

Reconciliation and Fulfillment of Civil Rights: Case of Ahmadiyya Adherents in Manislor, Kuningan, West Java

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Abstract

Religious conflicts pose a threat to social integration, including those involving the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Indonesia. This article discusses the post-conflict reconciliation and fulfillment of civil rights among Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor, Kuningan, West Java, Indonesia. Social actors have a powerful position in the reconciliation and fulfillment of civil rights, which have become one of their most apparent violations against Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor. This study uses a qualitative approach with data collected through fieldwork and ethnographic observations with Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor. This article scrutinizes 1) the typologies of post-conflict reconciliation, 2) reconciliation efforts in the communities by leveraging cultural and religious aspects, and 3) the struggles of fulfilling civil rights, such as issuing marriage certificates and identification cards. The results show that the willingness of Ahmadiyya elites to meet with stakeholders and socio-religious organizations, particularly in Kuningan regency, created a space for a dialogue of understanding that helped the reconciliation between Ahmadiyya and the wider community in Manislor. This study contributes to clarifying the pattern of reconciliation based on the local approaches durably practiced by Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor, Kuningan, West Java.

Konflik agama yang terjadi di masyarakat mempunyai efek laten yang seringkali menghambat proses integrasi sosial, termasuk dalam kasus Ahmadiyah. Artikel ini membahas tentang proses rekonsiliasi, khususnya pemenuhan hak-hak sipil, pasca konflik dan perselisihan sengit yang terjadi di kalangan penganut Ahmadiyah di Manislor, Kuningan, Jawa Barat, Indonesia. Posisi para aktor sosial telah terungkap sebagai dampak yang kuat dalam rekonsiliasi untuk menjelaskan tentang realisasi hak-hak sipil, yang telah menjadi salah satu fakta paling buruk terhadap penganut Ahmadiyah di Manislor. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan melakukan kerja lapangan dan tinggal bersama penganut Ahmadiyah di Manislor untuk melakukan observasi, wawancara, dan dokumentasi. Artikel ini mengkaji 1) tipologi rekonsiliasi pasca konflik, 2) upaya rekonsiliasi yang dilakukan dalam konteks komunal dengan memanfaatkan aspek budaya dan agama, dan 3) naik turunnya pemenuhan sejarah hak-hak sipil untuk memfasilitasi hak-hak masyarakat melalui penggunaan akta nikah dan kartu tanda penduduk. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa kesediaan elite Ahmadiyah untuk bertemu dengan pemangku kepentingan dan organisasi sosial keagamaan, khususnya di Kabupaten Kuningan, menciptakan ruang dialog pemahaman yang membantu rekonsiliasi antara Ahmadiyah dengan masyarakat luas di Manislor. Penelitian ini berkontribusi untuk memperjelas pola rekonsiliasi berdasarkan pendekatan lokal yang selama ini dilakukan oleh jemaah Ahmadiyah di Manislor, Kuningan, Jawa Barat.

Keywords: Ahmadiyya; civil right; Manislor; reconciliation; religious conflict

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Introduction

The Ahmadiyya adherents often experience threats, intimidation, and violence in the Muslim world (Crouch 2011), including Indonesia (Connley 2016). After the downfall of Soeharto, social conflict and violence against the Ahmadiyya increased. Tensions arose in many areas, including Manislor (Kuningan, West Java) (Hicks 2014), Cikeusik (Pandeglang, Banten) (Crouch 2012), and East Lombok (Burhani 2016), reaching a peak during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Suryana 2019). The tensions have increased even more with the growth of conservative Islam adherents, whose intolerance toward Ahmadiyya adherents has become increasingly apparent (Soedirgo 2018). Despite the peace initiatives, discrimination and persecution of Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor continue structurally, culturally, and socially (Sulistiyati 2017). Although Ahmadiyya adherents are the majority in the village, the population is a minority compared to the entire Kuningan Regency. Most of the Kuningan population (approximately 1.1 million in 2013) is Sunni Muslim (Suryana 2017).

Conflicts and violence among religious and ethnic communities were rising during the presidential administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2005-2010), triggered by the increasing discriminative acts (Suryana 2019), such as stigmatizing the believers of Ahmadiyya (Sodik, Susetiawan, and Abdullah 2015). These several facts are rooted in the inception of the Joint Ministerial Decree (*Surat Keputusan Bersama/SKB*) issued by Yudhoyono's administration (Sodik, Gufron, and Sujibto 2022). Data from the Indonesian Survey Institute (*Lembaga Survei Indonesia/LSI*) and Kontras recorded 1,483 cases from 2005 to 2012, or an average of 210 cases per year (Mdk and Tyo 2012). The

intolerance and persecution of Ahmadiyya adherents continued to the administration of the incumbent president, Joko Widodo (Komnas HAM 2018). The results of research conducted by the Indonesian National Committee of Human Rights (Komnas HAM RI), the Setara Institute, and the Wahid Institute show that local governments, both provincial and municipal, are the main perpetrators of violations of the rights and freedom of the Ahmadiyya adherents to believe and practice their religion (Irawan 2017).

Previous studies on the conflicts involving the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia have shown that they were rooted in theological disputes, which were later spread to different levels of society and escalated into violence (Mariani 2013). Research has also shown that jihad was used to justify violence toward the Ahmadiyya community (Burhani 2021). Other studies showed the links between the conflicts with SKB and the discrimination against minorities (Sodik et al. 2022; Connley 2016), the absence of state (Qurtuby 2012; Suryana 2018), the discourse of media in covering religious conflicts (Dulwahab et al. 2021), the peace process (Almujaddidy 2017; Noor 2015; Fadhillah 2017), and the fulfillment of the Ahmadiyya adherents' civil rights (Wahab 2015). Under the administration of President Yudhoyono, there were many civil rights violations against Ahmadiyya adherents, including withholding the issuance of identity cards (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk/KTP*) (Pamungkas 2018) and Family Cards (*Kartu Keluarga/KK*) (Almujaddidy 2017), marriage registration, and birth certificates (Hicks 2014). Stakeholders have sought reconciliation to overcome the violence and conflicts involving Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor and build peace among the communities (Noor et al.

2016). However, to be impactful, peace initiatives must be part of a perpetual process that builds supportive social systems (Nurdin et al. 2019).

This article aims to examine the resurgence of Ahmadiyya-related conflicts in Manislor following the progressive post-conflict initiatives to seek reconciliation and reduce tensions in the communities. Many stakeholders, including the state apparatuses, have taken different approaches to creating peace and harmony within society (Sodik and Sujibto 2020) and preventing conflict escalation (Suryana 2017). The Ahmadiyya group consists of 3,200 adherents, or approximately 70 percent of the total population in the village, so peacebuilding needs to consider their unique position as a majority. The Ahmadiyya adherents have particular ways of contributing to peaceful and productive coexistence (Del Re 2014).

This study fills the gap in the literature by providing data on post-conflict reconciliation and resolutions initiated by internal and external stakeholders in Manislor. Previous studies have not considered the involvement of local stakeholders in establishing dialogue or how they have systematically initiated post-conflict reconciliation. Therefore, this research seeks to discover the dynamics and typologies of post-conflict reconciliation, the roles of internal and external stakeholders, and the process of fulfilling the civil rights of Ahmadiyya adherents.

This study uses a qualitative approach with data collected from fieldwork, ethnographic observations, interviews, documentation, and archives. The fieldwork was conducted from 2018 to 2020, with multiple visits to Manislor to examine the reconciliation process and the fulfillment of the civil rights of the Ahmadiyya

adherents. Information was gathered from key informants, who could be considered representative of the groups (internal and external). Since the technique of identifying key informants is fundamental to ensure a proper representation of a community (Alasuutari, Bickman, and Brannen 2008), this study uses the following inclusive criteria: 1) prominent figures of Ahmadiyya, such as preachers and heads of the community, 2) the Manislor's village head, 3) officials from the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and 4) religious actors of Nahdatul Ulama in Kuningan.

This selection process also aimed to ensure a diverse and comprehensive set of perspectives and experiences that reflect the various segments of society. Several factors were considered in selecting informants to ensure the robustness of data and information. They were selected using purposive sampling, with deliberation based on the suitability between their experience and the research questions and the characteristics of being a 'good informant.' This purposive sampling recruited informants with the expertise and knowledge aligned with the research objectives. This approach ensured that the insights gauged could contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the research topic.

Following the rigorous selection of informants, the data were collected from observation and documentation for the analysis. The collected data were analyzed qualitatively by following Maxwell's scheme (Maxwell 2013), which puts them into three main groups: 1) memos, 2) categorizing (such as coding and thematic analysis), and 3) connecting (such as narrative analysis). The findings show that post-conflict reconciliation is important. Various factors have influenced Ahmadiyya adherents in

Manislor to become aware collectively to minimize the conflict and tension and create a solution to maintain harmony and peace-building.

The Urgency of Reconciliation

Reconciliation is prevalent among societies with histories of inequity and conflicts (Nikolakis 2020) and is critical to attaining lasting peace, political stability, and a just society governed by law (African Union Panel of the Wise 2013). Reconciliation is difficult to achieve, and the idea, in a strong sense, is utopian, but the idealistic applications can be realized by a collective effort of the groups involved in the conflict (Bhargava 2012). Reconciliation involves transitional justice, i.e., processes and mechanisms to deal with past abuses and histories and achieve accountability, justice, and peace (Satkunanathan 2014; Porter 2007).

Considering the complex nature of reconciliation, neither the process nor the goal becomes the main focus of its definition. Reconciliation focuses on future aspirations, something important to strive for, or even an ideal state to hope for (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huysse 2003) that brings sustainable peace. To recognize the typologies of post-conflict reconciliation, this article proposes to understand how reconciliation can reduce, to some degree, the fatal impacts of a direct and aggressive conflict. According to (Bhargava 2012), the notion of reconciliation exists in two senses. In a weaker sense, it is defined as a 'resignation,' and in a stronger sense, it is a cancellation of enmity or estrangement. In this sense, reconciliation is done through a morally grounded forgiveness, as the conflicting groups acknowledge the collective responsibility for past injustice and overcome their prejudices

through a profound and painful identity transformation. This second notion seems too idealistic to carry out, but local stakeholders are optimistic about bringing peace and bridging a heart-to-heart dialogue.

Ahmadiyya is headquartered in London, promoting a mission of peaceful sermons (*da'wah*) with the motto 'love for all, hatred for none' (Ahmad and Shah 2016). It refutes an accusation that it is a political movement aiming to unite all Muslims into a nation under a caliph's leadership (Valentine 2008). Interestingly, the concept of a caliph for the Ahmadiyya is a spiritual superstructure attached only to social humanity (Faiz et al. 2019). Ahmadiyya adherents in Indonesia, including in Manislor, declare that they never question the philosophical theory of Indonesia, Pancasila, or the application of other state regulations in Indonesia (Budiman 2020). Pancasila is not in contestation with Ahmadiyya's concept of caliph because the adherents remain national citizens of their respective countries and must comply with the laws. As a religious organization, Ahmadiyya is fully integrated into the adherents' social life.

The Ahmadiyya community is the majority in Manislor. The adherents can resolve tensions and build social cohesion by leveraging social and cultural systems, such as the value of kinship in the village (Kuwuh, interviewed on February 22, 2019). Other factors have also demanded the community to learn how to observe and adapt to survive. As a minority group in the mainstream Muslim community, they learn to adjust. They internally constructed 'the art of survival' to help them deal with social and cultural challenges from the external community (Rohmana 2020). They immediately recognized the urgency of reconciliation as a part of the peace process

participated in by many stakeholders in the village. The participation of local actors in managing and resolving their problems helped the reconciliation process and made it sustainable (Bhargava 2012).

Typologies of Reconciliation

Defusing Conflicts and Tensions

Growing religious tensions remain challenges that local stakeholders in Manislor have to overcome using different approaches. Over the years, reconciliation efforts have gradually decreased societal tensions and conflicts. The success of such peacebuilding can be attributed to internal and external factors. The first internal factor is kinship within the Manislor community, including between the Ahmadi (the Ahmadiyya adherents) and the non-Ahmadi (*ghayr*). The *second* internal factor is the existence of joint social activities, which indirectly contribute to social cohesion and positively impact the members, such as *Karang Taruna* (Youth Organization), women's organizations, sports clubs, and so on. The third factor is the involvement of elites and religious leaders within the village administration and the governmental structure (Aini and Mustaqim 2016).

Meanwhile, the first external factor is changes and transitions of formal leadership at the regional and local levels, which provide room for stakeholder negotiation. Compromises and leadership transitions were the most noticeable indicators that the reconciliation and peacebuilding process involving the Ahmadiyya adherents were achievable. The second factor is the involvement and concern of various societal stakeholders, such as intellectuals, universities, NGOs, elites, and national and local figures, who

educated the public and constructed the public's perspective on Ahmadiyya. The third factor is the support from the socio-religious groups, including Nahdlatul Ulama (one of the biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia). The local Institute for Study and Human Resource Development (*Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia/ Lakpesdam*) was initiated by young cadres of NU. It has an important role in building harmony and reducing tensions between Ahmadiyya adherents and the local government.

The roles of NU in mediating parties in the Manislor community turn tensions into dialogues. It has significantly facilitated the peacebuilding process and reconciliation efforts. The concept of *manhaj* (clear path) in NU focuses on the *ukhuwwah Islāmiyyah* (Muslim brotherhood principle). It helps strengthen social cohesion in Manislor. The understanding is that humanity has the same status as servants of God on Earth (*ukhuwwah insāniyyah/ bashariyyah*) and that the Muslim brotherhood is bound by the same bloodshed and the same nationality and homeland (*ukhuwwah waṭaniyyah*). These three values of brotherhood are found in the *Manhaj Aswaja* of NU. They serve as a logical basis for NU's involvement in the Ahmadiyya case for various fundamental reasons.

In dealing with external forces, Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor used to resist the majority. The resistance is not physical or confrontational but rather the struggle of discourse and power involving a knowledge system. The power is not centralized but distributed in all directions (power relations) where reconciliation is needed (African Union Panel of the Wise 2013). The strategies Ahmadiyya adherents used to resist external forces.

Building a Counter Narrative and Discourse

Discourse can be utilized as a tool to fight stigma, doctrine, and, in the case of Ahmadiyya, the insulting opinions of Ahmadiyya's belief systems. In this case, the discourses can be built and strengthened in the ideological-theological, juridical-political, and sociological-cultural contexts.

Theology

In response to the fatwas of the Indonesian Ulema Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia/ MUI*) Kuningan (2004) and MUI Jakarta (2005) concerning the heresy in the Ahmadiyya doctrines, the adherents built a counter-discourse by producing a narration of 'true Islam.' It includes several Ahmadiyya doctrines delivered in various activities, such as recitations, sermons, and audiovisual media. This narration of 'true Islam' was based on the recognition of the Ahmadi's social obligation to spread Islamic teachings. This obligation is perceived equally important as other obligations, such as prayer and *tarbiyat*, i.e., teaching and educational methods. Ahmadiyya adherents believe that this is their sacred mission as Muslims.

The Sunni Muslims are the majority in Indonesia, strongly influencing the discourses circulating in society. The Sunni majority dominates the international Islamic movement and the narration of culture, politics, and many other aspects of life. This domination, intentionally or not, invites a contestation. In the case of Ahmadiyya, the adherents are called to express themselves through public and competing discourses. For example, the

mainstream Sunni once implemented the 2005 MUI *fatwa*, referred to as the *Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islām* of the OIC, Resolution 4 (4/2) 1985 in the Second Congress of Jeddah. The *fatwa* clearly states that the Ahmadiyya are considered apostates and have left Islam. The Ahmadiyya activists countered the attacks against the community with their narrations. They consistently produced, reproduced, and spread their 'true Islamic' narrations. The summary of the competing narratives is presented in Table 1.

History

The second discourse is in the context of historical narratives. The Ahmadiyya's resistance was to rectify the misconstruction of their history that their opponents intentionally wrote incorrectly. In the constructed history of Ahmadiyya, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a false prophet. Meanwhile, the Ahmadiyya adherent genuinely believed that he was the chosen prophet of Allah. The common narratives spread in society states that the Ahmadiyya's *shahada* (Islamic oath) is *Lā ilāha illallāh Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Nabiyullāh* (I bear witness that there is no deity but God, and I bear witness that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the messenger of God) and that *hajj* (pilgrimage) is performed in Qadian-Rabwah.

The Ahmadiyya adherents counter these narratives by intensively promoting the narrative that their *shahada* is *Lā ilāha illallāh Muhammad Rasulullāh*, and the *hajj* is performed in Mecca-Madinah. Another false claim about Ahmadiyya's belief is that paradise can be obtained through paying a certain amount of money. It is countered by stressing that heaven is obtained through means of sacrifice.

Table 1
Representation of Islamic Theology (True Muslims)

	Sermon	↔ Ahmadiyya	Constructed discourse	Form of discourse
Text	Ahmadiyya is misleading	↔ Ahmadiyya is the right path for Islam	Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a legitimate messenger from God (al-Mahdi, al-Masih, Prophet)	Ideological-theological
Social recognition	The obligation to care for the people	↔ Obligation to recruit people and look after them	Inviting everyone to learn about and join Ahmadiyya as a holy mission	
Context	Sunni as the center	↔ Ahmadiyya as the center	The Ahmadiyya caliph is both <i>nubuwwah</i> (prophetic) and <i>ruhaniyyah</i> (spiritual) in nature, different from a political caliph	

Politics

Politics is an arena where the elites and other actors with vested interests capitalize on minority issues to gain power and benefits. After the fall of the New Order regime, minority groups, such as the Ahmadiyya, faced uncertainty more than ever. Political disputes and actors pressurized the Kuningan Regency’s local government to take immediate action. After the Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama/SKB) was issued, the local government emerged with a greater structural-political force through the regulations against Ahmadiyya, which essentially prohibited all forms of activities and Ahmadiyya teachings. The community was clearly being discriminated against by the state apparatus. In this case, inequality and conflicts inevitably become the starting point of the healing process (Nikolakis 2020).

The Ahmadiyya community produced a counter-discourse as a form of resistance. They refused to recognize the decree because its contents were against the state constitution. The

counter-narrative against the decree and its policy was based on the common roles of the state institutions and the fact that the constitution and international conventions protect freedom of belief. The organization was established as a legal entity registered with the Ministry of Justice as number JA. 5/23/13. 13-03-1953. In addition, the Ahmadiyya adherents’ dedication and loyalty were acknowledged in the struggle for independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The issuance of the decree was ‘resisted’ by the Ahmadiyya adherents by producing a discourse that any laws should aim to protect citizens. They insisted that laws must be autonomous and responsive to protect persecuted minority groups, and law enforcement must be strict against groups that commit violence.

Social and Cultural Aspects

The Ahmadiyya and Manislor communities exist as an inseparable unit. They take care of each other and have benefitted from each other.

The village is managed by the local stakeholders, mostly Ahmadiyya adherents. Living as a majority in the village, they are committed to building the social and cultural aspects and strengthening their social functions. As such, they organize the social system as well as possible and are always prepared to fulfill social and cultural needs in the best way to avoid tensions related to village management. Accordingly, the Manislor village has progressed and achieved several milestones, which have also benefitted the Ahmadiyya adherents as the local leaders. Historically, a non-Ahmadiyya candidate never won the elections for the local leadership in Manislor. At the village level, the local political power of the Ahmadiyya adherents is strongly supported by various social and cultural aspects to maintain religious solidarity and social cohesion (Kuwuh, interviewed on February 22 2019). In other words, Manislor has provided a number of political, economic, and cultural resources over time.

Developing the Arts of Defense

The arts of defense developed by Ahmadiyya adherents comprise three strategies. The first is avoidance, which is finding ways not to be involved. The second is disobedience, shown by openly rejecting orders or commands. The third is collaboration and fraternizing. These are the strategies to challenge the dominating power, especially the regulations and rules that infringe on their spaces.

Avoidance strategies are recommended when the Ahmadiyya adherents face legal problems and any issues related to official regulations. It should be noted that Ahmadiyya adherents do not violate the law. They obey the substance of the law, but they are against the

legal structure and its bureaucrats. For instance, the process of registering marital requirement documents was particularly difficult for them. In this case, they resist the legal structure (the local Religious Affairs Office/KUA in the region) by avoiding it and choosing to register at the KUA in a neighboring area. This shows that they comply with the law by fulfilling the marital documents. However, they bypass the law that puts them in a disadvantaged position by using alternative ways to achieve the same result. In this unfavorable situation, the Ahmadiyya adherents do not choose to unregister their marriage (commonly called *sirri* marriage), which is permitted according to Islamic law, but they are persistent in fighting against the legal structure and operational bureaucrats.

The Ahmadiyya adherents use various strategies to be more actively involved in society. Since Ahmadiyya is a missionary religion, approaching with a strategy is key to introducing the organization's value to social circumstances. They arrange it through various approaches to maintain social relations, such as attending social activities in the area and providing aid to those in need. Internally, Ahmadiyya has established social and economic systems through *chandah ám*, economic assistance collected from the adherents' assets and incomes. They have made this available in the public domain. The adherents even go above and beyond in making donations by donating eyes to anyone in need, including those outside the Ahmadiyya group (*ghayr*). They also actively organize social activities such as blood donations, disaster response, free medical treatment, and distributing *qurban* meat (the feast of sacrifice).

Stakeholders' Contribution to Reconciliation

In the peacebuilding process, the Ahmadiyya adherents engage as many stakeholders as possible to work hand-in-hand and promote the values of living in peace and harmony. NU has become the most supportive religious organization that assists in the peacebuilding process in Manislor. After gaining moral support from the official structure of the organization, NU's office in Kuningan worked hand-in-hand to support the peacebuilding process openly initiated by the internal leaders of the Ahmadiyya community. The Ahmadiyya community has also taken steps to overcome the aftermath of conflicts using social, cultural, and structural strategies (a member of Ansor, interviewed on February 23, 2019).

The tension began to subside when various non-structural circles of government started to pay attention to the issue. The Ahmadiyya leader in Manislor perpetually nurtures relationships with various social and religious groups, especially the moderate Islamic groups. NU plays a dominant role in this context through its stakeholders and NU members in the Manislor Office. This was reflected in the statement by the Ahmadiyya leader in Manislor.

"We also go to the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) and *kiai* (Islamic cleric) as well, such as *Kiai* Marjuki in Cirebon. Once, he sent a supportive letter to us, stating that all Muslims must be able to register their marriages. NU also supports us not to be afraid" (NH, interviewed on August 22, 2018).

This statement was confirmed by the Head of Manislor village, who is also an Ahmadi. He stated that he built relationships with government institutions and other groups to

enhance their reach. They also approached NU's figures by visiting Islamic boarding schools.

"Basically, whether you like it or not, the biggest religious organizations, such as NU, are still involved everywhere to support the peacebuilding process and reconciliation. As such, in religious issues, the government always consults and asks for advice from NU before making decisions" (Kuwuh, interviewed on August 23, 2018).

Building a good relationship between the local elites and Ahmadiyya leaders is a must to solve the complicated situations. A commitment like this is welcomed and supported by NU, which has proclaimed itself a moderate humanist organization advocating peace and tolerance. In line with this, as stated by Rusli Karim, there are two social functions of religion. The first is as a form of social cohesion that unites individuals and groups experiencing potential conflicts, and the second is as a social destruction that forces conflicts of interest between conflicting groups.

Thus far, it could be concluded that the NU figures in the Kuningan Office understood the anxiety of the Ahmadiyya figures in Manislor. People put humanity at the forefront rather than being stuck in the outdated debate of theological interpretation. As such, the involvement of NU figures in initiating peacebuilding in Manislor is a step toward a humanitarian mission. The Ahmadiyya adherents were viewed as fellow citizens guaranteed by the Constitution.

Among the NU figures in Kuningan with significant roles, Z was one of the key persons in the Lakpesdam of NU Kuningan at that time. He was a young figure and an activist who took part in the consolidation in Manislor. He explained that he initiated a program to promote tolerance in his role in Lakpesdam NU

Kuningan. He asked several prominent figures to talk about the cases experienced by the Ahmadiyya adherents. The findings show that they faced difficulty obtaining identification cards and martial certificates. He negotiated with supportive figures inside and outside of NU to resolve the problem and look for a solution (a member of the Ansor, interviewed on February 23, 2019).

The NU office in Kuningan held a focus group discussion (FGD) in collaboration with the Manislor village administrators by inviting other community stakeholders. Such FGD has allowed many sides of the community to hear and share perspectives to find the best way of defusing conflicts and tensions. The FGD was also attended by the head of the Religious Affairs Office (*Kantor Urusan Agama/KUA*), who stated that the KUA was willing to provide the registration of marriage documents of Ahmadiyya adherents. This collective awareness and understanding were shared among the stakeholders, which resulted in good resolutions. In Tunner's language, collective existence has become a part of individual subjectivity through a religious ritual. In the context of humanity, it encourages a person not to be trapped easily in the segregated space between *minna* (among us) and *minhum* (among them).

Building Social Harmony

Social harmony within the community has been established as a negotiation and social commitment for the Ahmadiyya adherents toward the outgroup. This commitment is informed by empirical findings and influenced by religious teachings. Meanwhile, there are concepts of reconciliation and conflict resolution that were held internally by the

community. The Ahmadiyya community in Manislor has passed the reconciliation and conflict resolution phases. Therefore, a follow-up, such as peacebuilding, must be conducted locally. Reconciliation throughout the peacebuilding process targets the ultimate goal of conflict management: positive peace. Following Galtung's view, the process can create a social system with neither structural nor direct violence. In other words, the peak of reconciliation and conflict resolution is harmony and building perpetual peace in the context of diversity.

In the national context, the Ahmadiyya community is known as a strong supporter of Indonesia as a republic and upholds the Pancasila national values. There has been no historical record of their rebellion against the country. The national narrative they built is not much different from the religious concept they believe in. The concept of the caliphate in the Ahmadiyya belief is none other than a spiritual concept, which has no conflict with political practice. They have centralized leadership led by a caliph (*khuzdur*), but this leadership is limited in the context of worship (spiritual). This is not much different from the leadership of *ṭāriqah* in the school of *taṣawwuf*, which Sunni groups widely follow.

The reconciliation process has been fruitful. The spirit of building harmony and peace becomes a noble idea and a long-term humanity project. The different interpretations of religion are seen as something complementary for the sake of plurality. Islam has become an inclusive religion for people with moral values, influencing life socially, politically, and culturally (Irawan 2017). In this case, tensions should be treated as forms of enrichment upon which peacebuilding can be built.

Stakeholders' Roles in Civil Right Fulfillment

The stakeholders' roles in resolving the Ahmadiyya issues in Manislor were significant, particularly in controlling and supporting civil rights fulfillment for those who lost their civil rights as citizens, such as obtaining an e-KTP (electronic identity card) and marriage documents. Indeed, after the severe conflict experienced by the Ahmadiyya adherents, the Religious Affairs Office (KUA) did not register the adherents' marriages on the grounds of administrative problems (YA, interviewed on February 22, 2019).

The presence of internal and external stakeholders in supporting civil rights fulfillment in a democratic country benefit both the Ahmadiyya adherents and the local officers. From the perspective of Ahmadiyya adherents, this support has encouraged them to speak up and show that democracy should advocate and provide freedom of expression and any form of organization. The social contract in the establishment of the state is the relationship framework between the state and citizens, materialized through the transfer of sovereignty by the people (Kuwuh, interviewed on February 22, 2019).

The Ahmadiyya adherents stood out to defend their rights by proposing the meaning of freedom in practicing the belief. For this reason, the state should protect people from threats and intimidation when practicing the belief.

Amid the dispute, the Ahmadiyya adherents learned from their supporters and advocates to escape conflicts and discrimination. Meanwhile, the local government's actions against the Ahmadiyya adherents in Manislor can be seen

as a practice of legal restraint and illegality before the law. The principle of recognition of equal rights before the law and government (Article 27 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution) guarantees the right to legal certainty (supremacy of law) (Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution) and guarantees personal protection, personal family, honor, dignity, and property under his control, as well as the right to a sense of security and protection from the threat of fear (Article 28G paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution).

The difficulty in obtaining e-KTP and marriage documents faced by the Ahmadiyya adherents are two of the many violations committed by the government to fulfill civil rights to legal citizens. These are the worst examples done by a country upholding the values of diversity. Having faced difficulty in obtaining an e-KTP and registering their marriages, the Ahmadiyya adherents used various methods in registering their marriages, such as 'joint marriage' (*nikah numpang*), which means registering outside the Kuningan Regency area. Most are married nearby, like Cirebon or Majalengka, and even in Bogor and Jakarta. The administrative staff automatically adjusts to local requirements.

In practice, the Ahmadiyah adherents try to adjust to societies and their values to co-exist. They already know when to defend, fight, break, or avoid. They often choose an evasive strategy to avoid conflict with the repressive local authorities. This strategy also includes resistance and obedience. They obey the substance of the law (referring to the contents of the law), but they oppose the domination of the legal structure (institutions controlled by repressive officials) by performing *nikah numpang*. The same is true for the KTP issue.

The way Ahmadiyya adherents are resilient in implementing the strategies encourages collective awareness. For example, the Ahmadiyya elites held an FGD in collaboration with Lakpesdam of NU in Kuningan. The FGD was attended by various groups, agencies, institutions, and community representatives and produced important recommendations such as the fulfillment of the right to register marriages at KUA and an e-KTP. In practice, implementation of the recommendations is not straightforward and requires a long and gradual process.

After the consolidations by stakeholders and the Ahmadiyya adherents, tensions have started to subside. The civil rights, which the adherents were mostly worried about, could soon be realized. In dealing with this context, the critical successful factors learned from the Ahmadiyya adherent's experiences in Manislor could be categorized into three. The first is about the collective psycho-political consciousness of Ahmadiyya itself, which has grown massively and impacts the reconciliation process (Satkunanathan 2014; Porter 2007). The shared experience includes facing the same struggle and suffering. It creates a collective consciousness. The second factor is good communication skills by Ahmadiyya leaders and elites to build relationships and networks (socio-religious groups), which become resources for reconciliation. The third is the involvement of several civil society groups consisting of socio-religious organizations such as NU, religious social figures and activists, non-governmental stakeholders, research institutes, educational institutions, and several other institutions that assist Ahmadiyya in obtaining their rights as legal citizens of Indonesia.

Conclusion

The experiences of massive conflict, violence, and discrimination endured by the Ahmadiyya adherents have taught them to formulate a strategy, such as by inviting agencies and stakeholders to support them. This article has revealed the typologies of post-conflict reconciliation: 1) the production of a counter narration to address any information that discredits the Ahmadiyya adherents, 2) the participation of active and supportive stakeholders to promote a peaceful life in the village, and 3) the fulfillment of civil rights of Ahmadiyya adherents. These findings conclude the reconciliation steps taken by multiple parties, both informally and formally, are needed for communities to live in harmony and peacefully, with mutual respect.

However, achieving equal rights as legal citizens has certainly not been easy. A long process of reconciliation, sacrifice, and optimism has reduced tensions caused by the conflict. Post-conflict life through building mutual peace, as in Manislor, is a long-term project. The involvement of civil society, socio-religious organizations (such as NU) acting as mediators, academics and campuses, national elites, and local figures is needed to restore peace.□

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