Tenggelamkan!: Susi Pudjiastuti’s Securitization of IUUF in Indonesia

Wahyu Arif Raharjo

Department of International Relations - Universitas Islam Indonesia
wahyu.arif.raharjo@uii.ac.id

Abstract

Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUUF) is not traditionally discussed in security studies, but this paper attempts to prove that the emergence of IUUF in Indonesia since 2015 has become a security concern. The slogan “Tenggelamkan” (which means “Sink It!”) echoed by Minister of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of Indonesia Susi Pudjiastuti indicated the surging attention, budget allocation and the sense of emergency in Indonesia’s IUUF problem. This study utilizes Securitization theory as the main framework of analysis in investigating three direct speech acts where Minister Susi attempted to securitize this issue by convincing president Joko Widodo and general Indonesian audience. This paper concludes that minister Susi had successfully securitize IUUF in Indonesia as evident in these three events: (1) the execution of exploding and sinking the captured vessels committing IUUF, (2) the militarization of IUUF in the form of involvement of Indonesian Navy and (3) the acceptance that this particular effort by minister Susi has brought fame for her as Indonesia’s female maritime hero.

Keywords: Securitization of IUUF; Susi Pudjiastuti; Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Bhindhara
INTRODUCTION

Indonesia has recently gained global reputation for its stronghold in enacting law that regulates fisheries in Indonesia’s territorial waters. Even before President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s inauguration in October 2014, Jokowi already had a vision to turn Indonesia into a ‘global maritime fulcrum.’ One of its manifestation took place when Indonesian government led by Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF), Susi Pudjiastuti, as of March 2018 sunk and blew up 363 foreign fishing vessels that have been caught fishing in Indonesian territory without proper documentation and permission (Firmansyah, 2018). This action is based upon Indonesia’s Law on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) No. 45/2009, which provides legal framework for such policy. This sink-the-vessels action has caught media attention nationally and internationally through media content showing the vessels getting exploded then sunken (Bever, 2016; Chan, 2017; Staff, 2017).

This action attracts worldwide attention when it successfully pushes away fish-stealing vessels from Indonesian waters. Minister Susi herself claims that based on a study conducted by US researchers, Indonesia’s ocean biomass index has doubled since 2014 (Setyowati, 2016). This study, which is conducted by UCSB researchers, confirms that Indonesia’s policy have reduced the rate of IUUF in Indonesia by 25 % since its inception (Cabral et al., 2018). For this success and firm stance, Indonesia has been praised internationally, including by Leonardo DiCaprio in UN Forum who calls Indonesia’s leadership ‘bold and innovative.’ For the same reason, minister Susi have always been invited to speak at prestigious forums such as World Economic Forum, World Ocean Summit in 2017, and to Stimson Center, and have been approached by government officials and enforcement authority from all over the world in various occasion, looking for solution. The same policy have been replicated by Palau and Malaysia, supported by Norway and Sweden, yet in Indonesia, this policy have been criticized for wasting potentially useful vessels and whether such action is appropriate, considering Indonesia’s relations with neighboring countries (Kurtenbach, 2015; Rodzi, 2017) (Zulkifli, Maulana, Ibnu, & Anjar, 2018). Indeed, China has protested, but Indonesia refused to compromise and, to the point that this article is written, remain unmoved (Hodge, 2016). Indonesia’s action in combating IUUF has been dubbed as ‘war on illegal fishing’ by a media giant, Bloomberg (Salna, 2018).

In traditional terms of security, IUUF has not been considered as security issue, however, minister Susi’s decision to blow up vessels suggests the implementation of force to tackle IUUF. One might consider that it is too much to blow up vessels, solely because they fish without proper documentation, and whether it constitutes a threat that requires an extreme measure to the extent of exploding the vessel. The question is, then, whether IUUF has been widely accepted as security issue that requires emergency measures, that sink-the-vessels action can be justified. What’s the reason behind measures taken to push away foreign fishing vessels? Moreover, why and how a fisheries issue requires such extreme measure?

This study aims at specifically finding out whether this phenomenon can be considered as an attempt to uplift the status of IUUF from political to security issue by operating securitization theory. This theory suggests that security is a product of social construction, thus what constitutes security is a subject to intersubjective agreement,
enabling actors to remove an issue from political into securitized end of spectrum (Balzacq, Leonard, & Ruzicka, 2016). As a first step, this paper will discuss the chronology of IUUF problem in Indonesia and its past policy dealing with this issue. This paper then investigates whether IUUF have always been considered as a security issue. Subsequently, as it is proposed to be the analytical framework of this study, securitization theory is explained. The core section of this paper will examine whether IUUF in Indonesia has been securitized, which will include deeper exploration on its elements: securitizing actor, speech acts, referent object, audience, and extraordinary measure.

IUUF in Indonesia

The term IUUF covers a wide range of activities. Generally, it encompasses various aspects as follows: (1) the unreported fishing which covers activity such as fishing in state's territorial waters or high seas without proper authorization, providing false information or no information at all to authorities, and on board fish trans-shipment, and (2) the unregulated fishing that includes the fishing operation that violates either national or international regulations, the use of unlawful fishing methods, fishing in prohibited location like disputed or conservation areas, or combination of both unreported and unregulated aspects (Sodik, 2009). Such activity can be conducted by domestic or foreign fishing vessels, in national territorial waters or in high seas with flag of states.

As the largest archipelagic country in the world stretching over a territorial area of 5,193,250 km$^2$, IUUF is never foreign to Indonesia. Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone which spread as wide as 2.8 million square kilometers, is the main target for IUUF. This area covers seas like Arafura Sea, Sulawesi Sea, North Moluccas Sea, Malacca Strait, the recently named North Natuna Sea, and all seas along Indonesia’s sea border. IUUF cases by Foreign Fishing Vessels in Indonesia have been steadily increasing in the last 10 years, ranging from 24 cases in 2005 to its peak at 159 cases in 2010 in which Indonesia caught FFV from Philippines, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. On the other hand, Indonesia's FFV have also committed such crime in local territorial water and territory of other states, for example when 49 Indonesian-flagged vessels were seized in Australian waters for conducting IUUF in May 2007 (Septaria, 2016).

IUUF indeed have caused damaging impact on marine resources and local economy, and more importantly, have become a significant part of transnational crime. Aside from transgressing national sovereignty, in Sulawesi Sea alone, APEC estimated that IUUF costs a loss of Rp 882 billion or US$ 103 million in 2003 (Palma & Tsamenyi, 2007). A study by Dirhamsyah also found that IUUF is largely conducted using environmentally unfriendly capture methods such as trawls, fish trap, gillnet, even using chemicals sodium cyanide which is lethal for human body (Dirhamsyah, 2012). The transnational and criminal nature of IUUF brings along other crimes with it: MMAF was shocked when Associated Press found a Thai-flagged FFF practicing slavery of hundreds of Laotian, Burmese and Thai, many of whom have died (Wright, 2015). Such practice is accompanied with corruption, drug and people smuggling, and human trafficking (Liddick, 2014).

Attempt at containing IUUF has been made for years, both through international agreement or in national policy context. Due
to IUUF’s transnational nature, this illicit activity has forced international authorities to establish regulations such as 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement, FAO’s International Plan of Action of IUU (IPOA-IUU) Fishing, even as far back as UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The legal basis to fight IUUF in Indonesia was revised in 2004 when the old Law No. 9/1985 was replaced with Law No. 31/2004. This law, as a product of decentralization, allows local authorities to manage its own territorial waters yet it is uncertain whether the protection measure of marine resources is also regulated within it (Patlis, 2007). It is during this time that IUUF started to increase drastically until the release of new law on Fisheries No.45/2009 which specifically explain measures in enacting prohibition of IUUF. The 2009 Fisheries law provided a legal framework to execute FFV that committed IUUF by burning it down or sinking it. To prevent and control IUUF, MMAF issued regulations and measures that include vessels monitoring satellites (VMS), fishing logbooks, inspection and observation, and the use of electronic evidence at court (Sodik, 2009). Nevertheless, the implementation is weak, far from IPOA-IUU’s standard, while IUUF was already rampant and on the rise.

Securitization: An Analytical Framework

The study of security has been experiencing a massive expansion in recent decades. Traditionally, security studies was always identified with concern about threat to state and the use of force, which involves issues like strategic thinking, military strength, and coercive diplomacy in the discussion (Collins, 202016). However, during 1970s to 1990s, several developments have changed the way that policy makers think about security, because various issues like climate change, grave and massive human rights violation, widespread and severe global pandemic, and economic crisis have been uttered in security terms. Buzan posits in his book People, States and Fear that narrow conceptual foundation of traditional security studies makes it inadequate to serve as analytical tool for such diverse security phenomenon (Buzan, 1991).

To resolve this problem, Buzan proposed an expansion of security to encompass wider framework. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde who at that moment were working at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, captured this expansion by crafting securitization theory, proposing a breakthrough from traditional understanding and assumption on security (Emmers, 2016). In a book entitled Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan et al. argues that security is a product of social construction, rather than naturally given, through intersubjective process named securitization in which an issue is ascended from normal political consideration and being regarded as above politics (Buzan, Waever, & deWilde, 1998).

There are three spectrum in securitization: an issue is non-politicized when it is not a matter of public debate and state’s concern, it is lifted onto politicized spectrum when it is managed with standard political procedure, become a public debate and considered as daily political life (Buzan et al., 1998). An issue is securitized when there is a consensus that it poses an existential threat to a referent object and removed from political debate, thus requiring more allocation of resources to solve the problem and maintain survival. It opens possibility for any issue and therefore anyone to present an issue as a matter of security, thus allowing more inclusive security paradigm. But it also risks blurring the meaning of security that everything and
therefore nothing in particular is a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998). This so-called Copenhagen School of security studies asserts that security is constituted of not only military security as in its traditional form, but also non-traditional ones such as political, political security, economic security, environmental security and societal security (Collins, 2020).

Securitizing act started when, first, security utterances is made by securitizing actor, and it is completed once the second stage is reached, which is audience acceptance that an issue in indeed a threat (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers, 2006; Emmers, 2016). Meanwhile, desecuritization refers to the reverse process in which an issue is shifted back to normal politics. There are several important elements in the act of securitization: securitizing actor, speech acts, audience, existential threat, referent object and extraordinary measure.

- Securitizing actors are those who articulate the existence of a threat to an object's survival, which include, but not limited to government, international organizations, or civil society (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers, 2006). The core securitizing actor should be the first one who conduct security utterance, but this is oftentimes difficult to identify because of overlapping actors voicing similar argument.
- Speech acts is the core essence of securitization, which can be understood as an act of using performativity of language to utter security and provoke changes in social reality as the proponent intended (Balzacq et al., 2016). Actors do not necessarily use the term 'security' or 'existential threat', rather, using security grammar to allow illustration about the existential threat among audience is sufficient to be classified as an attempt at securitizing.
- Audiences are the target of security utterances who determine the acceptance or non-acceptance of securitization. There are two kinds of audience: enabling audience who possess power and wider public audience who provides moral support (Balzaq et al., 2016). The acceptance of enabling audience is crucial to provide securitizing actor with formal mandate to continue securitizing. A successful act of securitization is achieved once audience accepted securitizing actor's proposal that an issue is an existential threat.
- Existential threat refers to an issue or problem that poses challenge to survival that without any counteraction will annihilate the existence of referent object. Solidum et al. classifies threats into three categories: actual existing threat that constrain security, potential threat that materialize under specific conditions, and fictitious threat that is merely perceived as a threat (Solidum, Saldivar-Sali, & Dubsky, 1991).
- Referent object is the threatened object that needs to be protected. Based on security classification, these might include individuals as well as groups and institution such as national economies, sovereignty, collective identities, species and habitat, etc (Adiong, 2010).
Extraordinary measures are any measure that is justified and does not require political debate due to the urgency of issue being managed. There are cases where actors do not adopt extraordinary measure, nevertheless securitizing actors who have been authorized through audience acceptance, can use such measure when necessary.

Despite extensive discussion on securitization, the framework is still on working progress because many aspects have been found problematic. With such a loose definition of security utterance and ambiguous scope of extraordinary measure, it is oftentimes difficult to identify whether any utterances, documents, regulation or change in policy can be categorized as securitization (Emmers, 2016). Additionally, the relation between securitizing actor and audience is not well-theorized. Successful securitization may bring parties that once was an audience to conduct securitization as well, expanding the scope of securitizing actors and blurring the boundaries between securitizing actor and audience. Empirical studies are necessary to test the workability of securitization as framework for analysis, to further contribute to theoretical development. Such is the core agenda of this study, and it will be conducted by exploring the above elements of securitization.

Method

Using securitization as a framework for analysis, this paper identifies, formulates and analyses components of securitization from the abovementioned speech acts. The researcher conducted qualitative descriptive research on these speech acts obtained from the internet as primary data. This study explores speech act in both written and spoken form during minister Susi’s term in office (from October 2014 to May 2018 when this study is conducted). There are news available online but these are not direct security utterances from Susi Pudjiastuti, rather a secondary source for study (Fardah, 2014). The following speech act represents the official discourse proposed by minister Susi herself to the audience. This section will explore 3 forms of security utterances in which IUUF is proposed as threat:


These documents are chosen because these are primary sources where minister Susi directly expresses her thoughts in public. Moreover, in Speech Act 1, Susi told her story about how she attempted to convince president Jokowi on enacting fisheries law as prescribed. Meanwhile, Speech Act 2 and Speech Act 3 are the evidence that minister Susi were actively promoting to the audience the importance of tackling IUUF in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Securitizing Actor

To identify securitizing actor, this analysis is based on three criteria: that an actor (1) expresses the urgency of an issue in a speech act and (2) articulate the existential threat to survival. There are two actors voicing the urgency of IUUF problem in
Indonesia: Indonesian president Jokowi and minister Susi. Both Jokowi and Susi fulfilled the criteria of a securitizing actor in terms of speech act, as both expressed the significance of IUUF issue. In 19 November 2014, Jokowi did declare war against IUUF during his speech at National Resilience Institute, a month after his inauguration (Widhiarto, 2014). It is an integral part of Jokowi’s ambition to turn Indonesia into a ‘global maritime fulcrum,’ which he mentioned as early as May 2014 during presidential campaign (Shekhar & Liow, 2014). Similarly, in her writing published by The Jakarta Post, minister Susi asserted that she wants to ‘protect our (Indonesian) water from fisheries crime’ (Pudjiastuti, 2016). Generally, it can be argued that it is both Jokowi and Susi who, collectively within Indonesia government within Jokowi’s Working Cabinet administration, securitizes IUUF.

When it comes to specific securitizing actor, however, it requires further exploration between two actors: who convinced who. Such analysis will uncover the power relations between both government officials in Indonesian government, makes it clear who securitized it initially. In his speech during presidential campaign, Jokowi already specified that illegal fishing is one of his priority if he were elected (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). This means that he already commit himself and his future administration to this cause. When he assumed office in October that year, he recruited Susi Pudjiastuti who at that time was a prominent entrepreneur in fishing and aviation industry, to fill MMAF position in his cabinet. In her speech at Stimson Center, Susi narrated her experience when she proposed to president Jokowi to execute uncomplying FFF using Law No.45/2009 on Fisheries as legal framework and to enforce this law firmly (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). She also ensured Jokowi that this is in line with his vision to see Indonesian seas as the ‘front façade’ of Indonesian nation therefore full fledged measure involving many government agencies including the navy (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). It is evident that before holding their respective post in office, both Jokowi and Susi already agreed on the importance of curbing IUUF, however it is minister Susi who convinced president Jokowi that normal politics is inadequate, that it requires more extreme measure. Understanding that it is minister who try to convince Jokowi, it can be said that she is the securitizing actor in this case.

Susi’s Speech Act: IUUF as Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)

The argument that the centrality of ocean is critical for human being and the environment, forms the basis of Susi’s proposition. In speech act 1 and 3, Susi always put forward national mission pledged by Jokowi to turn Indonesia into a ‘global maritime axis’ and make ocean as the front façade (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). This is strengthened by her argument in Speech Act 3 that small-scale fishers constitute a significant of population, thus the existence of IUUF will jeopardize the livelihood of these fishers (FAO, 2018). In the same speech, she further emphasizes that ocean comprised of 71 % of planet Earth, therefore concern should be directed to ocean to tackle climate change (FAO, 2018).

The main threat introduced by minister Susi is IUU Fishing as TOC. In speech act 3, she argued that fish stock in Indonesia has been stolen by more than 17,000 FFF operated in Indonesian water, causing damage in economy, environment and is a breach of sovereignty (FAO, 2018). IUUF is constantly condoning overfishing of marine resources in coastal countries, therefore threatening blue economy that has become source of
income for millions of fishers (FAO, 2018). Apparently, Susi argues in speech act 2, it has caused 90% decrease on fish stock and state losses of approximately US$ 20 billion annually for Indonesia only (Pudjiastuti, 2016). Number of fishermen also halved to only 800,000 in 2013, which suggests that they’re rapidly decreasing and additionally, in speech act 1, overfishing by IUUF causes local fishing industries to go bankrupt (Pudjiastuti, 2016) (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). Because of its underground nature, IUUF is organized across border which carries along not only IUUF but also other crimes they carry out to support IUUF such as slavery, white collar crimes, tax fraud, smuggling on drugs, human and illicit commodities like endangered species (Pudjiastuti, 2016).

In articulating this threat, she uses the language that suggests security sense of the issue. The word ‘protect’ is mentioned in speech act 1 and 2, suggesting that something is to be preserved and that there is something that harms. She explains that there is ‘depleting fish stock/marine resource’ which means that it will no longer exist if measures are not taken. Furthermore, she explains her estimation on FFF’s action in circumscribing MMAF’s measure using strategic terms, such ‘moving vessel’ which in the context can be interpreted as a countermeasure, ‘enjoined force’ with other countries and ‘calculation’ of what to do next (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017) (FAO, 2018). Susi exerts in Speech Act 3 that in doing her job she ‘would not compromise with anything,’ which can be translated that she would be bothered by political debate. The most explicit of all is when she mentioned overfishing by IUUF as ‘major threat.’ Interestingly, minister Susi mentions that she has not gone any further to use ‘force’ to stop IUUF because it is currently not necessary, but it nevertheless indicates that she has the power to employ it if needed.

Susi Pudjiastuti delivered these messages in a persuasive manner and practice ‘othering’ in her language. She opens the speech act 2 with ‘you will agree with me,’ assuming to herself that what she contends can be universally accepted. They way that she exhibits her success in repressing IUUF and generates economic and environmental gain for her policy, suggests an invite that people should follow her steps. Indeed in speech act 3, she explicitly invites decision makers to imitate this policy (FAO, 2018). She also uses ‘one ocean, one world’ proverb which consequently brings a sense of threat if one do not act in saving its own seas. In the same proverb, she practices social ‘othering’ by turning ‘I’ into a ‘we’ because everyone would be included in one world sharing the same ocean.

**Protecting Indonesia’s Territorial Water**

In promoting IUUF as a security issue, minister Susi uses the idea that there are three main concerns based on president Jokowi’s vision: sovereignty, sustainability and prosperity. These visions can be translated into discourses that Susi employs in telling IUUF story: political security in terms of sovereignty, economic security is interpreted as prosperity and environmental security as sustainability.

In terms of political security, the general referent object is national sovereignty from unauthorized access of FFF to national waters. IUUF activity essentially involves breach of sovereignty of the target country by crossing border without proper authorization and conducting oftentimes illegal and criminal activity in the area. In international context, minister Susi refers to the border enforcement which constitutes national integrity and sovereignty. In speech act 2, Susi mentioned that deterrent
effect works well and that keeps the border unviolated, which indicates that border is the one to be protected (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). Later Susi asserts the importance of curbing IUUF for small and low-lying islands states because it will ‘keep their water safe’ (FAO, 2018). In this sentence, she offers territorial waters as referent object. From the above discussion, in terms of political security, the specific referent object is territorial integrity of Indonesian waters.

Economic security is the main argument brought to public in regards with IUUF problem. Minister Susi constantly highlights that despite Indonesia’s large territorial waters, the fisheries produce rank only 3rd compared to smaller Southeast Asian countries (FAO, 2018). As a businesswoman in a fishing industry herself, minister Susi owns the logic of a fisher, and feels the negative impact of IUUF in Pangandaran, her hometown. This logic naturally brings her the idea that minister Susi expressed in speech act 1, because of IUUF, the most vulnerable group would be small-scale fishers who are already known as one of the poorest occupational group in Indonesia (Pudjiastuti, 2016). In this case, minister Susi pointed to her mission to create prosperity. Speech act 2 re-enact this argument when Susi uses increasing purchasing power, competitiveness among fishers as indicator of her success (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). The referent object in this case is fishing industry.

However, minister Susi later asserted in the same speech that the fish stocks is ‘depleting’, and that IUUF have exploited ‘marine and fisheries resources’ (Pudjiastuti, 2016). This implicitly means that fish stock must not deplete and therefore minister Susi aims for continued supply of marine resources. Indeed, it is renewable, however one would refrain from consuming, or limit consumption if one were to maintain its supply. It seems from these sentences that fish stock in the sea is a referent environmental object. But when she mentioned biomass index, health of oceans and recovery rate were consulted as indicator for success, this means that Susi also concerns for environmental sustainability (FAO, 2018; Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). But it is actually the interrelation between fish stock and fishing industry that concern her, which is manifested in the sustainability of both marine economy, its resources and wildlife.

It can be inferred from the above discussion that the integrity of Indonesian sea and resources within it, is the referent object of Susi’s securitizing act.

Audience Support

In the case of securitization of IUUF by minister Susi, there are two audience: president Jokowi as the enabling audience and general public opinion. President Jokowi by himself also consider IUUF issue as crucial in his mission, yet he did not went further as to argue that such extreme measure would be required (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). In speech act 1, Susi elaborated how she tried to convince president Jokowi about the importance of allocating more resource and to move the issue above normal political consideration (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). Due to unavailable primary source, the study cannot be conducted on primary source. Yet it can be predicted that Susi persuaded president Jokowi behind the screen, probably during cabinet meetings. Indeed, she mentioned that it is only after four meetings that she can convinced the entire cabinet (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). As evident from the implementation of her proposed measure, minister Susi have successfully securitized IUUF issue and gained formal mandate.
While she’s popular among Indonesian population, her policy attracts criticism from neighboring countries and political elites. Her brave step in sinking so many vessels combined with her tattoo, her unconventionally tough personality as a lady and her bright achievement in governing Indonesia’s sea have awarded her reputation as media darling (Dante, 2014). Many netizen named her a legend, a hero, even the new Kartini, as evident in comments on speech act 1. Despite some small protests by small scale fishers in several localities, her policy has largely been praised by most fishers and general public (Gunawan, 2018); (Hikmal, 2015); (Coconuts, 2018). And again, despite some protests from neighboring countries like Malaysia, China and Taiwan, minister Susi generally has been seen as a heroine, praised by many, as mentioned earlier in the introduction. Given the nation-wide and global-wide support on her cause, it can be argued that her effort in securitizing IUUF has achieved a high degree of success.

Extraordinary Measures: Surging Budgets and Policies in Tackling IUUF

There is a significant change in policy measure in tackling IUUF in Indonesia after Susi rose to ministerial position. Previously, Indonesia’s past administration handled IUUF with legal administrative manner and lacking in actual law enforcement on the seas. Law No.45/2009, without any revision, is the legal basis for Susi’s action, yet before that, from 2009 to 2012, only 37 vessels were sunk compared to 363 during Susi’s term (detikFinance, 2014). Susi argues that past regulation have allowed concessions for FFF, which is the main loophole in which deceptive foreign fishermen took advantage by duplicating their registration (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). As a result, the number of IUUF surged rapidly after (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). Past measure to stop IUUF has not worked well, because politicians were using it for personal gain, thus weakening the technical, administrative and judicial measure (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017) (Sodik, 2009).

Susi started her countermeasure against IUUF by reviewing implementation of fisheries regulation. Ministerial Regulation (MR) No. 57/2014 was released in November 2014, prohibiting transshipment at sea, a process of transferring fish catch to other transport vessels for processing or transporting without passing through Indonesian fishing authority. Shortly before that, Susi signed a moratorium for ex-FFF in Indonesian waters No.56/PERMEN-KP/2015. This moratorium, which lasted for a year, provided a space for MMAF to investigate 1,132 existing permits issued for ex-FFF. The fishing activity of these fleets were then evaluated based on the existing fisheries law. It is during this time that Pusaka Benjina, a fishing company practicing forced labor and human trafficking, were discovered (Wright, 2015).

In responding to IUUF, minister Susi utilized Article 69 (4) which specifically regulates the burn down/sinking of vessels caught illegally fishing. To do this, Task Force 115 is established under Presidential Decree No.115/2015 to eradicate illegal fishing in Indonesian waters (Task Force 115, 2015). This body is headed by government officials from MMAF, Navy, Indonesian Coast Guard, National Police, and Public Prosecutors. The main activity of this task force is monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) on Indonesian sea border front, functions that the previous administration failed to

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Kartini is an Indonesian renown feminist heroine who fight for women education during Dutch colonial era.
execute. This task force also manages the operational of sink-the-vessel activity, which is conducted only when appropriate judicial process have finished. In exploding vessel, Task Force 115 carefully assesses the explosives, its location and after the crew has been rescued first (Task Force 115, 2017). It is in this task force that the security-ness of measures in combatting IUUF most evident.

The unique strategy that minister Susi adopt to create deterrent effect is through extensive publicity of sink-the-vessels action. In these videos, the image of a vessel getting exploded and crumbled into pieces then slowly sink becomes a sensational content. Through this action, minister Susi warns FFF to comply with Indonesia’s regulation or otherwise will ended up just as the blown-up vessels (Pudjiastuti & Yozell, 2017). It demonstrates that the current administration will enforce fisheries law to its furthest extent possible and loose practices during the last 15 years is now a history. To add even more, her popularity serves this function well because the spread of ‘sink it’ memes depicting her as a courageous and firm figure, went viral on social media.

In comparison, prior to Susi’s administration, the measure taken to put an end to IUUF has been conducted in legal-administrative manner, while during her terms, regulation is treated as necessary framework for action. While past technical approach, although indeed exist, was weak and largely inoperative, current measures are more practical and responding to threat directly. Although military have been involved through Task Force 115, Susi insisted that these are yet to be called the use of force. When she said that she has not used force in her FAO remarks, it can be inferred that she has not use force to the maximum extent possible. Looking at the above measure, even if Susi have not uttered the danger of IUUF, significant changes in policy can be seen as securitization in practice-based approach.

**Conclusion**

Securitization framework is used to determine whether Susi Pudjiastuti action in sinking the vessels and uttering IUUF can be categorized as a security issue. Susi Pudjiastuti as Indonesian Minister for Maritime for Foreign Affairs, acts as the main securitizing actor because she is the one who attempted to convince everyone about the urgency of tackling IUUF. In delivering her message, minister Susi proposes the idea that, based on Jokowi’s global maritime fulcrum vision, IUUF is a dangerous kind of TOC, using the grammar of security such as ‘protect,’ ‘depleting,’ ‘force,’ etc. in a persuasive manner. Therefore, Indonesian territory, fishing industry and marine biodiversity in particular or the integrity of Indonesian territorial waters with its resources in it, should be protected. Jokowi, as the enabling audiences who holds power, accepted Susi’s proposition, as is Indonesian public opinion. Susi’s measure in tackling IUUF is significant different compared to the past, which suggest a change in policy. Moreover, her approach is more on firm action compared to legal-administrative manner in the past. Given the wide acceptance of public and enabling audience, it can be said that Susi Pudjiastuti has acquired such a high degree of success in her securitization of IUUF.
bangan dalam menjalani kehidupan, termasuk dalam kehidupan berpolitik. Kalangan politisi pesantren, tetap menjadikan restu kiai sebagai kekuatan dalam setiap langkah dan gerak politik yang dilakukan. Hal itu dalam derajat tertentu, semakin menunjukkan tentang tingkat kepatuhan seorang santri terhadap kiai, sehingga perilaku politik yang geluti tetap didasarkan pada arahan dan pertimbangan seorang kiai yang telah membesarkannya selama berada di pesantren.

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