

# The Politics of Power: Ridwan Kamil and the Dynamics of the 2024 Jakarta Election

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## Abstract

The 2024 Jakarta elections reflect the complexity of politics in Indonesia, where power is strategically used to maintain dominance. This paper aims to analyse the dynamics of power used by Ridwan Kamil, through the approach of Steven Lukes' (2005) three-dimensional view of power. Using a qualitative descriptive method based on a literature study, this study found that although Ridwan Kamil strategically utilizes the dimensions of Visible, Hidden and Invisible Power, public resistance hinders the effectiveness of this strategy. This confirms that in an increasingly elitist political system, the 2024 Jakarta election still proves that, as in democratic politics, power is not solely about elite dominance, but also a matter of legitimacy and public acceptance that cannot be fully controlled by political actors. However, it cannot be denied that the power struggle between elites will always continue to occur.

**Keywords:** Elections, Jakarta Elections, Power, Political Strategy, Public Legitimacy

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## Introduction

The 2024 Jakarta election was one of the most dynamic and significant political events in Indonesia. As the nation's capital as well as the center of the government and economy, Jakarta has strategic significance that extends beyond its borders. This election is not just an electoral contestation, but also an arena that reflects the pattern of power in Indonesian democracy. Jakarta elections are often placed in the highest position, which often becomes a benchmark for how the national election model will take place in the future. It is inevitable that the Jakarta elections will always attract public attention, both locally and internationally. This contestation, which is often intervened in by influential political groups, is at least one arena of competition to be reckoned with.

Therefore, the 2024 Jakarta election is indeed one of the most dynamic political events, with Ridwan Kamil being one of the leading candidates in this contestation. As the influential former Governor of West Java, Ridwan Kamil carries the image of a technocrat committed to development, innovation, and sustainability. In his candidacy, he was supported by the KIM Plus coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju), a coalition of major parties that have significant influence at both the local and national levels (Feisal, 2024). This support is further strengthened by the presence of President Prabowo Subianto, who openly provided political legitimacy through endorsements on various occasions, acting as the Chairman of the Supporting Party, Gerindra. Through this coalition, Ridwan Kamil is expected to consolidate the dominant political power and reinforce his position as a highly regarded gubernatorial candidate. Along with the

presence of the seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, who also expressed his full support for him (Khoirunikhmah; 2024, Salam, 2024). This further strengthens Ridwan Kamil's position in this election competition.

Power in politics is often not only direct or visible, but also hidden and even invisible (Beli, 2016; Lukes, 2005; Pradana, 2020). This power is closely intertwined with the oligarchic structure that dominates Indonesian politics. Winters (2011) states that oligarchy not only involves economic power, but also controls the political system to maintain the status quo. It should be emphasized that this power struggle is not only faced with the position of the elite and the masses, but also occurs among fellow elites in the government (Haboddin, 2020). In the 2024 Jakarta elections, this oligarchic power was reflected in the support of the major parties that formed the KIM Plus coalition, which indirectly gave Ridwan Kamil access to political resources. This election is also an example of how political parties play a central role in maintaining elite powers (Riawan et al., 2024). This kind of domination is often met with resistance from the masses, especially in urban Jakarta, which has high and diverse political awareness (Lubis, 2024).

However, for solid political support, Ridwan Kamil still faces various challenges to maintain his dominance in the election. One is Dharma Pongrekun's candidacy through an independent route, which is a surprising move that has raised political speculation among the public (CNN Indonesia, 2024). Behind Dharma Kun's candidacy, are more complex matters related to Jakarta's political dynamics. One is the polemic against the attempt to block Anies Baswedan,

who has been considered the main political rival in the 2024 Jakarta elections. Moreover, Anies's position as an incumbent also has considerable electability compared with Ridwan Kamil in Jakarta.

On the other hand, the process of nominating Pramono from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) as Jakarta's gubernatorial candidate added to the complexity of this contestation. PDI-P, as a party with a strong mass base in Jakarta, nominated Pramono as a gubernatorial candidate to strengthen its position in elections. This decision presents a bigger challenge for Ridwan Kamil, who still has to compete with Anies Baswedan's influence, as well as with a strong candidate from a major party such as PDI-P. In this case, Ridwan Kamil must navigate challenges from various parties, both within the coalition and from political opponents who have great power in Jakarta. Pramono's presence is sufficient to apply additional pressure that is difficult to avoid. This shows that support from major parties and national figures is not sufficient to ensure political dominance in Jakarta. Moreover, PDI-P, which has been known to have a strong political network and support from various circles, including Jakarta's elites, is a tough opponent that Ridwan Kamil must face. This shows that in the Jakarta elections, although Ridwan Kamil has strong support, his power cannot guarantee a win in this highly competitive political arena.

In addition to support from large parties, Ridwan Kamil is also suspected to have relied on a political strategy based on social assistance (Bantuan Sosial; Bansos) to boost electoral performance in the elections (Wisesa, 2024). This is often used to increase popularity, strengthen government legitimacy, and garner

political support at the grassroots level (Haliim, 2020; Hicken, 2011; Rahmanto et al., 2021). This strategy aims to strengthen the voting base among the lower- middle class, which is often the decisive group in elections (Rahmanto et al., 2021). Although social assistance is often considered effective in gaining public sympathy, the practice is often seen as controversial and risks worsening the image of politicians in the eyes of the public and does not necessarily provide maximum results (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).

Despite being supported by a large coalition, political parties, and a strong figure such as President Prabowo Subianto, it was not enough to overcome the challenges of his political opponents and deliver him to victory. The Jakarta election of 2024, which was initially predicted to be an easy victory for Ridwan Kamil, has shown that there are severe challenges in maintaining dominance. Despite his success in courting major political forces, both locally and nationally, he cannot ignore the importance of the popular vote, which has become increasingly critical of political practices. His failure to win elections shows that although power can be mobilized through various strategies, its success is still influenced by other decisive factors. Based on the vote recapitulation of the 2024 Jakarta elections, Pramono-Rano won the first position with 50.07% vote, followed by Ridwan Kamil-Suswono, who won the second position with 39.4% vote, and Dharma Pongrekun-Kun Wardana, who won 10.53% vote (kpu.go.id, 2024). The declaration of Pramono as the winner of the 2024 Jakarta election in one round further shows that no one can guarantee victory in this political contestation that is full of

uncertainty and competition. However, this paper seeks to examine the dynamics of Ridwan Kamil's use of power in the 2024 Jakarta election, without comparing it with other candidates, in order to understand his political strategy in maintaining power dominance by considering the three dimensional view of power by Steven Lukes (2005), in an effort to maintain his political dominance in the midst of intense competition with other elites.

### **The Politics of Power**

Power is a fundamental element in politics that determines how decisions are made, who is authorized to make them, and how interests and conflicts are managed within a social system. In Weber's (1947) classic view, power is seen as the probability of an individual or group achieving its will, even when facing resistance from other parties. Weber divided power into three types: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal-rational authority. In contemporary politics, legal-rational authority dominates, where the state uses laws and institutions to legitimately exercise power. However, in practice, power is not always exercised through formal rules, but also through the dominance of elites and political actors who control the main resources of the state (Mills, 1956).

This can be seen through how power in modern states is often concentrated in the elites who control the government, military, and corporations (Asep et al., 2024; Mils, 1956; Tans, 2012). This concept shows that although democracy appears to be a system open to all citizens, key decisions are often made by a small number of elites who have access to political and economic resources (Milner, 2015; Solihah,

2016). This phenomenon is also supported by the dominant influence of oligarchic groups, which are included in every large organization, including political parties and the state, where there is a natural tendency for power to be concentrated in a handful of elites who maintain the status quo (Michels, 2001). In addition, power is exercised through direct coercion, but also through ideological and cultural control (Gramsci, 1999). In modern political systems, elites not only control the state through policy, but also shape the way people think through the media, education, and other social institutions. By creating ideological consensus, the elite can maintain their dominance without having to use explicit violence. This concept ultimately helps explain how the status quo can persist despite resistance from marginalized groups.

However, power does not always work explicitly or on surface. As stated by Steven Lukes (2005), looking at power through the development of a three-dimensional concept of power provides a broader perspective on how power is exercised. Lukes emphasizes that power is not only limited to visible decision-making, as described by Weber (1947) and Dahl (1961), but also includes control over the political agenda and shaping of public preferences and consciousness. From this perspective, power works subtly, by limiting the space for political discourse and shaping people's way of thinking to accept the existing social order without realizing it. In his work *Power: A Radical View*, Lukes analyses how power is exercised, maintained, and challenged in various political contexts. He identifies that power not only works in the form of visible decisions (visible power), but also in the form of agenda control (hidden power) and structural

domination that shapes the way individuals or groups think and act without them realizing it (invisible power).

The first dimension of Lukes' theory, visible power, stems from Dahl's (1957) idea of defining power as ability to make B do something that B would not have done in the absence of A's intervention. In this approach, power is considered a measurable phenomenon that can be observed through the political decisions made by actors with authority. This perspective is similar to pluralism theory, which emphasizes that power is distributed among various competing groups in a democratic political system (Dahl, 1961). The second dimension proposed by Lukes, hidden power, looks more at how political actors can control the public agenda by determining which issues are discussed and which are sidelined. In this case, power works by limiting the space for discourse and influencing the way individuals or groups view a problems. This perspective is particularly relevant in the current political situation, where the media, interest groups, and political elites often use propaganda and information controls to shape public perceptions and direct mass attention in certain directions (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

The third dimension, invisible power, is most profound in understanding political domination. Lukes argues that power works not only through coercion or agenda manipulation, but also through the internalization of norms and ideologies that make individuals or groups accept the status quo as natural and unchangeable. This unconsciously forms a hegemony, where the ruling class not only uses intimidative power, but also shapes collective consciousness through educational institutions,

religion, and the media to maintain their dominance (Gramsci, 1999). In the contemporary context, this phenomenon can be observed in global capitalism, where a political-economic system dominated by transnational elites creates a social structure that makes economic and political inequality seem natural and unchallengeable (Harvey, 2005). Lukes' approach to power also opens up space for broader analyses to understand how various political actors, both state and non-state, use power mechanisms in government systems.

In the study of power, democracy is often an arena where oligarchic power continues to operate in a more disguised manner. In line with Winters (2011), in his concept of oligarchy, in modern democratic systems, political power is often concentrated in the hands of a few economic elites who are able to control public policy through political lobbying and control over economic resources. Within the scope of state and political parties, power is often used to maintain the dominance of certain groups through various strategies. The state, as an institution with a monopoly on intimidative power (Weber, 1947), often uses laws and regulations to strengthen the position of the ruling elite. Meanwhile, political parties use internal mechanisms such as regeneration, resource distribution, and political alliances to ensure that power remains in the hands of certain groups (Winters, 2011). Thus, although democracy provides the illusion of broad participation, key decisions remain in the control of a handful of individuals who have great influence over the course of the government.

## Methods

This study uses a qualitative approach with descriptive analysis that focuses on the three-dimensional view of power by Steven Lukes (2005) as an analysis to understand the dynamics of Ridwan Kamil's use of power in the 2024 Jakarta elections, as well as his political strategy in maintaining power dominance. This approach aims to identify the emerging patterns of power, both visible and hidden, as well as the political strategies applied by the main actors such as Ridwan Kamil and his coalition. The focus of this research is to see how Ridwan Kamil utilizes the three-dimensional view of power to maintain his position in the midst of competition with the influence of other elites, as well as to describe the public's response to these political practices. Data were collected through desk research from secondary sources, such as online media, books, journal articles, and other related publications.

## Result and Discussions

The 2024 Jakarta regional election is a contestation arena that not only shows the dynamics of electoral politics, but also how power operates through various complex and interlocking means. This election reflects how power in Indonesian local politics is not only overt and visible, but also operates through hidden and structured mechanisms. Ridwan Kamil, as one of the main candidates, utilized power in various dimensions to strengthen his position in the midst of intense political competition, but even so, it cannot be denied that he still faces tough challenges in his efforts to maintain his dominance. In this case, Steven Lukes (2005) three-dimensional view of power becomes a relevant framework to analyze how

Ridwan Kamil and his coalition utilize power to maintain their political position, amidst competition with other major actors, such as Pramono from PDI-P and the issue of Anies Baswedan's blocking. Visible, hidden, and invisible power each played an important role in this election, creating a complex dynamic between elite strategy, agenda-setting, and structured and covert power.

Lukes's (2005) three-dimensional view of power offers a more comprehensive approach to analyzing power in political and social contexts. Lukes identifies three main dimensions in understanding power: overt, covert, and structured aspects of power, providing a deeper understanding of how power is exercised, maintained, and contested in various contexts. In the first dimension, Visible Power, Lukes refers to power that is explicitly visible in the political actions of the dominant individuals or groups. This power operates in the form of decision-making that can be seen directly, such as policy-making or electoral decisions. In this dimension, power is open and transparent, with powerful parties having the ability to influence outcomes and processes.

On the other hand, when looking at the second dimension, Hidden, Power operates through control over the political agenda and issues that are considered important in the decision-making process. In this dimension, power is not only seen in the decisions taken, but also in the ability to regulate what is considered or not considered in a political discourse. By setting the agenda, the powerful can ensure that certain issues do not come up for discussion or debate, whereas other issues can receive greater attention. In this case, power

operates in the form of agenda-setting, which leads to decisions that favour the ruling party. Furthermore, the third dimension is Invisible Power, which is power that is more hidden and operates at a more structural level, where the influence of power can shape the preferences, beliefs, and interests of individuals or groups without fully realizing that they are being manipulated. It works in a more subtle way, often without awareness of those involved, and operates at a deeper level in society. Through this dimension, power can reinforce existing social structures, create invisible inequalities, and influence how people think and act.

When looking at the contestation in the current Jakarta election, it can be seen that the first dimension, Visible Power, refers to power expressed directly through political decisions, actions, or support that is clearly visible to the public. In the case of the 2024 Jakarta elections, Ridwan Kamil utilizes this dimension by relying on massive support from the KIM Plus coalition. This coalition consists of 12 major parties: the Gerindra Party, National Awakening Party (PKB), Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), United Development Party (PPP), NasDem Party, Perindo Party, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party (PAN), Golkar Party, Garuda Party, Democratic Party, and Gelora Party, which provide a strong political base for Ridwan Kamil to strengthen the legitimacy of his candidacy (Akbar, 2024; Helmi, 2024). With this support, Ridwan Kamil has easier access to significant political resources, both in the form of campaign funds, cadre networks, and political infrastructure that enables massive voter mobilization. This is in line with Pareto (2019) and Mosca (1939), who stated that elites tend to dominate the political system by maintaining

exclusive access to strategic resources. As part of the elite, the major parties supporting Ridwan Kamil not only provide political legitimacy but also become a tool to control the local political agenda. In practice, party dominance is often used to suppress competitors or create favorable narratives for candidates. Elites use structural power, such as local budget distribution policies, and symbolic power, such as political rhetoric, to create public loyalty and weaken opposition (Higley & Burton, 2006). This shows how political party power can function as an extension of a wider oligarchic power (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).

In addition, the endorsement of Prabowo Subianto, as President of the Republic of Indonesia and chairman of the Gerindra Party, reinforces Ridwan Kamil's position as a candidate who is considered to have political legitimacy at the national level. Legitimacy is key for elites to avoid threats from political opponents and to maintain power hegemony through elite consolidation in an electoral democratic system (Fokate & Mas'udi, 2020; Schatzberg, 2001). Prabowo's presence in Ridwan Kamil's campaign does not only symbolizes political power. Prabowo's support also gives Ridwan Kamil an advantage in gaining media access and a wider political platform, given Prabowo's great influence as a major political actor. However, this endorsement presents its own challenges. In Jakarta, where resistance to oligarchic politics and central domination is high, national figures such as Prabowo and Joko Widodo supporting Ridwan Kamil are not always well received by local voters (Lubis, 2024). Most Jakartans want leaders who are more independent of the influence of national elites, so the support of

figures such as Joko Widodo has created resistance in certain circles (Yaputra, 2024). The incompatibility of the candidate's figure with the political aspirations of the Jakartans has contributed to their reluctance to vote; this is a contradiction for relatively educated and politically literate Jakartans (Lubis, 2024). This finding suggests that visible power does not always provide significant political benefits, especially when public perceptions of support are at odds with local aspirations.

In addition to the support of parties and national figures, Ridwan Kamil also utilized visible power through his control over the campaign and political structures at the local level. For example, Ridwan Kamil's campaign team controls most of the political communication channels in Jakarta, including social media and the endorsement of celebrities who influence public perception of them. With this dominance, Ridwan Kamil managed to present an image as a technocratic candidate capable of continuing the development and innovation relevant to urban Jakarta. This narrative, although effective in reaching certain segments of the electorate, has not been able to reach all levels of society, especially the lower middle class, who are more focused on daily needs, such as public transport and housing. Some controversial program offered by Ridwan Kamil, have attracted public attention, such as the car confession program (Program Mobil Curhat), as a form of online psychologist consultation, overcoming brawls with cultural festivals, and the development of recreational areas such as Disneyland (Fallahnda, 2024).

Visible power is also reflected in support mobilization strategies through massive and structured campaign activities. Ridwan Kamil

often attends major events organized by his supporting parties to demonstrate his power before the public. The endorsement of Prabowo, which also involves Gerindra's party structure, provides a significant advantage in this mobilization. However, survey data shows that despite Ridwan Kamil's high media exposure, his acceptance rate among Jakarta voters has remained stagnant, indicating resistance that cannot be reached by visible power (Yaputra, 2024). Furthermore, visible power is used to demonstrate Ridwan Kamil's formal presence in institutional politics. For example, the official decision of the major parties to nominate Ridwan Kamil as the governor of Jakarta is a manifestation of institutional power translated into administrative support. Large coalitions such as KIM Plus give the impression that Ridwan Kamil is a candidate who trusts various political groups. However, the size of this coalition has also led to negative perceptions that view it as a form of monopolization of power by national elites. As noted by Koho (2021) and Syawawi (2021), in the context of Indonesia's increasingly complex politics, visible power must be complemented by strategies that are more inclusive and responsive to local communities' aspirations to deliver optimal results.

Furthermore, when examining the second dimension, Hidden Power, focuses on how power is used to set the political agenda and determine prioritized issues in the decision-making process. In the 2024 Jakarta election, Ridwan Kamil and his coalition actively utilized this dimension to influence the dynamics of contestation. Agenda-setting includes not only efforts to promote himself as the leading candidate, but also to minimize threats from

political rivals, such as Anies Baswedan and Pramono. One visible form of agenda setting is Dharma Kun's candidacy as an independent candidate. This move was seen as an attempt to ensure that the Jakarta election would not only be filled by Ridwan Kamil as the sole candidate, which was reinforced by the threshold polemic and the dominance of KIM Plus, which left PDI-P as the only major opposition party, which could create a democratic imbalance. Despite not having significant popularity or political support, Dharma Kun was passed as a candidate despite controversies over administrative processes, such as the profiteering of citizens' names as supporters (Bustomi, 2024). Some experts, such as Zaki Mubarak, a political expert from Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta, noted that Dharma Kun's candidacy reflected a deliberate political effort to create a narrative that the Jakarta election was a healthy competition divert attention from criticism of their political dominance while maintaining the image that they still respect democratic principles.

In addition to Dharma Kun's candidacy, agenda-setting is also evident in the systematic attempt to block Anies Baswedan, who has been considered the strongest rival from the beginning. Anies with, a high level of electability in Jakarta, poses a major threat to Ridwan Kamil. This can be seen through the loss of support from some parties such as PKS, PKB, and the NasDem Party, which previously supported Anies, immediately turned around and supported KIM Plus, the coalition supporting Ridwan Kamil (Putra, 2024). This change in support effectively prevented Anies from running. This strategy reflects not only political agenda- setting, but also how coalitions

of political elites work to eliminate potential threats to their dominance. The agenda setting by KIM Plus also reflects the oligarchic pattern in Indonesian politics, where a handful of elites control access to the political process and determine who can participate (Koho, 2021). In the case of the Jakarta election itself, the attempt to get rid of Anies, one of which is seen through the strategy of forming the KIM Plus coalition, has shown how hidden power can be used to control the outcome of elections, even before the election process begins. Syawawi (2021), mentions that elite domination is often exercised through control over the political agenda to ensure that their power structure is maintained. Agenda setting is also evident in the attempt to create the perception of Pramono from the PDI-P as the main threat, even though Pramono's electability is not as high as Anies's. Jakartans, who have a relatively high level of political awareness compared to other regions, began to realize that there were attempts to control contestation. This resistance was reflected in the election results, where Ridwan Kamil did not manage to win the election despite controlling many aspects of the political agenda, especially the support of many parties.

Moreover, the third dimension, Invisible Power, focuses on how power shapes people's preferences, beliefs, and values without them realizing it. In the case of the 2024 Jakarta election, this power is used strategically by Ridwan Kamil and his coalition to influence public perception and subtly shape support through various means, such as grand narratives, distribution of social assistance, and use of media to frame a positive image of the candidate; most importantly, how to gain public legitimacy through the massive support of

artists and influencers. The manipulation of power at this level creates a political reality that is accepted by society as normal, despite the hidden agenda behind it.

A form of invisible power is the distribution of social assistance. Ridwan Kamil and his partner, Suswono, utilized social assistance by organizing a cheap basic food market as a tool to build an image that they are leaders who care about marginalized communities. Social assistance is usually distributed in the form of basic necessities, cash, or other welfare programs directed toward low-income groups (Dharmakarja, 2017; Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). It is often used to increase popularity, strengthen government legitimacy, and garner political support at the grassroots level (Haliim, 2020; Rahmanto et al., 2021). Social assistance is often a determining factor in elections (Nelfira, 2024; Rahmanto et al., 2024). Social assistance was distributed through a structured strategy, with several reports indicating that some social assistance programs have been symbolically linked to Ridwan Kamil's campaign, including the use of his campaign logo (Wisesa, 2024). This creates the perception among social assistance recipients that Ridwan Kamil is a leader who genuinely cares about their needs. The distribution of social assistance is often not based on objective needs, but rather is directed to areas that have certain political interests, such as strong voter bases or electorally strategic areas (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Tanuwidjaja, 2010).

However, social assistance was not free from criticism. Some have pointed out that this practice is a form of disguised monetary politics that violates democratic ethics. From an elite perspective, social assistance ahead of elections

is used as a political strategy to increase electability, especially for incumbents or candidates with access to state resources (Mietzner, 2009; Rahmanto et al., 2021; Saragintan & Hidayat, 2016). Political elites tend to use social assistance programs as a tool of clientelism, where a patron-client relationship is formed between the donor and the recipient, in exchange for political support (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). For example, Churniawan (2024) notes that people are beginning to realize the political motives behind the distribution of social assistance, especially when it is only given to certain groups that are key electoral targets. This suggests that the invisible power used by Ridwan Kamil may face resistance when the public begins to question the motive behind the action. In addition to social assistance, Ridwan Kamil also utilized grand narratives to shape public perceptions. He carries concepts such as "Jakarta Maju and, Jakarta Baru" (Advanced Jakarta and, New Jakarta), which focus on sustainability and technology-based development. Through these campaigns, Ridwan Kamil shapes public preferences by positioning himself as the only candidate who can fulfil the needs of modern urban communities (Chairunnisa & Khoirunikmah, 2024). However, while this narrative is successful in reaching certain segments, such as the middle and upper classes, it is less effective in reaching the lower classes, who are more focused on pressing issues, such as housing, flooding, and public transportation.

Invisible power is also used in media. Media affiliated with the KIM Plus coalition played an important role in framing Ridwan Kamil's image positively. In many news reports, Ridwan Kamil has been portrayed as an innovative and

visionary candidate. In this case, invisible power works through information control to shape people's preferences without realizing it (Putra, 2024). The use of invisible power in the 2024 Jakarta elections also reflects the oligarchic pattern in Indonesian politics, where political oligarchs operate in an invisible way, shaping a power structure that is difficult for the public (Koho, 2021).

Ridwan Kamil, as the leading candidate supported by a large coalition and national figures such as Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo, demonstrates how power is leveraged through party mobilization, political narratives, and media dominance to strengthen positions. However, the challenges that emerged, such as resistance from local voter segments who wanted independence from the influence of national elites, served as a reminder that power did not always deliver the expected results. Overall, the 2024 Jakarta elections show how power works in a complex and multidimensional framework. The dynamics built, through visible, hidden, and invisible power strategies, reflect the great challenge of managing local politics in the midst of increasingly diverse societal expectations.

## Conclusion

The 2024 Jakarta election features complex political dynamics, where Ridwan Kamil, as the leading candidate, utilizes the three-dimensional view of power, as explained by Steven Lukes — visible, hidden, and invisible — to maintain his dominance. Visible power through the backing of the KIM Plus coalition, which consists of 12 political parties, as well as endorsements from President Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo, granting Ridwan

Kamil significant political legitimacy. However, this strong support sparked resistance among Jakartans, who are increasingly critical of oligarchic political dominance. Besides, hidden power was used to set political agendas, such as the nomination of Dharma Kun to create the perception of healthy competitive elections, and the deliberate weakening of rival elites' positions.

Invisible power is manifested through the distribution of social assistance and framing of a positive image through the media to subtly shape voter preferences. While these strategies wielded considerable influence, the election results ultimately revealed their limitations, as they were insufficient to secure victory. As it turned out, Pramono won the election from PDI-P.

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