

The Emergence of Global Maritime Fulcrum Indonesia's Maritime Strategy and its Linkage with U.S Indo-Pacific Strategy and China-Belt and Road Initiative

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Abstract

This study aims to understand the concept and factors behind the emergence of Indonesia's maritime strategic vision known as the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) initiative, which was conceived by President Joko Widodo in 2014. This vision emerged in the context of the dynamics of competition between major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly between the United States, with its Indo-Pacific Strategy, and China, with its Belt and Road Initiative. This study uses an exploratory qualitative method relying on secondary data. Data collection techniques were conducted through a review of literature, including journal articles, books, and news reports. Data analysis focused on the constitutive variables that influence the emergence of GMF. The results of the study indicate that GMF was established in response to Indonesia's growing awareness of its identity as a maritime archipelagic country and in light of the geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. GMF focuses on five key pillars: rebuilding maritime culture, preserving marine resources, developing maritime infrastructure and connectivity, fostering cooperation with maritime partners, and enhancing maritime defense capabilities. Analysis using a constructivist approach reveals that the GMF, the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and China's Belt and Road Initiative are all social constructs that aim to fulfill their respective national interests, with a focus on maritime security, regional stability, and economic cooperation. However, their scope and priorities differ. This research contributes to explaining Indonesia's position as a middle power that seeks to maintain balance and stability amid US-China competition, as well as filling the gap in analysis regarding the application of the constructivist approach in examining Indonesia's maritime strategy.

Keywords: Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indo-Pacific Strategy, Belt and Road Initiative, constructivism, Indo-Pacific geopolitics

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Introduction

The discourse on the geopolitical dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region in the last decade since 2013, marked by China's massive presence in the region (Alunaza & Sherin, 2022), has gained increasing prominence and may attract the attention of scholars and observers of international relations. For almost 70 years, the system of order in the Asia-Pacific region, often referred to as "Pax Americana" and dominated by the United States, had not been called into question (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). The geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region have changed significantly with the rise of China through the Belt and Road Initiative, which ultimately led to the region being renamed the Indo-Pacific. The impact of the change in geographical nomenclature from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific influences and even changes the way other nations and their leaders view the regional strategic order, which in turn influences how a nation behaves in its foreign policy (Saeed, 2017; Summers, 2023).

The change of the term "Asia-Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific" cannot be separated from Japan, as one of the close allies of the United States, which gave birth to this term in 2016 through Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech at the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD) VI in August 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya (Sundararaman, 2023; Yoshimatsu, 2023). Japan sees that China, through its Belt and Road Initiative programs, has become the world's largest economy, which has also changed the regional balance of power in political and military terms, Beijing developed its ideas and concepts of regional order and subsequently launched its initiatives (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). From this point on, the term

"Indo-Pacific" spread, and Japan needed the support of the United States and Australia to strengthen the Indo-Pacific idea. In addition, the United States has strongly supported the Indo-Pacific Strategy through its foreign policy, particularly Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) (Gaens & Sinkkonen, 2023), from the era of President Donald Trump's administration to the era of President Joe Biden's administration. This has led experts to believe that the Asia-Pacific has been replaced by the Indo-Pacific as the region's primary geopolitical construct.

China's Belt Road and initiatives, as well as the Indo-Pacific strategy with the United States as the key player, supported by its allies in the Indo-Pacific region such as Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia, are both ideas that have been raised in their interest. In the Indo-Pacific context, security and economic interests are a priority to maintain their influence and regional stability. International security studies with a constructivist approach convey that security is a social construct created by actors. Security in constructivist thinking assumes that the meaning and practice of security are socially constructed (Aria, 2025; Farrell, 2002; Muhammad & Riyanto, 2021). This applies to the meaning of the concept itself, to the definition of the community and its values in need of protection, perceptions of threats, and to the types of actions that are seen as legitimate in carrying out security policies.

Due to its highly strategic geographical location, Indonesia is in a vortex of rivalry between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia can become an actor outside of these two major powers. With a vast territory, great economic potential, and major players in ASEAN, Indonesia must behave

and determine what position it takes as the rivalry escalates. Indonesia's position has the potential to determine the future of security stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The emergence of the vision or idea of the Global Maritime Fulcrum by President Joko Widodo in 2014 can be interpreted as a brilliant idea from a visionary president at the helm of Indonesia. The Global Maritime Fulcrum Strategy is a vision or big idea of the Indonesian nation based on the sea to revitalize the maritime identity culture and improve the underdeveloped maritime sector. Indonesia lies at the intersection of two oceans the Indian and Pacific Oceans where, at the same time, rivalry between the United States and China prevails in the region, and Indonesia also needs to gain control of its waters.

Several studies have discussed the Global Maritime Fulcrum. However, there is a gap in the analysis that comprehensively links the emergence of GMF with the constructivist theoretical framework in international security studies. Previous studies tend to describe GMF separately or view it from a realist, often with a strong materialist approach. Such as Gindarsah & Priamarizki (2015) understood GMF as a maritime vision that has been transformed into a grand strategy to strengthen maritime diplomacy and defence, Pattiradjawane & Soebagjo (2015) view GMF as Indonesia's win-win solution strategy for regional security amid rivalry between the United States (US) and China; Hudaya & Putra (2018) emphasized the importance of strengthening naval power, both in terms of maritime forces and infrastructure, as a key prerequisite for realizing the GMF, referring to Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of Sea Power.

The study of GMF is expanding in line with the intensifying rivalry between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific. Security studies on GMF have evolved into strategic hedging analysis, particularly as a middle power. Miswar (2024), Pratiwi et al. (2021), and Yoshimatsu (2022) explain that GMF is an instrument for Indonesia in maintaining balance (hedging strategy) against China's rising influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy promoted by the US and its allies. Thus, this study contributes to analyzing the ideological factors (identity, norms, perceptions) that shape the GMF through the lens of constructivism, as well as explaining how the GMF has become an instrument for Indonesia to navigate US-China competition while maintaining national interests and regional stability. This study also provides insight into Indonesia's unique position as a middle power that leverages its maritime identity to build cooperation, rather than confrontation, in the Indo-Pacific region.

Research Methods

This study uses a qualitative method with an exploratory approach. The data used are secondary data collected through in-depth literature studies of sources such as scientific journal articles, social science textbooks, and credible news reports. The focus of the analysis is on the constitutive variables that influence the emergence of the GMF idea, such as Indonesia's maritime identity, the "Free and Active" foreign policy norm, and perceptions of threats and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region. Data analysis was conducted by identifying, grouping, and interpreting themes that emerged from the literature to find patterns of relationship

between the GMF, the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and China's BRI, particularly in the context of regional maritime security and stability.

Theoretical Framework: Constructivism Approach in Security Studies

This study uses constructivism in international security studies as its main theoretical framework. Constructivism argues that world politics, including the concept of security, is socially constructed through intersubjective interactions between actors. Security is not an objective, fixed condition; instead, its meaning and practice are socially constructed. Ideational factors, such as identity, values, and norms, play a central role in shaping a state's national interests and behaviour (Aria, 2025; McDonald, 2023). Within this framework, Indonesia's identity as a great maritime nation with a historical legacy of maritime empires such as Srivijaya and Majapahit became an important foundation for the birth of the GMF. This identity influences how Indonesia perceives itself and its place in the world (Berenskoetter, 2017; Cho, 2012). Indonesia's maritime identity reflects historical, social, and cultural factors that have developed over centuries (Ampun et al., 2023; Lampe, 2021; Putri, 2023). Furthermore, the deeply rooted "Free and Active" foreign policy norm has shaped Indonesia's tendency not to take sides with any power bloc but to actively contribute to peace (Muzakki, 2017; Rosyidin, 2023). This norm is reflected in the GMF, which emphasizes cooperation and conflict management rather than confrontation.

Constructivism also emphasized the role of the "norm entrepreneur" (Benantar, 2025;

Wunderlich, 2020). In this context, namely, President Joko Widodo. The president's vision, inspired by Soekarno's Trisakti idea, played a crucial role in establishing GMF as a national maritime policy popularizing a standard. Thus, the constructivist framework will be employed to analyze how maritime identity, the "Free and Active" norm, and the role of social leadership shape the GMF vision, and how this construction of ideas influences Indonesia's behaviour and strategy in its interactions with the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region.

Analytical Framework

Global Maritime Fulcrum: Indonesia's maritime strategy

What is the Global Maritime Fulcrum? And why? Both are fundamental questions that the author will explore in writing this paper, and their linkage to the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative is another important part of this paper, which is closely related to the geopolitical circumstances in the Indo-Pacific. The concept of the Global Maritime Fulcrum emerged at the beginning of the election of Joko Widodo as the seventh president of Indonesia in 2014. This idea was inspired by the Trisakti idea of Indonesia's first president, Soekarno. Jokowi revived Sukarno's Trisakti ("three pillars of the state") as the organizing principle of his presidential campaign for an Indonesia that is sovereign, economically independent, and with a strong socio-cultural identity, reflected in his foreign policy. In his "Vision and Mission" manifesto for the presidential election, Jokowi listed the action agendas needed to achieve his four foreign policy priorities. These were (a) the promotion of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state; (b) the promotion of Indonesia's

middle-power regional role; (c) a new focus on the Indo-Pacific; and (d) reforming the foreign policy process (Weatherbee, 2017).

“Global Maritime Fulcrum” is an idea that arises from the Indonesian nation's ability to look inward, namely its identity as a maritime state based on geographical location, and the ability to look outward, namely, the geopolitical dynamics of the region. Through the global maritime pivot, Indonesia aims to build itself as a strong maritime state, a middle or alternative power country in the Indo-Pacific region, and to create a stable and secure Indo-Pacific region. With this maritime policy strategy, Indonesia builds regional security according to the ideas contained therein and becomes Indonesia's approach when dealing with other states or responding to the current US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. In this sense, the Global Maritime Fulcrum approach as a strategic idea is in the same position as the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and the China Belt and Road Initiative. Directly through the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), the essence of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is part of the broader US security strategy (Chongkittavorn, 2019). The Indo-Pacific strategy was developed by the United States. A concept that outlines the common goals and interests of countries in the Asia-Pacific region with a view to maintaining peace, security, and prosperity despite regional and global problems.

In addition, the plan recognizes the importance of maintaining regional balance of power and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. The US Indo-Pacific strategy is more about forging and strengthening alliances such as QUAD and

AUKUS to adopt a cooperative military posture. Nevertheless, this approach is different from that of the BRI, which has a clear framework and implementation; the concept of the FOIP (free open Indo-Pacific) is not yet settled. There are no concrete steps from the Quad to implement the FOIP optimally (Pratiwi et al, 2021). However, the China Belt and Road Initiative indirectly describes itself as a strategy of China as brokered by the United States through USINDOPACOM and more as a collaboration of China's international economic development and infrastructure with its neighbours. Rather than itself, China is building a powerful state, and the Belt and Road Initiative map shows China's efforts to expand and strengthen its regional and global influence.



Figure 1. Map of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy vs. China-Belt and Road Initiative

(<https://www.observerbd.com/news.php?id=286111>)

“Global Maritime Fulcrum,” “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” and “Belt and Road Initiative” all three are strategies that share a social construction that meets their respective national interests. Another similarity is that all three are located in the Indo-Pacific region, and maritime security is important for establishing regional stability. For this reason, the constructivist approach in international security studies is the appropriate

choice to discuss the text in this essay. In international security studies, the constructivist approach is an approach used to read or analyze phenomena. Constitutionalism offers an alternative perspective on international security studies that has been dominated by realism and liberal approaches. Through this approach, it will be possible to provide a different sense of international security. Constructivists argue that world politics is socially constituted through intersubjective interaction, that agents and structures are mutually constituted, and that ideational factors such as norms and identity are central to its constitution and dynamics.

Constructivism attempts to explain the processes through which world politics has come to be composed, with a desire to shed light on how the actors involved have come to understand their own interests and how they could or should interact with others. For example, to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty from invasion, some states view security as a state of military alert. Others may view security as the adoption of multilateralism or the exercise of good international citizenship to uphold international standards and promote progressive national values. For constructivists, social construction also extends to the dynamics that influence the meanings and practices of security. Constructivists emphasize the importance of ideational factors that help determine conceptions, practices, and dynamics of security, factors generally neglected in realist accounts of international politics (McDonald, 2023).

Constructivism strongly emphasizes the importance of ideas in achieving its meaning and goals. The connection with the global maritime pivot is that this idea or vision arose,

one of which was inspired by the idea of the first President of the Republic of Indonesia, Ir. Soekarno, who was inspired and prioritized Indonesia's foreign policy vision in this era by President Joko Widodo. A maritime focus was central to Jokowi's presidential inaugural address. He said, "We have far too long turned our backs on the seas, oceans, straits, and the bays. It is time to restore everything so that jalesveva jayamahe (in the sea we will triumph), a slogan used by our forefathers, will echo again." It states the goal of establishing Indonesia as a strong, secure maritime-based middle power between the Pacific and Indian oceans. The GMF is a rubric under which discrete strategies and policies can be linked in symbolic unity (Weatherbee, 2017).

The constructivist approach in international security studies also emphasizes the importance of norms and identity (Wendt, 1992; Wunderlich, 2020). Norms are shared expectations of appropriate behavior held by a community of actors. At the international level, constructivists have explored how norms influence state behavior and how governments understand their national interests. Theorists in this discipline have examined the process by which norms form and change over time to argue for their significance. In this context, some have emphasized the significance of "norm entrepreneurs," such as civil society organizations or political figures, in advancing a specific norm. In this regard, the Global Maritime Fulcrum is a norm formed and believed by Indonesia and part of Indonesia's maritime policy. This global maritime fulfillment strategy influences Indonesia's behavior toward the United States and China. Unlike the United States and China, which perceive both strategies

as threats, Indonesia, through the Global Maritime Fulcrum, emphasizes joint collaboration with both countries to achieve Indonesia's national interests and stable Indo-Pacific regional security.

Results and Discussions

Global maritime Fulcrum: Indonesia's maritime strategy under President Joko Widodo's administration

With two-thirds of its land area made up of oceans, Indonesia is an archipelago rich in marine natural resources. Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago, with a massive sea. From the perspectives of philosophy, politics, economy, socioculture, law, environment, defense, and security, the maritime and marine sectors are extremely crucial for Indonesia. The Global Maritime Fulcrum is the main and interesting topic of discussion in examining President Joko Widodo's foreign policy from the beginning of his administration (2014) to the end of his term (2024). The central idea of the GMF is to foster the country's maritime identity. Reasserting the long-standing "archipelagic outlook," President Widodo values the waters surrounding the Indonesian archipelago for their economic potential and national strength rather than construing them as a natural disadvantage (Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015).

The five pillars of the GMF are: first, rebuild Indonesia's maritime culture that recognizes the country's link to the sea. Second, guard and manage ocean resources with a focus on food security. Third, prioritize the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity. Fourth, invite all of Indonesia's maritime partners to work together to eliminate sources

of conflict; and fifth, build a maritime defense force, not just to guard Indonesia's sovereignty and wealth but also to protect maritime security and navigation. This strategy, in its broadest sense, includes Indonesia's internal and external approaches to accomplish the three main goals of stability, prosperity, and regional prominence. Moreover, the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) seeks to transform Indonesia into a pivot point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Understanding the GMF and what can be done to advance it has significant policy implications for Indonesia as well as broader geopolitical trends, including the conceptualization and promotion of the Indo-Pacific as a region, China's increasing assertiveness in the maritime domain, and U.S. efforts. Indonesia has a long history of maritime in the history of the "Nusantara" called Indonesia in the past records, the two kingdoms, Srivijaya (650–1377) and Majapahit (1293–1527), were more maritime-oriented. As other researchers have noted, Indonesia's colonization under the Dutch (1603–1949) and its independence movement also played a role in reinforcing the inherent dual vulnerability of this vast archipelago. this vast archipelago: intervention from without and division from within (Parameswaran, 2020).

With a strong maritime historical record, the question that needs attention is why it was only in the Jokowi era that the big idea of "Indonesia Maritime Country," conveyed through the vision and mission of the Global Maritime Fulcrum, emerged. In the author's perspective and observation, the emergence of the Global Maritime Fulcrum is inseparable from the leadership factor, which in this case is the

visionary figure of President Joko Widodo. In Jokowi's view, which is supported by his cabinet, the GMF is Indonesia's effort to maintain harmonization of relations with China and the United States in the region without having to sacrifice relations with either of them.

According to Parameswaran, through this GMF strategy, President Joko Widodo tries to provide potential synergies between the GMF and other countries or regional organizations such as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Indonesia's leadership in shaping the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Outlook on the Indo-Pacific statement that was finalized in 2019 after the Trump administration's release of the U.S. free and open Indo-Pacific vision. Furthermore, this paper will also discuss how the GMF is related to the IPS and the BRI in maintaining the security stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

In addition to personal factors, the leadership of Joko Widodo, who originated the idea of the Global Maritime Fulcrum Strategy and was inspired by Sukarno's Trisakti ("three pillars of the state"), the first president of Indonesia, the other supporting factors that strengthen the emergence of the Global Maritime Fulcrum in the framework of the constructivist approach, as mentioned by Agoes Aufiyya, are such as: History of Indonesia's maritime heritage. The idea of a maritime nation and state vision has existed for a long time in the era of the Srivijaya and Majapahit Kingdoms, long before the Indonesian state was formed in 1945. As mentioned in terms of maritime historical legacy aspect, the maritime kingdoms of Indonesia in the past played an essential and inseparable role in contributing to

Indonesia's recognition of the concept of the Indo-Pacific. As the term is critically close to the maritime domain within the Indian and Pacific oceans, it is relevant to the historical past of Indonesia's maritime kingdoms (Aufiyya, 2023).

The emergence of the idea of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy clearly has an important relationship with the Indo-Pacific. In his first official speech after taking the oath of office as President of Indonesia for the 2014–2019 term on Monday, October 20, 2014, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) explained and linked the Indo-Pacific region to his vision of the Global Maritime Fulcrum from a historical perspective. "Oceans, seas, straits, and bays are the future of our civilization," he said. We have long turned our backs on oceans, seas, straits, and bays. So, starting today, we will bring back the glory of our ancestors as brave sailors. The motto of our ancestors in the past resonates again: „Jalesveva Jayamahe" [which means] on the sea we are victorious (Widodo 2014, 10).

The next is the "Bebas-Aktif" Foreign Policy Principle. The first factor mentioned above includes the idea of a maritime state, and the second factor contains the idea of stability. According to Agus, who took a quote from Moh. Hatta, the second vice president of Indonesia, about understanding the "Bebas-Aktif" foreign policy principle, Indonesia's independent principle does not wish to align herself with either of the opposition blocs, the Western bloc or the Communist bloc, whereas the active principle actively carries out a peaceful policy as a loyal member of the United Nations. Based on this understanding, Indonesia has a strong commitment to maintaining regional security stability. This is in accordance with what was stated by the Global Maritime Fulcrum and

Indonesia's view of the Indo-Pacific on the importance of creating a stable region and conflict management.

In the geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific region, the competition between the United States and China has the potential to threaten stability, security, and peace in the region. This circumstance demonstrates that Indonesia is at the center of China's and America's rivalry. According to the principles of Indonesia's foreign policy, the Indo-Pacific region is not neutral; rather, it is directed by a policy agenda. In this case, Indonesia stands to gain from the rivalry between the two parties. Indonesia's stance as a balancer and guardian of stability during rivalry can be seen in its relatively good and strong relations with the two superpowers. The Indonesian government, led by President Joko Widodo, is taking a flexible and realistic approach to maintaining relations with the two countries. Certainly, Indonesia appears to be continuing to establish strong military cooperation with the United States, and conversely, economically, Indonesia appears to be moving closer to establishing a working relationship with China.

Factors of heritage Indonesia's maritime history and the principle of Indonesia's foreign policy, "Free and Active," can be very strong ideas behind the emergence of a global maritime fulcrum strategy. Under President Jokowi's leadership, Indonesia gained a strong regional and global perspective on the Indo-Pacific, providing a strong foundation for the adoption and recognition of the Indo-Pacific term. In order to improve Indonesia's standing internationally, particularly in the Indo-Pacific area, and to realize the Global Maritime Fulcrum

vision, maritime history and the Bebas-Aktif foreign policy were essential.




Figure 2. Indonesian Ocean Policy GMF

(Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs,
Republic of Indonesia)

The Global Maritime Fulcrum and Belt and Road Initiative

The linkage between GMF and BRI seems to be better with IPS than with IPS. The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) also has five main priorities, similar to Indonesia's GMF, which are: first, the path of green development. Second, there is ocean-based prosperity. Third, maritime security. Fourth, Innovative growth. And fifth, innovative governance. Similar to the GMF's pillars, MSR priorities also have economic undertones, with pillars one, two, and four especially containing the key words "development," "prosperity," and "growth." In fact, total trade between the two countries showed an interesting development, as it has kept increasing since President Jokowi took office in 2014. Therefore, it is clear that Indonesia and China prioritize economic cooperation over other issues in their GMF and BRI policies (Yeremia et al, 2020).

In terms of policy connectivity, Presidents Xi and Jokowi came to a significant agreement on the promotion of BRI and GMF synergy for the

benefit of their respective nations' populations. The two countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperatively promoting collaboration within the framework of the BRI and the GMF. Along with supporting President Jokowi's proposed maritime highway, China has contributed to important infrastructure projects in Indonesia, including ports, railroads, and roads.

The main project of the first stage of strategic alignment is the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (HSR). A new phase of construction has recently begun. Furthermore, as the primary initiative for the second stage of strategic alignment, the two countries have initiated intergovernmental collaboration on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Corridor, with some initial projects already underway. The two sides are currently investigating working together on industrialization, which may turn into a new focal point for coordinating growth plans between the countries.

Conclusion

Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) strategy, introduced by President Joko Widodo in 2014, plays an important role in revitalizing Indonesia's maritime sector and identity. The GMF aims to strengthen Indonesia's maritime culture, manage marine resources, develop maritime infrastructure, foster cooperation with maritime partners, and build maritime defence forces. President Joko Widodo's 2014 vision outlined the emergence of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) strategy is President Joko Widodo's vision outlined in 2014. Inspired by Sukarno's Trisakti idea, Jokowi aims to revitalize Indonesia's maritime sector and identity by promoting the country as an archipelagic

maritime nation. Jokowi stressed Indonesia's regional role as a middle power. In the past, during the Srivijaya and Majapahit Kingdoms, Indonesia was a strong maritime power.

Indonesia's effort to maintain harmonious relations with large countries like the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region without sacrificing its own interests, is known as the GMF strategy. This strategic vision reflects Indonesia's self-awareness of its identity as a maritime nation, as well as its desire to position itself as a global maritime power in the context of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, the shift in geopolitical dynamics has influenced the development of these maritime strategies.

The key similarities between Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and China's Belt and Road Initiative are that they are a construction of ideas to achieve their national interests with the same focus on maritime security, economic cooperation, and regional stability. Indonesia's GMF stresses the importance of maritime infrastructure development, collaboration with maritime partners, and maritime defense. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, enhance regional prosperity, bolster security, and build resilience to transnational threats. China's Belt and Road Initiative prioritizes green development, ocean-based prosperity, maritime security, innovative growth, and collaborative governance.

However, there are differences in the scope and objectives of these strategies. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy covers a comprehensive US strategy for the entire Indo-Pacific region, while the GMF primarily focuses on Indonesia's maritime interests and regional collaboration.

China's Belt and Road Initiative is more focused on infrastructure development and connectivity across Asia, Africa, and Europe, while also emphasising economic cooperation. Overall, while all three strategies aim to enhance economic cooperation and regional stability, they differ in their specific priorities and approaches to achieving these goals.

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