup>25</sup> Secondly, the decade saw the return of the first batch of Yoruba students from Saudi Universities, namely: the Islamic University of Madinah and Al-Imam University of Riyadh. The returnees had to practice some of what they had been taught. Prominent among those returnees were Shaykh Ameenullahi Ibrahim (Ilorin), Shaykh Hadiyyatullahi (Iwo), Shaykh Isa Ameen (Lagos), and Dr. Khidr (Abeokuta). Thirdly, the first mention of *Salafyyah* and the negative reaction by the traditional scholars against the trend in Yorubaland began in the decade. Al-Ilori only made mention of the trend in 1978 and reacted to some issues which are the major themes of current *Salafyyah*, such as *Tawassul* (intercession) *Istighāthah* (seeking the help of the saints), and polemics on *Taşawwuf* (mysticism).<sup>26</sup> In fact, he even described the adherents of *Salafyyah* as products and allies of the Muslim World League and *Dārul-Iftāi* which were the main channels used by the Saudi kingdom to reach out to the Muslim world.<sup>27</sup> Another negative reaction to the *Salafyyah* trend was also the book published

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<sup>24</sup> Al-Juhaniy, *Aṣ-Ṣaḥwat Al-Islamiyyah*, 15 – 24.

<sup>25</sup> Al-Juhaniy.

<sup>26</sup> Adam Abdullah Al-Ilori, *Tanjih Ad-Da'wah Wad-Du'at*, ed. 3 (Mushin: Daaru-N-Nuur Printing Company, 2006), 8.

<sup>27</sup> Al-Ilori.

by Shaykh Aliu Jabata in 1978. The author sought to refute the allegation of the new adherents of *Salafīyyah* against the tenet of Sufism.<sup>28</sup> He got the approval of Shaykh Adam who gave forward to the book. It is glaring from the above that 70s was the premier stage or starting point for the teachings of *Salafīyyah* in Yorubaland. The characteristic feature of the trend at that time was that *Salafīyyah* was being practiced individually and surreptitiously due to the strength and popularity of Sufism among the people in Yorubaland. In addition, the adherents were youths who could not dare the authority of their teachers. Hence, the majority of the first batch of Saudi returnees later resorted to the traditional *Sufi* scholarship.<sup>29</sup> The only few who could endure the stigma attached to being a *Salafi* by society were the ones whose names shine currently among the adherents of *Salafīyyah*. Many had gone with the winds.

In the 80s, there was enhanced awareness about the trend of *Salafīyyah* due to the increasing number of Yoruba students returning from Saudi Universities. But in this stage, there was a strong un-noticeable mix-up between the trend of *Ikhwān* and *Salafīyyah*. This can be explained in the sense that the University system in Saudi was at this time under the unchecked influence and power of the Muslim Brotherhood-trained scholars who often trained students with movementalist thought.<sup>30</sup> Hence, in the 80s, most Saudi graduates who returned to Yorubaland were products of merged *Salafīyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood. The mix-up was later uncovered towards the beginning of the twenty-first century when the literature of *Salafīyyah* countering the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood began to troop into the region. Thus, in the 80s, both advocates of Muslim Brotherhood methodology and *Salafīyyah* ideology were representing the *Salafīyyah* trend, but the

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<sup>28</sup> *Raf'u Ash-Shububāt*, n.d.

<sup>29</sup> Nafiu Ahmed Arikewuyo, "Personal Interview with Shaykh 'Abdul Mu'min Onisin," 2018.

<sup>30</sup> Husām Tamām, *Al-Ikhwān al Muslimūn*, ed. 1 (Cairo: Dar Ash-Shuruq, 2012), 108.

title of *Ahl as-Sunnah wal Jamā'ah* was the dominating adopted tag. The major characteristic feature in this stage was that neither the conservative Muslims nor the representatives of *the Salafīyyah* trend, as it was then, could fathom the difference between the ideology of the contemporary *Salafīyyah* group and the Muslim Brotherhood. They stood for a uniform mission which was to revive the way and methodology of the Prophet and his noble companions in a society highly dominated by syncretic faith. It should be noted that even in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, only a few in the 80s could also make a distinction between the two trends before the ideological and political polemics of the 1991 gulf war.

*Salafīyyah* continued with the title of *Ahl as-Sunnah* without any distinct identity from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 90s up to the beginning of the twenty-first century when the dichotomy of *Salafīyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood began to be heating up in Yorubaland. Two factors were responsible for this development. First was the influence of foreign literature produced by the polemics that ensued after the gulf war. The kinds of literature which contained the 'refutation' and 'exposition' of the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood by Shaykh Rabīcu al- Madkhalī -led scholars had a great influence on the thoughts of the new emerging *Salafī* youths in Yorubaland as from the beginning of the twenty-first century. Also, some aggrieved members of the Muslim Brotherhood-oriented organizations who differed with their leaders over some matters of religion saw in the new emerging *Salafīyyah* a relief and platform through which they could register their grievances and contention.<sup>31</sup> Hence, the beginning of the twenty-first century marked the separation of the Muslim Brotherhood faction of *Ahl as-Sunnah* from the contemporary *Salafīyyah* faction.

Currently, *Salafīyyah* groups have become one of the most formidable and influential groups in Yorubaland with a large rate of

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<sup>31</sup> Examples of such people were *Asātidhab* Ibrahim Oganija, Fatai Sarumi, Abdur-Rauf Bello, Ibn Raji and Abdulmu'min Eleyinla.

mosques under their control, a great number of scholars and advocates, large followers, and extensive programs on the radio/television stations and other social platforms.

The first contact of any Yoruba Muslim to the call of the Muslim Brotherhood was in 1949 when Shaykh Adam Al-Ilori (d. 1992) visited the founder of the Brotherhood in Cairo shortly before his death.<sup>32</sup> One cannot confidently assert with the visit that Al-Ilori was initiated into the apparatus of the group, but it is glaring that the contact had an influence and bearing on the subsequent missionary journeys he had. One of those traces is visible in the first work published by Al-Ilori after his return from Cairo. He strongly advocated in that work for a total reversal from the status quo in the practice of Islam and inscribed the *Al-Waṣāyā al-ʿAsbr* (Ten admonitions) by Al-Bannā at the end of the work.<sup>33</sup>

Another influence of that sojourn on Al-Ilori is that, somewhat in the 60s of last century, he was a party to the creation and operation of a Brotherhood's apparatus for recruiting youths in Nigeria under the auspices of Kamil Sharīf, Jordan Ambassador to Nigeria at that time and a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, who led one of the military battalions in the 1948 Palestine – Israel war. Al-Ilori contributed to the success of the Brotherhood training apparatus in Nigeria by sending some of his direct students to partake in the training exercise. Prominent among them were Dr. Mu'min Omolaja who asserted that they were being trained by one Engineer Abdul Mucti Bahjat in 1967.<sup>34</sup>

From all indications, it is obvious that Al-Ilori could not commit all efforts to the sustenance of the apparatus due to factors unknown to us, but probably it appears that the task of spreading the knowledge of Arabic education which was then scanty in Yorubaland was too noble to al-Ilori more than any revivalist thought, the implementation of which was not only ripe, it might

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<sup>32</sup> Adam Abdullahi Al-Ilori, *Ad-Dīn an-Nasḥab*, n.d., 44.

<sup>33</sup> Al-Ilori.

<sup>34</sup> AbdulMu'min Yusuf Omolaja, *Qadhāif Al-Haqq*, ed. 1 (Agege: Islamic Cultural Press, 2011), 53.

also not be relevant to the local setting of his. Hence, the attempt to launch a Brotherhood apparatus in Nigeria was not sustainable due to the lack of a local mouthpiece that could endure the stress thereof. However, the Brotherhood training apparatus in the 60s had the credit of exposing the trained youths to the new trend in modern Islamic thought. It also served as an instrument for those youths to link with Brotherhood apparatus outside Nigeria as some of them with the established orientation they had had before traveling to Saudi Arabia for the study were easily conscripted into the structure of the *Ikhwān* at the kingdom.<sup>35</sup>

Among those who might be tipped to have built on the training of the 60s in linking with the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood scholars were Shaykh Mustapha Zhuglul (d. 2017) and Shaykh Abdur-Razzaq, Iwo. The former was reputable to the international apparatus of *Ikhwān* and has been recommended by it for Shaykh Abdulfatai Thāni who was among the flag bearers of the full-fledged apparatus of the *Ikhwān* in Yorubaland.<sup>36</sup>

It should be noted that the foregoing account only indicates the traces of the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yorubaland. The advent of a full-fledged and organized structure for the Muslim Brotherhood in Yorubaland was at the beginning of the 80s of the 20th century. It took two various forms. Before 1980, the Muslim Brotherhood had formed an unofficial structure and apparatus at various university campuses in Saudi Arabia. The structures assumed the platforms upon which foreign students, including Nigerians, were being trained. Virtually all the students from Yorubaland who were students in the 70s and 80s were produced by this system.<sup>37</sup> In 1980, there was an initiative of forming a similar Brotherhood structure in Yorubaland by the students who thought that it would not be

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<sup>35</sup> Omolaja.

<sup>36</sup> Nafiu Ahmed Arikewuyo, "Personal Interview with Shaykh Dhikrullahi Shafi'i (A Founding Member of TMC)," 2018.

<sup>37</sup> Nafiu Ahmed Arikewuyo, "Personal Interview with Prof. Qaasim Badmaasi (Founding Father of Tadāmun)," 2018.

proper that the religious zeal in them should die after returning home. Hence, they converged at Madinah in 1980 to inaugurate a Brotherhood structure that would serve as a uniform platform of *Da'wah* in Yorubaland for the returning graduates. The name *Tadamun al-Muslimin* was adopted. Prominent among those who were present at the inauguration were now Professor Sulaiman Rabi'u, Professor Ade Bello, Professor Yushau Sadiq, Professor Zubair AbdulQādir, and Dr. Qasim Badamasi, Dr. Rashid AbdulAzeez, Dr. Sirajudeen al-Asra' and a host of others.<sup>38</sup>

The second form through which the advent of the Muslim Brotherhood structure got its way to Yorubaland is that at the heel of the 1979 Iranian revolution. There was a wide acceptance and the inclination of Muslim youths and students to the thought of the Islamic movement which was at the forefront of advocacy for the revolution. The success of the revolution has sold out the twin thoughts of the *Shi'ah* and Muslim Brotherhood to the zealot youths. Hence, the books on the two trends constituted the hotcakes in the consumption market. The Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) paid host to the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood from the beginning of the 80s.<sup>39</sup>

The ideological tendency of the Muslim Brotherhood in the MSSN was fanned by the arrival of Shaykh Abdulfattahi Thāni to society in 1985. Thāni was trained by the Ikhwān structure in Kuwait. The training of Kuwait was different from the Brotherhood training of Saudi in three ways: first, freedom and independence characterized the training of Kuwait, unlike that of Saudi which was operating in secrecy. Also, the Kuwaiti apparatus of the Ikhwān was the platform of elites and political leaders who at then had control over various international organizations for Muslim youths, such as the Islamic World Federation of Student Organizations (IWFSO). The MSSN was

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<sup>38</sup> Arikewuyo.

<sup>39</sup> Nafiu Ahmed Arikewuyo, "Personal Interview with Dr. Luqman Abdur-Rahim (Amīr National Headquarter of The Muslim Congress)," 2018.

also under the organization. Another difference was that the Saudi training was a merge of Salafiyyah elements with Brotherhood thought, while that of Kuwait was devoid of any Salafi element.<sup>40</sup> Hence, Abdulfattahi Thāni's major mission from Kuwait was to launch and inaugurate a full-fledged Brotherhood apparatus in Yorubaland, using the already established structure of MSSN. He had been empowered fully with the control over Baytu Zakat and Jamciyyat cAbdullahi Nuri Al-Khayriyyah (Abdullahi Nuri Philanthropic foundation) which would be used to fund and mobilize interested students. The mission was resisted by some members of MSSN who didn't want the society which is an umbrella body for all Muslim students regardless of their affiliation to turn into a platform for recruiting members for a foreign ideology.<sup>41</sup> Hence, the commitment of Abdulfattah Thāni to realizing his mission through the instrumentality of the Islamic Centre of Nigeria which he established, and the resistance of some members of MSSN marked the beginning of an un-ending crisis within the society. In 1994, those members of MSSN who were convinced by the training brought by Thāni converged in Lagos to take off an organization with the title of The Muslim Congress (TMC). Gidado has considered The Muslim Congress as one of the secessionist groups from the Muslim Students' Society.<sup>42</sup>

It is deducible from the above that there are two factions of the Muslim Brotherhood apparatus in Yorubaland, namely: the Saudi and the Kuwaiti apparatuses. However, unlike the *Salafiyyah* factions, they are not hostile to each other and are very cordial. Thus, they went into a merger in 2011 with

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<sup>40</sup> Arikewuyo, "Personal Interview with Shaykh Dhikrullahi Shafi'i (A Founding Member of TMC)."

<sup>41</sup> Arikewuyo.

<sup>42</sup> Taofiq Miqdad Gidado, "New Trends Among Muslim Youths in Nigeria: The Muslim Students Society of Nigeria as a Case Study" (University of Ilorin, 1997), 65.

the two other apparatuses of the *Ikhwān* in the Northern part, namely: the *Tajdid* in Kano and *Jamā'at al-Muslimīn* in Sokoto.<sup>43</sup>

It is worthy of note that besides the Organization of *Tadāmūn al-Muslimīn* and The Muslim Congress which are the affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood's main international apparatus, there are also organizations in Yorubaland that belong to the orientation of the *Ikhwān* both in ideology and methodology. They include The Islamic Movement (TIM), Jamācat Tacawunu al- Muslimeen (JTM), and the Islamic Youth Organization (IYO)

From the above discussion, it is apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood-oriented organizations in Yorubaland are of two categories: the affiliate and the influenced. The affiliate comprises Organizations of *Tadāmūn al-Muslimīn* (OTM) and The Muslim Congress (TMC), while the influence comprises The Islamic Movement (TIM), Jamācat Tacāwun al-Muslimīn (JTM), and the Islamic Youth Organization (IYO).

### **Influence of Salafiyyah and Muslim Brotherhood on Religious Polemics in Yorubaland**

The religious polemics evoked by the advent and spread of *Salafiyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups in Yorubaland can be categorized into three, namely: polemics between the Muslim Brotherhood and *Salafiyyah* groups against the traditional Muslims, polemics between the *Salafiyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood groups against each other and polemics among the *Salafiyyah* groups against one another.

The polemics maintained by the two revivalist groups against the traditional Muslims include the condemnation of leading *Şufi Tariqah*, namely the *Qādiriyyah* and the *Tijāniyyah* orders, condemnation of the talisman being practiced by Muslim scholars, *Fidāu* prayer for the deceased Muslim, disapproving the mode of kneeling and prostration while

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<sup>43</sup> Arikewuyo, "Personal Interview with Shaykh Dhikrullahi Shafi'i (A Founding Member of TMC)."

greeting, the mode of calculating '*Aqiqah* (birthday ritual) and syncretism.

Before the advent of the two revivalist groups, there was no record of any polemics over the legitimacy of *Şufi* orders among the traditional Muslims, for they were all likely to be of *Şufi* methodology.<sup>44</sup> The Islamic awakening which stresses the necessity of returning to the way Islam was being professed by the early Muslims has made the groups discover fundamental heresies and un-Islamic vices in the existing *Şufi* orders. Among the vices in the *Tijāniyyah* order that provoked polemics over it by the revivalist groups are giving priority to *Şalāt al-fātiḥ* above the Qur'ān and above the prophetic prescribed *Şalātul Ibrahimiyyah*,<sup>45</sup> spreading white cloth while doing *Wathīfah* (congregational supplication) with the intention that Prophet would bounce on it, marrying more than four wives as done by some of the *Tijāniyyah Ibrahimiyyah* scholars, looking down on the prophetic traditions with the claim of *Bātinīyyah* (esoteric), placing Shaykh Ahmad Tijani and Shaykh Ibrahim Inyas above the companions of Prophet, and in a very rare circumstance, some members of *Tijāniyyah* do place the duo above Prophet Muhammad;<sup>46</sup> veneration of the graves of the 'saints', and most especially, supplicating and seeking assistance from the *Mashāyikh* (*Şufi* scholars).

The *Qadiriyyah* Order too shares in some of the vices of *Tijāniyyah* but is peculiar with using drums and dancing in pure ritual activities. The issues raised above by the revivalist groups are responsible for the massive withdrawal of many adherents from the *Şufi* Orders. The vast majority of the transnational groups in Yorubaland were former members of both *Şufi* Orders. Although, there is still a large proportion of adherents

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<sup>44</sup> Al-Ilori, *Tanjih Ad-Da'wah Wad-Du'at*.

<sup>45</sup> Al-Ilori.

<sup>46</sup> The researcher has listened before to some *Tijāniyyah* members in Lagos State upholding that.

for the Şufi Orders in Yorubaland, the set-back created by the denunciation of a high number of members who have seen comfort in the new emerging revivalist trends could not be ignored.

Condemnation of Talisman which remains the biggest source of fetching money for the traditional scholars is also a serious polemic created by the calls of the two revivalist groups. It is undisputed by the agreement of Muslim scholars that talisman is unislamic, but, unfortunately, it was imported into Yorubaland together with Islam as asserted by Al-Ilori.<sup>47</sup> The prophetic tradition that provides that love charms and hung amulets are forms of polytheism has closed down any argument over the propriety of talismans.<sup>48</sup> Hence, the polemics over talisman is only an expression of grudge between the truth and falsehood.

*Fidāu* prayer which is the act of organizing three or seven days of prayer, as the case may be for the deceased, is often characterized by ostentatious celebration and has been institutionalized by the traditional scholars in Yorubaland.<sup>49</sup> Although, the practice had been condemned by some Yoruba scholars such as Shaykh Baqi, Iwo, and Shaykh Muritala AbdulSalam, Ibadan before the advent of the revivalist groups, it has recently transformed into a powerful religious polemics with the strong condemnation of the act both in word and practice by the *Salafīyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood oriented groups. The main argument of the revivalist groups is that it is unanimously admitted, as also upheld by the traditional scholars, that observing supplication for the deceased is commendable in Islam, but the manner in it is being done, as represented by *Fidāu* prayer, has no antecedent in the history of

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<sup>47</sup> Adam Abdullahi Al-Ilori, *Nasim Aş-Şabā Fi Akhbār Al-Islām* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2014), 36.

<sup>48</sup> Ahmad Hanbali, *Al-Musnad*, ed. 3 (Cairo: Darr as-Sunnah, 2009), 308.

<sup>49</sup> Adam Abdullahi Al-Ilori, *Al-Islām Wa Taqālid Al-Jāhiliyyah* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2012), 86.

Islam and records of the classical books in Islam. If it were to be religiously sanctioned, it would have been better applied to the Prophet and his guided companions. There is no gain-saying in the fact that how *Fidān* is being organized in Yorubaland alludes to the fusion of pre-Islamic Yoruba cultural practices with Islam. Furthermore, the word *Fidān* was never known to the Muslim jurists as with the meaning attached to it by the Yoruba traditional scholars.<sup>50</sup>

The mode of greeting is another polemic that ensued between the revivalist groups and the traditional scholars. Although, the Ahmadiyyah movement was preceded by condemning kneeling and prostration while greeting, the wide spread of the revivalist groups in Yorubaland more than the Ahmadiyyah gives the subject a wider audience. Furthermore, Al-Ilori and Al-Adabi who were the greatest traditional scholars of Yorubaland in their time have also condemned the act, though not fundamentally as did the current revivalist groups. The traditional scholars argue that Qur'ān narrates that the angels were commanded to do so for Adam; the brothers of Prophet Yusuf also did so as reported by the Qur'ān and that it is a cultural practice done in honor of fellow human being and not to worship him. The aforementioned arguments have all been refuted by Al-Ilori who submitted that the act of previous religions does not apply to Muslims if there is ample evidence in *Shari'ah* for the act.<sup>51</sup> The current revivalist groups have quoted the views of virtually all the Muslim scholars spread across the past and current on the issue and submitted that there is a conventional position by scholars against the practice.<sup>52</sup> Hence, according to them, kneeling and prostration while greeting are not allowed in Islam.

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<sup>50</sup> The Qur'ān uses it with the meaning of ransom to be tendered by the war captive to liberate himself See Q47:4.

<sup>51</sup> Al-Ilori, *Al-Islām Wa Taqālid Al-Jābiliyyah*, 67.

<sup>52</sup> Abdulfattahi Sarumi, *Hukm Al-Inbināi 'Inda Tahjiyyah*, ed. 1 (Ilorin: Bi-iznillahi Ventures, 2009), 43.

The Muslim scholars agreed that seven days are to be counted for identifying the exact day for birthday ritual activities but disagreed over the mode of counting.<sup>53</sup> The traditional scholars have upheld the view of the Maliki school of thought which opines that the counting is made in exclusion of the delivery day.<sup>54</sup> The revivalist groups are convinced with the view of the majority of Muslim schools of thought which say that the calculation is made with the inclusion of delivery day.<sup>55</sup> Hence, the issue gathers controversy and polemics between the traditional and revivalist scholars in Yorubaland. It is however worthy of note that some *Salafiyyah* scholars have called for calmness on this matter, holding that the two views are not heretic as the matter is only a juristic one with a record of ancient polemics. Among those scholars are Shaykh Abdulwahrāb Ajia and Dr. Jamiu Abdulwahrāb Elehin.<sup>56</sup> Hence, their call for caution is very appealing and convincing.

One of the peculiarities of the profession of Islam by the Yoruba Muslims is syncretism. It is getting to the extreme that daily prayer is the only apparent feature that differentiates some Yoruba Muslims and their scholars from the unbelievers. The aspects which much attract syncretism are therapy, medicine, doctrine, and culture. Some of the modes of practicing therapy by Yoruba are giving sacrifice to the demons, seeking the pleasure of evil eyes through presenting a prescribed item to them on a popular roundabout road, and reciting an un-Islamic incantation. All the afore-mentioned practices have been institutionalized by some Yoruba Alfas (scholars) popularly known as Onijalabis.<sup>57</sup> Although, the above practices do not constitute controversial matters in the transmitted literature of Islam as they remain the cultures of the

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<sup>53</sup> Abdulwahrāb Ajia, *Jawab 'an Sitti Masā'il* (n.p, n.d.), 38.

<sup>54</sup> Ajia.

<sup>55</sup> Ajia.

<sup>56</sup> Ajia.

<sup>57</sup> Al-Ilori, *Al-Islām Wa Taqalid Al-Jāhiliyyah*, 41.

unbelievers, it is very unfortunate that condemning them in Yorubaland by the revivalist groups and defending them by some traditional scholars have turned them to seem polemical in the eyes of the unconscious Muslims. Nevertheless, with the increasing rate of revivalist orientation in that vicinity, truth is fast becoming distinguishable from falsehood. The second category of polemics brought by the revivalist groups in Yorubaland is the one that exists between the *Salafīyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups against each other. The matters that have attracted polemics include *Bay'ah* (oath of allegiance), *Elegbe* and *Lajamacah* dichotomy, boycott, legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy, partisanship, and protest and demonstration.

The conventional practice among the Brotherhood-oriented groups is that the members of the high-ranked members give an oath of allegiance to their leader. The exercise, to them, indicates the expression of compulsory loyalty to a Muslim leader who is tasked with moving the wheel of Islamic struggles and controlling the affairs of his followers following the dictates of Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. They believe that such an act was conventional among the Muslims before the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, and since then, Muslims are left with no overall leader that deserves allegiance other than the locally trusted leaders of struggling organizations that share the mission of the caliphate.

The *Salafīyyah* groups have condemned the act and described it as an emulation of the practice of the *Ṣūfīs* from whose *Mashāyikh* receive the oath of allegiance.<sup>58</sup> They maintained that only the state leader is given that right under the *Shari'ah* and that such practice indicates the non-loyalty of the groups to the current constituted authority. While it is convincing that the practice of the Muslim Brotherhood groups

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<sup>58</sup> Abu Ibrahim Al-'Adnāni, *Al-Qutbiyyah*, ed. 1 (Cairo: Darul Munhaj, 2007), 219.

has given birth to a clash of loyalty and partisanship in the sense that every individual will give allegiance to the leader of his group, it will also be hypocritical to give such religious allegiance to the current authority who has vowed to defend the democracy. It has been stated before that according to many *Salafyyah* adherents, democracy is tantamount to *Kufr* (infidelity). It is also noteworthy that the practice of the Brotherhood groups is the negative fall-out of the loss of the caliphate. Be that as it may, one will always be loyal to the one with whom one shares a uniform mission, and giving an oath is just an expression of what we nurse in the mind.

Another heated polemic between the *Salafyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood groups in Yorubaland is the contention over the propriety of establishing Muslim organizations. The too much concentration by some groups of *Salafyyah* on attacking all the existing Muslim organizations and ignoring their unparalleled achievements has earned them the title of *La Jamacah* (anti-Muslim organizations) from their opponents. This group has interpreted the admonition of the Prophet on the division of the *Ummah* into seventy-three to mean that the Muslim organizations are covered by the seventy-two condemned sects. Shaykh Sulayman.

Amubieya of Ibadan and Muhammad Ali Jabata lead this trend. Although, other blocs within the camp argue that there is nothing wrong with the creation of Muslim organizations, their ideology, methodology, and creeds are what matter, all the *Lā Jamacah* groups believe there is no Muslim organization in Yorubaland that measure up to the scrutiny of current *Salafyyah*. Hence, this *Salafyyah* group wages war against the smooth-running and noble missions of those Muslim organizations. They referred to the members of the organizations, their leaders, and sympathizers as *Elegbe* (partisan elements).

The *Elegbe* scholars have argued that in a multi-religious nation such as Nigeria, the organizational platform remains the

only means to fight for the right of Muslims. They added that the Brotherhood groups in Yorubaland do not have any ideological peculiarity which can justify grouping them under the heretic sects. The attacks of the *La Jamacah* on the Elegbe groups have constituted the biggest challenge to the latter as expressed by the various leaders of the organizations in the interviews conducted with them. The latter has lost many members to the former.

*Muqāṭacah* (boycott) of products linked to America Israel funded companies such as CocaCola by some Brotherhood-oriented groups such as The Muslim Congress is another polemic between them and the *Salafīyyah* groups in Yorubaland. The former has followed the verdict of some current scholars that have confirmed the veracity of sponsoring and funding the unjust Israel war against Palestine by the money accruing from the sale of some products, it is incumbent on Muslims not to partake in destroying their brothers through affording those products. The *Salafīyyah* groups have labeled them with this act and argued that what *Shari'ah* has made lawful cannot be forbidden on account of human interpretation.

Showing love and loyalty to the Saudi monarchy has been a major feature in the current *Salafīyyah* groups while expressing grudge and opposition to her has been known with the Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups in Yorubaland. It should be noted that the most influential scholars of the *Salafīyyah* groups in Yorubaland are very loyal to the monarchy and such loyalty has been taken as hallmarks of adopting the ideology of current *Salafīyyah*. Hence, speaking against the tyranny of the monarchy is a hallmark of being an advocate of *Ikhwān* orientation to them. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood groups in Yorubaland have always reiterated the religious implication of Saudi's tie with the western powers and her shortcomings in the case of the Palestine war. They regard the ideology of current *Salafīyyah* groups which states that ultimate silence should be maintained against the seeming

tyranny of the monarchy and other governments as the influence of new religious interpretation funded and dictated by the monarchy.<sup>59</sup> Hence, this matter remains one of the heated political polemics among the groups.

The allegation of *Ḥizbiyyah* (partisanship) against the Brotherhood-oriented groups by the *Salafīyyah* groups in Yorubaland is another polemic existing between them. According to the *Salafīyyah* groups, partisanship which entails giving priority and preference to fellow members in a group has been part and parcel of the methodology of the Brotherhood groups. They alleged that one is not qualified to marry a member of those organizations except if one is also a member. In my interview with the leaders of the various Brotherhood-oriented groups in Yorubaland, it is glaring that the allegation has been exaggerated. The leaders did not disguise that priority in marriage is always given to the person in which one has confidence, as that is the conventional practice in all groups, including the *Salafīyyah* groups, which does not suggest banning marriage of their members with outsiders. They boasted of a large number of females of their *Jamā'ah* who has been happily married to other groups. My finding further shows that the group leaders though have negative attitudes toward their members to getting married to *Salafīyyah* groups, it is apparently due to their previous bitter experiences where many of their trained ladies have been turned against them by their *Salafīyyah* husbands. Such fear is very natural as no one will be comfortable favoring his sworn enemy.

It is however worthy of note that traces of partisanship are more featured in some *Salafīyyah* groups as their nepotism surpasses the level of marital ties to ruling out the knowledge and piety of all non-*Salafī* scholars throughout the ages. The Brotherhood groups have often been open to the intellectual wits of non-Brotherhood scholars. It is thus revealing that no

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<sup>59</sup> Al-'Adnāni, 218.

group is spared from the bondage of partisanship, though with relative disparity.

Protest and demonstrations are another polemic and controversy evoked by the ideology of *Salafīyyah* and Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups in Yorubaland. According to the former, protest falls within the realm of challenging the authority of the leaders, and such is condemnable in *Shari'ah*. The latter argues that it rather falls within the realm of correcting the leaders which is a commendable act. The former responds by holding that correcting the leaders can only be done privately and not publicly.<sup>60</sup> The latter responds by holding that correcting the leaders is also allowed to be done in public, most especially in a democratic dispensation where the leaders have given the right of doing so to their subjects.

The *Salafīyyah* groups are seen to be likely applying the rule given by foreign scholars to those aggressive rioters in Syria and other Arabia countries ravaged by the political crisis to the Nigerian situation. Such an application will be very wrong considering the context under which the rule is given. Protesting in a bid to overthrow a sitting leader is quite different from expressing one's displeasure over a policy in a peaceful manner guaranteed by the constitution of the land. Hence, application and contextualization remain the bone of contention between the two groups on this matter.

The third category of polemics invited by the advent of the revivalist groups into Yorubaland is the one among various *Salafīyyah* groups. The matters which have attracted polemics among them include the propriety of participating in voting, the legal status of bowing to greet and *Bid'ah*, collaborating with the non-*Salafis*, and verdicts on the members of Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups.

On the propriety of voting in a democratic system, some *Salafī* groups led by Dr. Sharafudeen Raji, Shaykh Abdul

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<sup>60</sup> Yusuf Qardāwī, *Fatāwā Mu'āsirah* (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islami, 2002), 723.

Ganiy Jumat, and Shaykh Sarumi have ruled that it is unlawful, for democracy is un-Islamic. Other *Salafi* groups led by Prof. Abdur-Razzaq Alaro and Shaykh Abdulwahhāb Ajia have argued that it is lawful in a multi-religious nation such as Nigeria where the boycott of the exercise by Muslims will bring political and economic disaster to the *Ummah*.<sup>61</sup> Hence, the *Salafīyyah* groups in Yorubaland are polarized over this matter.

Although all the various *Salafīyyah* factions in Yorubaland are unanimous that bowing to greet is condemnable, they are at the loggerhead over the act being *Ḥaram* (forbidden) or a *Shirk* (disbelieving act). While the *Jabatīyyah* faction firmly holds that doing the act brings one out of the fold of Islam, others believe it is only forbidden. The judgment of *Jabatīyyah* on this matter emanates from failure to differentiate between *Sujūd al-ʿIbādah* (bowing to worship) and *Sujūd at-Taḥīyyah* (bowing to greet). The Muslims are unanimous on the verdict of the former while they differ over the latter.<sup>62</sup>

In the same direction, all the *Salafīyyah* groups do not differ over the condemnation of *Bidʿah* (innovation), but they disagree over its legal status of it. The *Jabatīyyah* has advocated that all singular innovations in Islam bring one out of the fold of Islam. They relied on the prophetic tradition that portrays all innovation as misguidance and the last phrase has been interpreted by the group to mean disbelieving. Worst of it is that this group never makes a distinction between controversial heresy from unequivocal one in that assumption. Hence, one can be easily declared as an un-believer for merely using the rosary to pray – according to the way of *Jabatīyyah*. It is indisputable that there is neither mentor nor antecedent for this group in the history of *Salafīyyah*. This matter remains the fundamental dichotomy between *Jabatīyyah* and all *Salafīyyah* groups, not only in Yorubaland but throughout the globe.

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<sup>61</sup> The researcher was present in the venue when the duo gave the verdict.

<sup>62</sup> Nafiu Ahmad Jawhari, *Shubuhātun Ḥawla As-Sujūd*, n.d, 5.

Other *Salafiyyah* groups are of the view that religious innovations are of different categories and implications. Their position remains the true representation of what the *Salafiyyah* literature contains.

Collaborating with non-*Salafi* Muslims by attending their public lectures or giving them invitations is another serious polemic wrecking the *Salafiyyah* groups in Yorubaland. The vast majority of them firmly believe in the content of the classical *Salafiyyah* works wherein it is stipulated that non-*Salafis* should not be encouraged to perpetrate their heretic practices. Based on this, the application of those texts by them is that there is no room for religious collaboration with non-*Salafis* except in case of necessity.<sup>63</sup> The belief is so deep that some extremists among them have got to the level of declaring as non-*Salafis* those of their fellows who have acted against this literal application. This belief has been contested by the elders of *Salafiyyah* who, due to life experience and academic exposure, are compelled to collaborate with other Muslims in promoting the common mission of Islam, and their defiance of the assumed “principle” has attained them the title of *Dakātirah* faction by the over-zealot youths. The polemics over this matter brings one to the conclusion of dividing the current *Salafiyyah* groups in Yorubaland into open-minded and partisan *Salafiyyah*. It should be noted that the partisan *Salafiyyah* retains the largest proportion of adherents who are majorly inexperienced and over-zealot youths. The adherents of partisan *Salafiyyah* have declared all groups outside their fold as heretics, including the members of Muslim Brotherhood-oriented organizations in Yorubaland. The basis of their declaration is the polemics accounted for earlier on over *Baycah*, partisanship, lackadaisical attitude towards *Tawhīd*, and most especially, their collaborative

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<sup>63</sup> Lectures delivered by Jumat, Sarumi, Ejigbo and lanre Najimdeen. They can be accessed via the various whatsapp groups of *Salafiyyah* groups in Yorubaland.

tendency with other Muslims. The open-minded group within the *Salafīyyah* camp majorly occupied by the *Dakātirah*, as early mentioned, argued that being a member of an organization does not bring one out of the fold of *Salafīyyah* if there are no fundamental heresies committed.<sup>64</sup> The major reason for their contention is that while the open-minded group is looking at the concept of *Salafīyyah* with a broad sense devoid of current political influence, the partisan group narrow-mindedly restricts the concept to the understanding of some current *Salafīyyah* champions.

### **Conclusion**

The findings of this study show that transnational Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and *Salafīyyah* have played a central role in transforming the religious dynamics of Yorubaland. Their activities have introduced new forms of theological debate, organizational structures, and reformist discourse that have redefined relations among Muslim groups. The polemics that arise from these interactions reflect a complex process through which local Muslim communities reinterpret global Islamic ideas according to their social and cultural realities.

In conclusion, the influence of transnational Islamic movements in Yorubaland demonstrates how global Islamic trends continue to interact with indigenous religious traditions. These interactions have produced both renewal and division within the Muslim community. Addressing these differences with mutual respect and ethical engagement is essential to maintaining harmony and preventing ideological conflicts from developing into open confrontation.

However, it can be established from the previous discussion that religious polemics evoked by the transnational Islamic movements in Yorubaland involve fundamental and

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<sup>64</sup> Shaykh Muhammad al-Awwal Olalekan, "Lecture Delivery," in *Conference of As-Sunnah Academy of Da'wah and Research* (Ilorin, 2017).

subsidiary issues. The subsidiary issues at times become complicated due to partisan affiliation and identity. It is also obvious that the polemics have much contributed to mutual hatred, grudges and disunity among the concerned stakeholders. This kind of phenomena could be observed from the body language and style of presentation by the leaders and adherents of each group.

The study strongly recommends, in order forestalling the polemics generating into physical crises in the nearest future, the display of high level of ethics of disagreements among the traditional and the revivalist Muslims in Yorubaland as well as statutory regulation of religious practice by the concerned authorities.

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