A Critical Study of Comparative Education in The Middle Eastern Countries: Ideological and Cultural

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ABSTRACT

As a center for Islamic studies, countries in the Middle East Region (in this case including Saudi Arabia and Iran) have not been replaced in the eyes of Muslims, especially Indonesia. However, these students abroad do not only adopt their scientific studies, but they also tend to adopt the prevailing ideology and culture there which may not be fully applicable in Indonesia. This type of research is library research because it is entirely produced from literature studies, namely studying library materials/literature related to research problems. The approach of this research is a descriptive qualitative approach, namely by describing the entry of ideology and culture from Saudi Arabia and Iran to Indonesia through graduates who have studied in these two countries. The purpose of this research is to find the problems and solutions of Saudi Arabian and Iranian graduates in the context of ideology and culture. The results of the research show that there are three things graduates from the Middle East including from Saudi Arabia and Iran can contribute positively to this nation, namely: first, emphasizing the values of love for local culture; secondly, instilling religious insight as a whole; and third, negotiations between outside ideology and culture and local culture and ideology.

KEYWORDS
Ideological-Cultural Conflict, Middle Eastern Students

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Introduction

Indonesia, a country (Najib & Rahma, 2020) does not rule out the possibility of learning a lot from developed countries and adopting their progress (Nugroho, 2019), especially in terms of education. Indonesia today cannot progress because the management of the education system has not been able to run properly, consistently, and directed with a patented curriculum, so education in Indonesia today has not been able to educate the nation's children fully. This requires the improvement of the national education system, including the curriculum, and this can be done by adopting the education system in more advanced countries, including in the Middle East.

Looking back at history and even today, the Middle East remains the "mecca" of Muslims. The Middle East as the "country of origin" of the birth of Islam is the main cause, which is then followed by the rise of each generation studying knowledge. There has been a transformation of Islamic scholarship, especially in Indonesia, with the establishment and development of Islamic boarding schools (Isbah, 2020) or other Islamic institutions as means of forming an integrated Muslim personality.

The Middle East is always synonymous with Islam (Karcic, 2019), so studying Islam in the Middle East is like drawing water from the source, especially when it is related to the history of how Islam emerged, which then developed rapidly in various studies of Islamic scholarship through well-known figures in their fields. This success has always been a clear illustration of why, until now, the Middle East remains the special choice for Islamic students to study.

The Middle East has a very strategic position. As a center for Islamic studies (Karcic, 2019), countries in the Middle East Region have not been replaced in the eyes of Muslims, especially Indonesia. Although some are starting to look to the West as a center for Islamic studies, several universities and Islamic study centers in the Middle East remain the main alternative for continuing their studies. Among the countries often the main destinations for studying Islam in the Middle East Region are Saudi Arabia (Mecca and Medina) and Iran.

These students abroad (in this case including Saudi Arabia and Iran) not only adopt their scientific studies but also tend to adopt the ideology (Subkhan, 2018) and culture (Argue & Velena, 2022) that apply there, which may be appropriate to eastern ideology and customs, but on the other hand, they cannot be fully implemented in Indonesia. This also opens up opportunities for the entry of several Middle Eastern cultures/cultures and ideologies into students' countries of origin, including Indonesia, such as radical, liberal, and others (Anshori, 2019).

One of the entrances to radical understanding or thought is through educational activities (Sirry, 2020), where most Indonesian students study abroad, especially in the Middle East region. It is unfortunate that the understandings they get are then swallowed whole and forced to be applied to a system of life for the Indonesian people

which is very different from life in the Middle East where they studied. This is what made radicalism very massive and widely developed in Indonesia, especially after the 1998 reform movement when all media access was free from regime authority at that time (Schmidt, 2021).

In propagating their aims and objectives, they offer their ideologies by using violence and displaying anarchist actions that can harm many people. In addition, they also use subtle and almost invisible methods, namely by entering educational institutions (Aminah, 2022), both formal and non-formal. Failure after failure using methods that tend to be violent has made these extremist groups maneuver into new channels to gain followers, namely through print and electronic media such as magazines, books, radio, television, and the internet, which are currently reaching the formal education sector tend to be exclusive and closed. In addition, puritan Islamic groups have also expanded their influence through cultural aspects by echoing the importance or necessity of abandoning the Indonesian style of dress, which they see as "un-Islamic" or "non-religious". Therefore, in several areas, this puritan Islamic group preaches about the obligation to wear the Arabic kebaya or "wavy headscarf" for women and robes for men while "forbidding" the wearing of traditional Indonesian traditional clothing, even though it is actually "very Islamic". In this case, it seems that they failed to grasp the "moral message" or the main purpose of Islamic law (maqashid shari'ah) regarding the hijab as "covering the genitals" instead of referring to a particular type and design of clothing.

There are several studies similar to this research: Muhamad Basyrul Muvid's research entitled Comparison of the Structure of Islamic Education Institutions and Curriculum in Indonesia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, in which the researcher examines comparative aspects of the education system in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. In addition, research written by Eka Yanuarti and Devi Purnama Sari HS entitled Comparative Analysis of Multicultural Education (Indonesia, America, Canada, England) reveals differences in multicultural-based education in the four countries.

This research has several objectives as follows: First, to reveal and examine the educational model in Saudi Arabia and Iran. Second, to describe the ideology and culture of education in the two countries; and third, to explain the ideological and cultural implications of these two countries for education in Indonesia.

Method

This research approach is a qualitative descriptive approach, namely by describing and explaining the entry of ideology and culture from Saudi Arabia and Iran to Indonesia through graduates or alumni who have studied there. The descriptive analysis method provides clear, objective, systematic, analytical, and critical descriptions and explanations.

This type of research is library research (library research) because it is entirely produced from literature studies examining library materials/literature related to research problems. A series of activities related to library data collection methods, reading, and recording and processing writing materials are conducted. The other data sources through the interview process only aim to strengthen and support the results of this study. According to Hamzah (Hamzah, 2020), library research is part of the study of figures in the four-level quadrant. Character studies are high-level qualitative research because they focus on certain people and certain fields as the unit of analysis. This research originates from the literature by using data in the form of writings or texts from books.

In this study, the object of research is education in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Iran) from an ideological and cultural perspective, so the purpose of this research is to describe the portrait of education in Saudi Arabia and Iran, to describe the ideology and culture of education in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its implications for education in Indonesia.

Results and Discussions

Traditionally, at least from the 17th century to the end of the 19th century, students from the Malay-Indonesian World made the Haramain (Mecca and Medina) the foundation of their scientific rich or talab al-film. Azra's study (1994) has detailed the role of Southeast Asian students in cultural exchange and religious transmission from the Middle East to Indonesia. Here, the author will provide data findings related to the education, ideology, and culture of Saudi Arabia and Iran and their implications for Indonesia.

Portrait of Education in Saudi Arabia and Iran

1. Education in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country with a desert area and is the largest country in Central Asia. Although parts of the region are desert areas, in the southwest, there are mountainous areas that are grassy and green (K. Hitti 2008). Saudi Arabia is known as a large oil-producing country worldwide (International, n.d.).

As with other developing countries, education has been the main concern for Saudi Arabia since the country was proclaimed on September 23, 1932, and especially since 1954 when the Ministry of Education was formed. Renewal in the field of education began during the reign of King Faisal bin Abd Aziz (1964-1975) and was continued by King Khalid bin Abd Aziz (1975-1982) and King Fahd bin Abd Aziz (1982-2005). One of the reforms that can be seen and felt is providing education for men and women from kindergarten to university. Students are given scholarships to continue studying at international universities/institutes. The state assists parents of students who are less able to pay for their children's schooling.

The Saudi Arabian government adopted the slogan free education for all (Agustiar Syah Nur, 2001). The education system in Saudi Arabia consists of several levels starting from pre-primary education, basic education, secondary education, and higher education which will be described in tabular form as follows (Assegaf 2003).

Table 1. Model of Education in Saudi Arabia

Pre School	Elementary School	Middle School	Secondary School
Age of 4-5 years Material: playing, tell a story, drawing, reading and writing	Age of 6-11 years Material: Arabic B, Cultural Arts, Geography, History, Home Economics (for female students), mathematics and Pend. Sport (for male students) Get a Diploma: Certificate "Shahadat al Madaris al Ibditida'iyah"	Age of 12-14 years Subjects: Arabic, Art, Geography, History, Home Economics (for female students), Islamic studies and Science, and English. Diploma: Shahada al Kafa'at al Mutawassita.	Age of 15-17 years. Saudi secondary education offers three educational programs: general secondary education, religious secondary education and technical secondary education.

The material or curriculum at each level of secondary education is as follows:

Table 2. Educational Materials and Curriculum in Saudi Arabia

General Secondary Education	ReligiousSecondary Education	TechnicalSecondary Education
Arabic, Biology, English, Geography, History, Home Economics (Female students), Mathematics, Sports (male students), and Religious Education	Arabic, English, Culture and Arts, Geography, History and Education Religion	There are Three Majors: First, the Department of Engineering: Architecture, Automotive, Electrical, Mechanical Engineering, Mental Mechanics, Radio, Television, English, Arabic, Physics, Chemistry and Religious Education. Second, Commercial Majors: Arabic, Mathematics, Economics, General Mathematics, Geography, Management, Secretariat, Religious Education. Third, Department of Agriculture: Agricultural Economics, Agronomy, Animal Breeding, Applied Biology, Applied Chemistry, Applied Physics, Applied Mathematics, Arabic, English, Agriculture and Land Management, Horticulture, Religious Education, Food Marketing and Nutrition (Assegaf, 2003).

The higher education level in Saudi Arabia is divided into two main sections, namely religious education and general education. However, in Saudi, several universities currently synergize the two (religious science and general science). Among them are the Institute for Women, the Institute of Public Administration, and the Teacher Training Institute. All tertiary institutions are supervised by the Ministry of Higher Education (Ministry of Higher Education), except for the Islamic University of Medina which is under the supervision of the Council of Ministers.

In addition, Saudi Arabia also classifies the types of higher education. This is a form of Saudi Arabia's service to Muslims, both in Saudi and outside Saudi Arabia, to be able to choose and develop their knowledge at the universities there. The following describes the type of higher education:

Table 3: Types of Higher Education in Saudi Arabia

University Higher Education consists of:	Non-University Higher Education consists of:
First, Strata One / S1 with a study period of 4 years	First, D3 Higher Education majoring in automatic control, automatic electrical systems, automotive, electrical equipment, electrical installation, industrial chemistry, industrial electronics and production engineering.
Second, Strata Sua/S2 with a study period of 2 years	Second, D1 Higher Education with a study period of 1 year
Third, Strata Three/S3 with a study period of 3 years.	Third, Special Higher Education in Finance and Commercial Sciences. With a study period of 2 years. The majors include accounting, commercial and business correspondence, English, insurance, Islamic culture, marketing and advertising, purchasing and inventory and secretarial matters
Fourth, Administrative Science Higher Education. The study period is 2-3 years	The majors available are; banking (2 years), electronic data processing (2.5 years), hospital administration (2 years), librarianship (3 years), personnel science (2 years), secretarial science (2 years) and warehousing science (2 years).
Fifth, Higher Teacher Education which includes the majors of Elementary and Junior High School	Teacher Education, Senior High School Teacher Education and Advanced Teacher Education (Assegaf, 2003).

2. Education in Iran

The country of Iran is located in the Middle East region, precisely in the Southwest Asia region, and in its early days, Iran was known by the name of Persia, although later, after the Iranian Revolution, it became the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the nineteenth century, education has gradually become one of the main focuses of reform there, sending students abroad and bringing in many instructors from Europe, especially to teach the military after its defeat in the war against Russia (Soli Shahvar, 2009).

To date, the number of students from Iran continues to increase in order to study and gain knowledge abroad in various ways and for reasons for the progress of the country in the future. Based on the results of the initial registration in 2010, Iran sent 38,125 students abroad to obtain proper education. According to data from the Unesco Institute for Statistics (UIS), there were only 26,928 students two years earlier. The same year, immigrant countries recorded around 26,647 international students pursuing higher education abroad. The data illustrates that Iran continues to experience improvements in the field of education, as evidenced by the large number of interested parties who continue their education abroad. Many interested parties will indirectly state that Iran has a high quality of education and competitiveness in education, which is quite good on the international stage.

In Iran itself, the central government, through the Ministry of Education, is responsible for financing and controlling the administration of primary and secondary education. Education is overseen through the Provincial Government and District Offices at the local level. In addition, the Ministry of Education oversees national examinations, monitors standards, organizes teacher training, develops educational curricula and materials, and funds the construction and maintenance of schools. Meanwhile, the Higher Education Council is a legislative body that approves all educational policies and regulations. Private (non-profit) schools are partially funded by the government and operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Education (M. Nurul Ikhsan Saleh, 2015).

Tri Yuliani et al. (Yuliani et al. 2020) argue that the education system of the Islamic Republic of Iran has undergone changes and is centralized/centralized in the form of education at the preschool, elementary, secondary, and higher education levels. Education at the preschool, elementary, and secondary school levels is under the management and auspices of the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education), and higher education is under the supervision and regulation of the Ministry of systems and processes of higher education procedures. Iran's education system and management in a more directed manner, namely:

a. Pre-School Education

At this time, private institutions introduced education and prepared children under school age to continue formal education later. Teaching at preschool level education is very simple, starting with introducing letter numbers and assembling words and giving assignments and lessons carried out by playing, singing, dancing, and counting. The learning process involves simple steps by painting, reading stories/storytelling and doing simple and easy handwork—facilities and infrastructure are used for learning using writing boards, pens, and plain paper.

b. Basic Education

Education in this period lasts for approximately six years continuously, including orientation and introduction to children regarding education and lessons for three years.

The introduction during the orientation period for children aims to provide influence and stimulation for students/students to connect and continue their schooling at a higher level of education in the future, which can be used to find work.

c. Secondary Education

The next educational is secondary education, which is carried out over for four years. Where the process of this period is divided into two educational paths, namely the academic path related to the fields of science and humanities and the second path related to technique and honesty of attitude. On the other hand, routes related to industry and agriculture have not developed rapidly or are less interested in seeing the conditions and culture in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The secondary education process provides direction and coaching after graduation and before starting the level of education at a higher level or university for students for 1 year. After taking this education and graduating, students can continue their education with the following stages:

1) Engineering/Vocational School (Fogh-e-Diplom or Kardani), two years of study;

2) University/Bachelor Degree (Karsenase or License), four years of education.

3) Master's Degree (Karsenase-ye Arsyad or Fogh License), two years of study.

4) Doctoral/Ph.D program (Karsenasi Arshad - Napayvasteh or Doctora), three years of study.

d. Higher Education

During high education, two Ministry agencies are responsible for post-secondary education, namely the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education (MCHE) and the Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MHME). Higher education is divided into teacher education colleges that do not require a high school graduation as an entry requirement and various other high schools and universities. But many students study abroad.

Educational Ideology and Culture in Saudi Arabia and Iran

1. Educational Ideology and Culture in Saudi Arabia

In the Saudi Arabian education system, religious studies, especially those with Wahhabism, are more dominant than others, so this is often the reason Saudi is accused of being the source of the birth of the Wahhabism movement (Murofikoh and Alfaridah, n.d.). The Wahhabi movement, often known as the Salafi movement, is based in Saudi Arabia, born and developed there since the 18th century (Vassiliev 1986). Historically the Wahhabi teachings were first brought by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab who was later supported by one of the tribal rulers named Muhammad bin Saud. Abdul Wahhab saw that the Arab conditions at that time and the Ottoman Empire had deviated a lot from Islamic teachings. Together with the reign of Ibn Saud, Abdul Wahhab spread his teachings in the Arabian Peninsula. The expansive attitude of the Saudis made him face the Ottoman Turks' power as the rulers of the Arab and Islamic world at that time. The Ottoman Turks convicted Abdul Wahhab's movement as a deviant movement and carried out a rebellion within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Turks even equated Abdul Wahhab's movement with the Khawarij group and the Shia Qaramithah group that had stolen the Black Stone (Commins 2006).

Various wars occurred between the Usmani and Ibn Saud's rule, but the Ottomans were not able to conquer and eliminate them until finally Saudi power was increasingly consolidated and succeeded in declaring the state of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The hallmark of this thought is inviting a return to Islam which is by al-salaf al - Shalih, the Koran, the Sunnah of the Prophet, the companions, and the teachings of the great scholars of the past. For many writers, the term Wahhabi is more widely

used to describe Salafi thoughts in Saudi because the use of word Salafi is also used by many movements other than Saudi, such as the Islamic renewal movement brought by Muhammad Abduh (1849) and Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-1897).) (Al-Rasheed 2007).

Meanwhile, the Salafists in Saudi Arabia are rooted in the thoughts brought by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. The word Wahhabi is commonly used to express the school of thought brought by the followers of Abdul Wahhab even though the followers themselves do not like to be called Wahhabiyyun or followers of the Wahhabi movement.

There are also several special features of Wahhabi thought that distinguish it from other schools or schools of thought in Islam, Al-Quran or Hadith texts related to the nature of God are understood literally which have an impact on the likeness of God to his creatures (anthropomorphist) such as, God sits on the throne (al-Kursi) and Allah descends to the heavens of the world physically every last third of the night; forbid the practice of tawassul through pious people; God has limitations that only He knows, and dividing monotheism into several sections: Tauhid Uluhiyyah, Tauhid Rububiyyah, and Tauhid Asma` wa Shifat (Mousalli 2009).

Hasbi Aswar in his research (Aswar 2016) stated that what distinguishes the Wahhabi group from other Muslims is the concept of heresy. Bidah is a concept in Islam that relates to practices not practiced by the prophet or not guided by the religion. Bid'ah is the opposite of sunnah. For Muslims, it is obligatory to carry out the prophet's sunnah and prohibited or forbidden to commit heresy. For many Muslim scholars, the issue of heresy is a term whose meaning has been agreed upon. However, scholars differ in classifying new cases, which are considered heretical and contrary to Islam and which are not. There are even scholars who share that heresy is divided into two, there are good heretics and there are bad ones. What religion prohibits is bad.

From the perspective of the Wahhabi group, bid'ah is understood as a single term that has a negative meaning and is considered heretical by its practitioners. Bid'ah in the Wahhabi view is all religious practices or concepts that only existed after the third century of the Hijriyah (Algar 2011). With this kind of understanding, Wahhabism promotes various practices carried out by other Muslim groups such as various practices of remembrance and rituals of Sufi groups, traditional celebrations of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, celebrations of the Prophet's Birthday, recitation of Qasidah al-Baranji, and so on. When a Wahhabi labels a certain person or group as

heresy, he will automatically go astray and anyone who goes astray will be punished in hell.

Madawi Rasheed mentioned the character of Wahhabi thought as an authoritarian ideology, just like the state that supports it. It is called authoritarian because the Wahhabi sect considers its teachings to be the purest and most Islamic while others are called heretics or people who pervert religion. Rasheed mentions, "Official Wahabiyya is religiously dogmatic, socially conservative and politically acquiescent" (the core of Wahhabi teachings is dogmatic, conservative, and politically passive (Al-Rasheed 2007).

According to Cronin (2009), the Salafi movement has become a global religious movement that has spread to almost all regions of the earth's surface. This movement became so massive, among others, because the political and economic power of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supported it. This country has poured millions of dollars into the idea of Salafism to spread throughout the world through the establishment of mosques, Islamic centers (Islamic centers), schools, and universities including support for various da'wah movements. In addition, the Saudi kingdom also provides scholarships for young people from various Muslim countries to study at Saudi Arabian campuses. The impact of this massive movement is that there are 50 million Salafi followers globally as well as making this movement the fastest-growing transnational movement among other movements (Cronin, 2009)

However, according to Ignatius (2015), the level of success achieved by the Salafi Movement is not always in line with the response of some Muslim communities where Salafi tries to spread its influence. Some circles try to link Salafi as a threat that has the potential to disrupt political stability and security in certain regions. In the Southeast Asian region, Salafi teachings are considered to have contributed to the rise of Islamic extremism, a culture of intolerance, violence, and hatred that occurs in this region (Ignatius, 2015)

However, ironically, even though the Salafi group thinks that they are a pure representation of Islam, it does not mean that the figures or the ulema also share the same view. In Saudi history, conflicts and blaming each other and even misleading have occurred between figures or scholars following the Salafi sect itself. For example, the rebellion of the armed brothers who had different views from the Saudi government regarding technological modernization and the kingdom's expansion policies, the 1979 Al-Haram Mosque siege carried out by a group led by Juhayman al-Utaybi and Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Qahtani based on dissatisfaction with the Saudi government which is considered not to have fully implemented Islam and

adopted western culture, as well as the criticism made by many Saudi clerics in the 90s against the kingdom which was considered to have deviated from Islamic teachings. Some well-known opposition clerics are Safar Hawali, Salman al-Awdah, and `Aidh al-Qarni (Aswar 2013). Many other issues show not only the views of fellow scholars and leaders of the Wahhabi sect.

Even though some problems and disagreements occur within the Wahhabi clergy and figures, this teaching remains strong as the official state teaching held by the Saudi Arabian government. This Wahhabi Islamic teaching is used as a paradigm in governing the state of Saudi Arabia from the economic, educational, cultural, and social aspects of society, including in foreign policy.

2. Educational Ideology and Culture in Iran

Before talking about Shia in the Indonesian context, here is a brief overview of the beginnings of the emergence of the Shia sect and its adherents. Some experts from Ahlusunnah argue that the seeds of Shia emerged from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, or at least politically the seeds emerged when he died (Abu Bakr's allegiance to Saqifah). At that time the Prophet's family and many friends thought that Ali bin Abi Talib was more reasonable and worthy of becoming caliph, than Abu Bakr. Opinions about the birth of Shia like this, among others, were put forward by Ibn Khaldun in his Tarih, and some orientalists, such as Goldziher and many other contemporary thinkers (Shihab and Hizbullah 2007). Abu Hasan Asy'ari said]the reason why this group is called Shia is that they are followers of Ali, by giving him higher rights over other friends (Subhani 2012).

In terms of ideology, the Shiites have very significant differences with the Sunnis, especially in matters of faith, where the Shiites have only four pillars of faith, namely Tawhid, Prophethood, the Last Day, and Imamah or belief in leadership after the death of the Prophet saw. (Rachman 2020). This is of course very much different from Sunni Muslims who have six pillars of faith and consist of Faith in Allah SWT, Faith in Angels, Faith in the Book of Allah, Faith in Allah's Messenger, Faith in the Last Day, and Faith in Qodho and Qodarullah.

This difference arose since the division of the Muslim community after the Shiffin war in 37 Hijri. The war was a battle that took place between Ali bin Abi Talib and Muawiyyah's side which was caused by Muawiyyah's non-acceptance of Ali bin Abi Talib's election as caliph because the caliph Uthman bin Affan who was the previous caliph had died because he was killed. In addition, Ali bin Abi Talib and Muawiyyah's parties who were involved in the war had to go through the stages of arbitration or

tahkim, this was done to get peace or conflict resolution. After the arbitration, the Muslims began to split into three groups, one of which was the Shiites, namely loyal followers of Ali bin Abi Talib. However, over time the Shia glorified Ali bin Abi Talib and his descendants with great exaggeration. This is also a thought controversy among Sunni Muslims.

The Controversy of thought between Shiites and Sunnis also occurs in terms of the holy book they believe in, where the Shiites have a holy book called the Fatimah mushaf and do not believe in the holy book Al-Quran, the Sunnis use the Ottoman mushaf, and they think that the holy book The original Al-Quran has been brought by the twelfth Imam who will later incarnate as Imam Mahdi (Abidin 2006). The Shia holy book is called the Fatimah Mushaf because they believe that the book came directly from the mouth of Fatimah bint Muhammad saw. by the caliph Uthman bin Affan. This can be analyzed as an outlet for the hatred committed by the Shiites against the Sunnis in terms of faith in their holy book. As for in essence, in the holy book Al-Quran, the Ottoman Manuscripts stated that the Al-Quran was revealed gradually through the mouth of the angel Gabriel and delivered to the Prophet Muhammad. Meanwhile, the collection and bookkeeping, it is done by collecting the writings of the holy verses of the Al-Quran which are scattered both on leaves, stones, and even from those who memorize the Al-Quran.

The next thought controversy that exists between the Shiites and the Sunnis is about the leadership after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. In terms of mention, the Shiites call the leader after the Prophet Muhammad. with the title of priest, this is due to their pillars of faith, one of which is faith in the priest or leader. As for the leader or imam they believe in here, namely Ali bin Abi Talib, because they believe that the most suitable a leader after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. is someone who comes from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. themselves, because in their minds, the whole family and descendants of Rasulullah saw are people who are infallible or protected from all kinds of sins in their daily life, or in other words, they are included in the class of people who are holy from mistakes (Hatta 2017). This is what ultimately becomes a deep controversy regarding the thinking of the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. to Shiites. As for the mention of the leaders after the death of Rasulullah saw. for Sunnis, it is known as caliph which also means leader. And, they believe in the fact that the leader after Rasulullah SAW died was Abu Bakar As-Siddiq, who had been chosen through the stages of

deliberation by the Muslims at Tsaqifah Bani Saidah and based on the agreement of the companions of Rasulullah SAW. (Sutisna 2014).

In their political thought, the Shiites also have commemorations or holidays that are not owned and not carried out by adherents of Sunni teachings. One of the commemoration days is the Arbaeen Walk, which first appeared in the country of Iran which is also the country with the largest number of Shiite adherents in the world. Arbaeen Walk is a day of remembrance for the Shiites in the forty days after the death of Husein bin Ali bin Abi Talib, who is also an Imam who was highly venerated by the Shiites, tragically during the Karbala war in the Karbala region which is located in Iraq against the forces of Yazid bin Muawiyah in 680 AD (Nikjoo et al. 2020). This is why the Shiites make the fortieth day after the 10th of Muharram every year a day of remembrance which is carried out on foot to one of the graves of Husein bin Ali bin Abi Talib in the Karbala area by reciting poems on the teachings of the Shia aimed at Imam Hussein as the Imam who they venerated greatly throughout their journey, as well as the physical violence they self-inflicted on their bodies which they believe is the release of all the sorrows that Hussein bin Ali had felt during the Karbala war took place (Fauzi 2011). The person who first commemorated Arbaeen by walking to the grave of Sayyidina Husein bin Ali was a Shia scholar named Jabir bin Abdullah (Tajbakhsh, 2020). And whoever makes a pilgrimage on foot to the tomb of Imam Husein, will get a reward like a thousand pilgrimages and a thousand pilgrimages, which of course cannot be found in the words of the Prophet Muhammad. himself in his hadith (Nikjoo et al. 2020) the activities in this commemoration have become famous and are always carried out by almost adherents of Shia teachings as a whole, especially in the countries of Iran and Iraq since the leadership of Shaykh Anshari who also died in 1281 Hijri (Rachel 2018).

In addition, through international youth activities, the Shiites began to introduce the annual celebration of the Arbaeen Walk without informing them that the celebration was part of the teachings of the Shiites. In the international youth forum which was carried out massively, the organizers explained the arbaeen commemoration and distributed documents containing implicitly written details regarding the activity, which it can be found in the documents that they conveyed Shia political thoughts by linking the Arbaeen commemoration The Walk which is their big day, with the commemoration of world peace which is the main vision and mission of UNESCO, as well as the international youth activities of the Arbaeen Ambassadors in Peace and Justice are introduced as activities that can be shared by all people from

various religions, cultures, and races (Arbaeen Ambassadors for Peace and Justice, 2020).

Thus, there are various kinds of thought controversies between Shiites and Sunnis, which often lead to conflicts or incompatibilities in muamalah. On the other hand, these existing controversies have caused the majority of scholars to state that Shia is not part of the Islamic religion, especially because the holy books and holidays are believed to be very different (Sahide 2013). As for the thoughts of the Shiites that have caused this controversy, they have continued to try to spread their thoughts with political ideas to various regions of the world. Thus, it can be said that the case of the spread of Shia thought is not only a religious issue but has also become a political issue with their massive transnational movement (Minster 2013).

Implications of Iranian and Saudi Education on Ideology and Culture in Indonesia

The study of Islam in the Middle East emphasizes a normative and ideological approach to Islam. Islamic studies in the Middle East start with the acceptance of Islam as a revealed and transcendent religion. Islam is not made solely as an object of scientific study which is freely subject to the principles prevailing in the scientific world but is placed in an honorable manner by its position as a doctrine whose truth is believed without doubt. Thus, the scientific attitude that is formed is commitment and appreciation. Efforts in scientific studies are aimed at broadening understanding, deepening beliefs, and drawing benefits for the benefit of the people. The study orientation in the Middle East places more emphasis on doctrinal aspects accompanied by an approach that tends to be normative. To a certain extent, the connection with efforts to maintain the continuity of tradition and ensure the stability and uniformity of forms of understanding creates a tendency to emphasize memorization rather than developing criticism. Although this trend is not dominant, the influence of the rise of fundamentalism in the Middle East has influenced its more normative educational orientation (Zada, 2009).

Although higher education in the Middle East places a strong emphasis on normative and ideological approaches to Islam, the thinking environment of students is not as uniform as many people imagine. The stream of normative approaches to Islam is very strong among academics in Middle Eastern universities. However, this is not the complete picture because there are also quite strong currents that emphasize historical and sociological approaches.

There are many concerns if this Salafi school spreads in Indonesia in a cultural aspect, for example, Aminah (2022) in her research stated that recently there has been a resurgence of many puritan Islamic groups in Indonesia who are so persistent in preaching the importance or obligation for a Muslim/Muslim woman to maintain the purity of the faith—(theology) and Islamic teachings from various local traditions and cultures (Aminah, 2022). According to El Fadl, puritans consistently and systematically adhere to absolutism, think dichotomously and are idealistic. They are uncompromising, tend to be purist in the sense of being intolerant of various points of view, and believe that pluralistic reality is a contamination of authenticity (El Fadl, 2006: 29-32). This is because, according to them, local traditions and culture can tarnish the purity of Islamic creed and doctrine. Unfortunately, a number of these puritan Islamic groups not only speak but also call for and even destroy several icons, symbols, and treasures of Indonesian traditions and culture to pave the way for the purification of Islamic doctrines, teachings, and beliefs.

This puritan Islamic group, because of their limited insight into Islamic history, sociology and anthropology, often cannot distinguish between "Islamic teachings" and "Arab culture", so in practice what they claim is an effort to uphold Islamic "religious teachings". are Arab or Middle Eastern "cultural precepts" in general. For example, regarding the "niqab" and the like, such as the burqa and khimar or the cloth covering the face (veil) worn by women.

Not only preaching the culture of dressing in the Arab style which according to them is more "Islamic", but puritan Islamic groups also preach the importance or necessity of abandoning the Indonesian style of dress which according to them is seen as "un-Islamic" or "non-religious". This puritan Islam is passionate about preaching about the obligation to wear the Arab kebaya or "wavy headscarf" for women and robes for men while "forbidding" the wearing of traditional Indonesian traditional clothing, even though it is actually "very Islamic". In this case, it seems that they have failed to grasp the "moral message" or the main purpose of Islamic law (maqashid shari'ah) regarding the hijab as "covering the genitals", not referring to a particular type and design of clothing.

Another concern is related to the interpretation by Salafists of ideas in Islamic texts such as the concept of monotheism; the obligation to follow the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet and stay away from bid`ah or innovation in religion. Salafi groups often use the concept of monotheism and Sunnah to view religious activities as something that is Islamic or not. The problem is when this interpretation is used to judge groups

that are at odds with the Salafis as bid`ah (heretics) and misguided or violating the concept of monotheism. Although on the other hand, non-Salafi groups have their method of interpretation which is considered correct in viewing religious concepts. This Salafi method can awaken movements against Salafi's preaching and activities in various places.

Salafi in Indonesia can also be said to be a growing movement with various groups being formed, studies being held, schools, Islamic boarding schools, and the media that assist their publication among Muslims in Indonesia. However, one obstacle to this movement is that the Salafi religious tradition is different from most of the religious traditions in Indonesia which have acculturated a lot with local cultures, besides that most Muslims in Indonesia are known as adherents of ahlu sunnah wal jamaah, the Asy`ariyyah sect. This situation has the potential to create a wave of rejection of the Salafi missionary movement in Indonesia, both at the local or regional level as well as nationally. This phenomenon has appeared in recent years in Indonesia.

Discussions

Islamic education is one of the factors that came into the spotlight when inter-religious and ethnic riots appeared in several places in Indonesia. With this tragedy, it is felt that education needs to be extra in providing sufficient provisions to students on developing a tolerant attitude towards differences and diversity in society.

Related to the emergence of radicalism movements in Indonesia by a group of Middle Eastern graduates, there is indeed an opinion that the educational curriculum in the Middle East, in this case, Saudi Arabia, seems to provide space and fertile seeds for the birth of radicalism and extremism, so it needs to be reformed. International attention, especially from developed countries, especially the United States for Saudi Arabia need to review in depth its education policies after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, namely since the bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) building. The building (Twin Towers), which became a symbol of the glory of the capitalist economy carried by the United States was destroyed by two commercial planes hijacked by terrorists. This act of terrorism was allegedly masterminded by Al-Qaidah, led by Osama bin Laden, who incidentally is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, thus making Saudi Arabia indirectly accused of this act of terrorism. These are the most difficult testing times for the Saudi and United States alliance because 15 of the 19 terrorist perpetrators are Saudi nationals (Md. Mudassir Quammar, 2021).

The September 11 terror incident is associated with very threatening extremism and terrorism, and this threat extends not only to Western countries but also to other

countries. Indirectly, the International Party associated this terror act with education. They pressure Saudi Arabia to review its educational curriculum which seems to provide opportunities for the birth of radicalism and extremism which has implications for terrorism (Md. Mudassir Quammar, 2021).

Suppose you look at it from a historical perspective. In that case, the government of Saudi Arabia cannot be separated from the Wahhabi group, because the Wahhabi group has quite an important role in the establishment of the State of Saudi Arabia (M. Syafrizal Izaqi 2016, 388), so it is not surprising that this Wahhabi ideology has become dominant in Arabia. Saudi (E. Gearon, 2016).

The social construction of Saudi society has undergone many changes, especially in terms of freedom of expression in the public sphere. Men and women are equal to fill the public. Moreover, women can now drive their vehicles after the government officially granted permission in June 2018. Muhammad Bin Saud (MBS) is an important figure behind the major changes taking place in Saudi Arabia. Based on bureaucratic reform, economic progress, and the creation of religious moderation in Saudi Arabia, MBS changed the direction of the monarchy from being initially conservative to being moderate and open to the times. The step taken by MBS was due to his position as a policymaker after being appointed crown prince. Simply put, MBS is trying to change the image of Saudi Arabia, which is known as a conservative, rigid and fundamental country, to become more moderate, not extreme, and open. This step was taken to change the international world's perception that the current Saudi is different from the previous Saudi.

MBS wants to change Saudi Islam to be more moderate to provide breakthroughs for the succession of his reform projects. Before MBS, King Abdullah also launched this moderation. However, this could not be realized due to the strong dominance of the Wahhabis. What needs to be known is that Wahhabi scholars also have veto rights in decision-making and government policies. This has often forced Saudi kings to follow their wishes, including when King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz (in power from 1982-2005) opened cultural and educational offices in more than 70 Saudi embassies in various countries.

After the 2030 vision was launched, MBS took a new step in recent years. This can be seen from the extreme social order reforms by MBS, which King Abdullah had never touched before. For example, MBS guarantees the participation of Saudi women in public spaces without any discrimination from state apparatus, such as the shari'ah police or mutawa. Apart from that, MBS also dared to open free entertainment venues for men and women. MBS took this step to carry out social reforms to realize economic reforms in Saudi Arabia. Conservative clerics want Islamic puritanism to continue and become a pattern of The Saudi religion. However, to realize his reform mission, MBS, as the authoritative voice representing the will of King Salman, has

clearly and firmly stated that he will eradicate extremism that has taken root in his country. The moderation of Saudi Arabia that MBS wants does not mean to remove traces of Wahhabi puritanism or other rigid Islamic doctrines, but rather to condition the Saudi people to follow the Islamic pattern desired by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, namely moderate, open and friendly Islam so that the economic reforms desired by the kingdom can be materialized. In this case, the Wahhabi clerics as old friends of the rulers of Saudi Arabia cannot do anything. With the authority he has, MBS is brave and able to punish anyone who interferes with his reform agenda. MBS is not the same as King Abdullah who can be pressured and regulated by anyone, including conservative Wahhabi clerics so that it can derail his reform agenda.

The role of the Wahhabis that the rulers of Saudi Arabia needed was none other than for political purposes. Among other things, to counteract the influence of ideologies outside of Wahhabism, such as from Egypt, Nasser's secular socialism, and the export of the Iranian revolution which was once considered a threat to the status quo of the Saudi kingdom. The situation and Saudi political demands are no longer the same for now. Therefore, the needs of the Saudi Kingdom for Wahhabism are certainly not the same. The current kingdom of Saudi Arabia needs moderate Islam so that the Wahhabi clerics seem to be faced with the choice of supporting or opposing the kingdom, which of course has its consequences.

But over time, to keep up with globalization and the negative stigma on Saudi Arabia, moderate Islam has become the ideal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, meaning that Saudi Arabia is trying to present a new basis, namely a new religious movement. According to Clarke (2006), the existence of this religious movement is caused by very significant currents of globalization, so religion must adjust to adapt to this globalization. Therefore, this new religious movement was formed and packaged not rigidly, so that it is more modern and can respond to the times due to globalization (M. Syafrizal Izaqi 2016). Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia chose moderate Islamic teachings as an alternative to replace the Wahhabism inherent in the region (Anna Zakiah Degrees & Toni Kurniawan, 2021).

Prince Muhammad bin Salman as the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since June 21 2017 replacing his cousin Prince Muhammad bin Nayef made fundamental changes in various aspects. Under the Vision 2030 National Program, Saudi Arabia is said to be increasingly opening up to modern culture. Under the pretext of economic diversification, it also influences society and culture. Since taking office as Saudi crown prince or de-facto leader, Muhammad bin Salman has issued several policies that dismantled the conservative culture of the Islamic country, such as: relaxing the dress code, opening cinemas, allowing music concerts, opening amusement parks (Muhammad Hendra Yunal, 2022). Besides that, Muhammad bin Salman also allowed women to drive cars, travel and live alone without being accompanied by a male guardian, change names without the permission of a guardian,

join/enter the military and even allowed bikinis on the beach (Muhammad Hendra Yunal, 2022).

Saudi Arabia wants to carry out socio-economic transformation by modernizing its government system. Under Vision 2030, education reform is presented as a means to implement economic reforms. The government, on the one hand, seeks to introduce modern curriculum content such as science, philosophy, music, and foreign languages, such as English and Chinese, which will help the government later build a modern economy, and on the other hand, to combat/get rid of narratives of religious extremism as a whole directly (Najah Al-Otaibi, 2020).

Saudi Arabia realizes that education is the answer for all to face the development of this world, and life skills are needed. If the previous policy approach was more towards teaching staff (lecturers/teachers) by hiring (hiring) teaching staff from abroad, recently the policy of Prince Muhammad bin Salman is more towards reforming institutions/institutions and the education system (Muhammad Hendra Yunal, 2022).

Even so, the reform policy did not have implications for the position of the Wahhabis there (Mahmud Hibatul Wafi: 2018, 237). This can be seen in Saudi Arabian graduates who returned to Indonesia and brought Wahhabism and the seeds of radical Islamic movements are still massive.

The emergence of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia is not only a social, political, cultural, and theological phenomenon but also a portrait of a failure to properly understand and interpret history. This statement is in line with the opinion of Khaled Abou El Fadl (El Fadl 2005) and Azyumardi Azra (Azra 1996). In this context, it seems that radical Islamic groups do not try to interpret history according to the context of the times that surround it. On the contrary, they wish to return history to the way it was before, without giving constructive criticism. Rigidity in understanding history also contributed to the emergence of radical movements. According to Robert Wuthnow, efforts to apply history that has passed as it was with the era after it is called rediscovery (Wuthnow 1992).

Since radical Islam gained momentum after the collapse of the Suharto regime (New Order) which was known to be authoritarian (Abaza 1994), the spirit of presenting a radical Islamic face has strengthened, so that with it the socio-religious conditions of society began to shift. This is marked by the emergence of various Islamic community organizations (hereinafter abbreviated as mass organizations), both on a transnational, national, and local scale. They are persistent in voicing the appearance of Islam strictly the same as in the time of the Prophet. In addition, the presence of a number of these new Islamic organizations appeared aggressively, and vocally and was able to compete with Islamic organizations that had been born before, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Tarbiyah Islamiyah Association (Perti), Islamic

Association (Persis), Washliyah, and other Islamic organizations, so that according to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus-Dur), mainstream Islamic organizations that have existed so far have begun to "drown" (Wahid 2001)

The new Islamic mass organizations that have emerged recently generally reinforce the ideology of religious extremism. They tend to dominate changes in social, religious, and political life in Indonesia, such as the widespread aspirations of formalizing Islamic law and the strong desire to establish an Islamic state. In addition, the expression of Islam also shows a change in the face, which was originally friendly and tolerant then changed to be scary and militant (Madjid 1995a). This fact is proven by many events that have befallen Indonesia, such as the bombings in Bali, Solo, Jakarta, and other places. This incident resulted in an unsavory assessment of Islam (Madjid 1995b) so that according to Deliar Noer in his foreword in Khamani Zada's book (Zada 2002), more and more terms were used, such as the terms militant Islam, radical Islam, fundamental Islam, Liberal Islam, extreme Islam, political Islam (as opposed to cultural Islam), exclusive Islam, substantive Islam, and many other terms. Militant Islam is a label given to Muslim groups who have a high religious spirit (Jansen 1980).

Meanwhile, Islamic mass organizations that were born after the New Order often expressed Islam, such as the radical criteria that will be presented below. Then at the same time, the Islamic mass organizations mentioned above showed quite rapid development in several regions of Indonesia, including in West Sumatra. Of course, by itself, it will raise problems in people's lives who are not familiar with or are not accustomed to witnessing Islamic expressions like this. According to Ted Robert Gurr, all forms of radicalization are threats that must be feared, including the radicalization of Muslim communal groups (Gurr 2008).

But ironically, the puritan Islamic movement pioneered by the FPI and HTI movements as well as several follow-up organizations are no longer dominantly rejected. Every action taken is always protected by the opinions of some people who "tolerate" actions that some other people consider intolerant. Several events, such as the dissolution of worship services, the reduction of baligo at the Christian University, to the sweeping of Christmas attributes, have always been hotly debated within the community. This is none other because there are people who agree and disagree with the attitude of these fundamentalist and puritan mass organizations. The situation is exacerbated by the freedom of the media, both formal and informal, to share the news that is either a hoax or real. In the end, every one of us who always shares news, consciously or unconsciously, is the media itself. Some people have even started to openly discuss the concept of an Islamic state, often including Saudi Arabia and Turkey as examples. Some elements even play up the Syrian issue with the hashtag save Aleppo as an opinion that the Syrian case is purely a battle for Sunni and Shiite hegemony, as an effort to build special sentiment towards certain circles. People

increasingly see Pancasila as an obsolete ideology that does not improve their economic life at all. In the end, the promises of heavenly pleasures in religious offerings gradually won this ideological battle. if part of society begins to be affected and becomes increasingly irrational, this is a major threat to the integration and existence of Pancasila (Adiwilaga 2017).

There is also an ideology brought by Middle Eastern alumni, in this case, Iran, namely Shia (Gonda Yumitro: 2017, 247). Even though the seeds of Shia existed before in Indonesia, during the reform era because alumni who had studied at Qum University, Iran, made Shia openly show their existence to the public (Hasim: 2012, 156).

Shiites only entered the archipelago after the 16th century after Persia was ruled by the Safavid dynasty, which adhered to Shia beliefs. Supporters of Islamic theory entering the archipelago from Persia include Oemar Amin Hossein, P.A. Djajadiningrat, and Abu Bakar Atjeh (Azra, 2013), Some observers say that Shia in Indonesia is Shia Imamiyah based in Iran. Later his followers in Indonesia called themselves Ahlul Bayt, which in essence is Shia Imamiyah itself. They established an official mass organization as a forum for preaching, namely IJABI (Association of Jamaah Ahlul Bayt Indonesia) chaired by Jalaluddin Rahmad and ABI (Ahlul Bayt Indonesia) with its commander Dr. Umar Shahab (Hasib, 2013).

The existence of Shia adherents has long existed in Indonesia. It was recorded that after the 16th century AD, it was said that there were Shia people who had landed in Indonesia. But their number is small, compared to the entourage of preachers and traders from Hadramaut Yemen. Therefore, the influence of Shia in the archipelago is not very significant. Even that time was considered non-existent. Hence, the majority school of Muslims in the archipelago is Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, not Shia. Shia in Indonesia perhaps developed rapidly after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Coinciding with the eruption of the revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlevi, Shia began to be recognized and studied in depth in Indonesia. Shia charismatic figure in Indonesia, the late Husein al Habsyi (1921-1994), who was also the founder of the East Java YAPI Bangil Foundation, and was originally known as a Sunni figure was then encouraged to study Shia during the Iranian revolution. The Iranian revolution influenced Husein al Habsyi's pattern of thought. It was from Husein al-Habsyi's hands that Shia cadres were born in Indonesia, some of whom continued their studies in Iran. Regeneration after Husein al Habsyi continues to run by sending students to Qum, Iran. This Islamic boarding school does have good relations with Iranian Shiite scholars (Ari Arkanudin, 2021).

The Shia movement in Indonesia is monitored by ICC Jakarta (Islamic Cultural Centre), which is led by a director named Mohsen Hakimullah from Iran. ICC is engaged in two aspects, namely education, and da'wah. In the field of education, ICC built

several educational and social institutions and published many books and magazines spread across several regions in Indonesia. Later, in 2011, the ICC inaugurated the Mulla Sadra School of Islamic Philosophy.

Meanwhile, in the field of da'wah, the ICC moves through two channels. First, a social movement run by a mass organization called IJABI. Like tit for tat after the establishment of the ICC Jakarta, Shiite figures with the support of the Iranian Embassy in Indonesia strengthened their rotten conspiracy by establishing Iranian Corners (IC) in 12 campuses in Indonesia including UIN Syarif Hidayatulloh, Jakarta Muhammadiyah University, Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah University, Ahmad Dahlan University Jogja and UIN Sunan Kalijaga. The Iranian Corner organizes studies of philosophy and logic and scientific meetings with references to the works of Iranian Shia thinkers. Shia books, Tafsir and Hadith CDs as well as Iranian television broadcasts via satellite balls are the facilities that are also provided. The ICC in carrying out its Shia mission uses two axes, the first is the social movement axis run by the Ahlul Bait Jama'ah Association (IJABI). IJABI absorbs many non-habaib cadres from campuses and academics.

That said, the organizational structure has spread nationally to the Level II Regions. At the regional level, IJABI has become a strong point of the Shia movement. The second axis of the political movement by spreading militant Shia cadres to various political parties in parliament seats. It seems that the Shi'a power in our country continues to work hard day and night tirelessly to produce cadres and agents who are ready to mutilate the Indonesian Muslim Ummah to fall into the embrace of Shia teachings.

Second, the political movement is run by the OASE Foundation. The OASE Foundation movement tends to be political. This foundation specializes in forming public opinion or mobilizing discourse. In other words, this foundation is tasked with creating propaganda and spreading cadres to political parties, as well as using the mass media to fight opinions, form discourse, and issue management. Islamic universities, such as UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Ahmad Dahlan University Yogyakarta, and Muhammadiyah University Malang. At the Iranian Corner, there are facilities in the form of Iranian television channels, CD cassettes, books about Shia, and a room for the study of philosophy and Shia thinkers. H. As'ad Said Ali, deputy chairman of PBNU, believes that the political Shia typology in Indonesia will make the Marja'iyyat al-Taqlidi institution like in Iran noteworthy. Iran used to form this institution before igniting the fire of revolution. The Marja' Taqlidi Institution, apart from functioning to compile and prepare for the formation of the government and constitution, also has the function of formulating government priorities, including the formation of a military wing called the amkatab or lajnah asykariyah. From this information, the Shia movement was quite massive, but it wasn't visible. Shia shows more campaigns for ukhuwah, brotherhood, and tolerance. What is behind this

ukhuwah campaign? Nothing but silence the Sunni preachers and they have no energy to debate Shia, so the plan to form Marja' Taqlidi is much easier.

Of course KH's comments. Ali Maschan Moesa in 2007 while visiting Iran advised the police to be aware of Iranian alumni, which made sense. According to the former chairman of the East Java PWNU, there are around 5,000 Indonesian students in Iran. He asked to establish his mosque in Indonesia, separate from other Muslims. From the information disclosed by As'ad Ali, it is Shia politics that control the movement of Shia propagation in Indonesia. Between political and non-political Shiites, they collaborate. Non-political Shiites are concerned with the da'wah of education. However, the direction and strategy are controlled by political Shia, which in Indonesia is driven by the ICC under the direct supervision of the Iranian SCRC (Supreme Cultural Revolution Council). In 1984, Indonesia was stirred up by the bombing of the Borobudur temple, a church in Malang, and the Pembudi Express bus bound for Bali. One of the perpetrators was provoked by the echoes of the revolution in Iran in 1979. The planners of the bombing admitted that they wanted to become an imam in Indonesia, like Khomeini in Iran. The wing of Shia militancy in the eighties increased. That said, the architect fled to Syria and then to Iran after the bombing case was uncovered by the police (Hasib: 162).

Regardless of the truth about the number of Indonesian students there, it has been proven that Qum University alumni in particular and other campuses in Iran are militant Shia cadres who manage Shia institutions and foundations in Indonesia and are spread across the archipelago, numbering more than 150. consists of 100 foundations, pesantren, and taklim assemblies, 50 publishers, and 5 radio and TV broadcasting institutions. Umar Shihab, Husein Shihab, and Ahmad Barogbah were among the first generation of Qum alumni who returned in the 70s and were very active in spreading Shia, especially through campuses. After the events of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, since 1981 the sending of students with second-generation scholarship programs to Qum has become more intense.

Several campuses were used as early embryos for the basis of Shia thought, including the University of Indonesia, Jayabaya University, Jakarta, Padjadjaran University, Bandung, and the Bandung Institute of Technology. But now they are developing the link to 25 campuses spread across big cities on the islands of Java to Sumatra and Sulawesi such as Aceh, Manado, and Makassar. In 2003 a central institution was established, the Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) having its address at Jl. Buncit Raya Kav. 35 West Pejaten, South Jakarta to coordinate all these Shia institutions led directly by the Iranian Shia figure Muhsin Hakimolloh. This institution also took the initiative in forming the LKAB (Ahlul Bait Communication Institute) having its address at Jl. Bintaro KODAM Grand Bintaro, South Jakarta as a forum for Qum alumni, fostered several foundations including al-Muntadhor, Fatimah Aqilah, Arrodhiyah, Mulla Sadr, Annaqi, al-Kubro, al-Washilah, and others. Studies at the ICC

were filled by Shiite figures such as Umar Shihab, Muhsin Labib, Haidar Bagir, Musa Kazim al-Habsyi, Khalid Walid, the brothers Umar Shihab (Chairman of MUI) and Quroisy Syihab (former Minister of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia) and prominent figures Haba'ib Alawiyin and others.

The reality of the number of Indonesian students in Iran is quite worrying, but the number of alumni that will be produced each year has not been counted. That is the fact that the existence of as-Shiro 'baina al-Haq wa al-Bathil (the battle between truth and falsehood) will last until the Day of Resurrection. The Shia religion was born from the womb of hatred and is continuously indoctrinated to hate Muslims. In history, the conspiracy of the descendants of Abdullah bin Saba' al-Yahudiyah with the enemies of the Muslims in destroying the Ummah has been revealed many times. Since the Shi'a revolution in Iran in 1979, slowly Arab areas such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain are being undermined by the Shi'a, every time they get wind and succeed in instilling influence in an area, then you can guess what happens next. they will take up arms against the local government and wreak havoc until they succeed in occupying the reins of government and then implementing their teachings and beliefs in the area.

Shia, when they are still a minority, will try their best to influence government policies wherever they are. Therefore, it is understandable that if there is a government policy that does not support the existence of Shia, then they will protest as they have done to cancel the East Java MUI fatwa regarding Shia deviance on January 21, 2012. The MUI fatwa is also supported by the Governor of East Java by issuing Decree (SK) number 55 of 2012 concerning the Development of Religious Activities and Supervision of Heretical Sects in East Java (Ida & Dyson, 2015).

Meanwhile, when they are strong, they do not hesitate to commit acts of violence. This can be seen from developments in Iran and Syria where Sunni groups are under pressure. In Iran, Sunni mosques were burnt to the ground, and clerics were killed. Likewise in Syria, access to the economy and politics is more broadly given to the Shia group because the political regime is controlled by the 'Alawi Shiites. Even during the current revolution, Sunnis are still the target of attacks by this Shiite group (Gonda Yumitro: 2017, 242).

Due to the increase in Shia teachings in Indonesia, where the ideology is deviant, the tension between Sunni and Shiite groups is increasing. The first clash occurred at an Islamic boarding school owned by Ustad Ahmad, in Brayo Village, Wonotunggal District, Batang Regency, Central Java, on April 8, 2000. At that time, a mob attacked the Islamic boarding school after Friday prayers, around 14.00 to 16.30. As a result, three houses at the al-Hadi Islamic Boarding School were damaged and one was burnt by the mob. In 2006 there was another conflict in the village of Brayo, Batang; between 2003 and 2012, there was violence against Shia in Sampang that hit a

pesantren led by Tajul Mulk Mohammad Affan, et al., Bara in Garam Island, 135; and a conflict arose in Bondowoso with the target of a pesantren owned by Kiai Musowir who was holding a Yasinan on Friday night.

The attack then occurred again in the house of the caretaker of the Jar Hum Mosque in Bangil, East Java, in November 2007. The mob destroyed the house because they refused the presence of Shiite followers. Attempts to attack Shiites also occurred in Jember, East Java. In the month of Ramadan, August 2012, some banners appeared saying Habib Shia's teachings were heretical. However, the propaganda cloth was successfully taken down by residents and Civil Service officers before the conflict escalated.

From the explanation above, from a cultural and ideological perspective, comparative education will bring many impacts, not only positive impacts but also negative impacts that will become a necessity that will occur. This is similar to the study Understanding Violent Extremism in Indonesia written by Matteo Vergani, Greg Barton, and Yenny Wahid which stated that radicalism and fundamentalists in culture and ideology were brought by Middle Eastern alumni who returned from their studies to Indonesia (Vergani, 2021). In line with this article, the research conducted by Fang Gao examined English learning in China, where the ideology and culture of English were very different from China's, so Gao tried to negotiate the two of them to be the same while maintaining their identity while being able to absorb the expected knowledge. (Gao, 2020).

Vigilance needs to be increased, and efforts to enlighten the ummah to true and pure Islam need to be encouraged, so that the ummah does not fall prey to the syubhats of the Shiites both in faith and thought. Therefore, awareness of the urgency of pluralism (Muhajir, 2022) and inclusive (open) educational design is expected to be able to play an educational function that can form friendly and empathetic people to the anxieties of every human being without exception, including those who are non-Muslims.

Every year dozens of scholarships for bachelor, master, and doctoral degrees are given by Iran to Indonesian students at dozens of campuses spread across the cities of Tehran, Ishfahan, Qum, Qazvin, and several other major provinces. Of course, we don't want the majority of Indonesian Muslims who believe in Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah to be late in realizing the dangers of a Shi'i conspiracy, and even still have good prejudice against them by forging relations to form the Indonesian Sunni-Shia Ukhuwah Council which was just declared on May 20, 2011, even though it is pseudo and only illusion.

Based on some of the studies that we found above, it is appropriate that the existing comparative studies should also be strengthened by several things:

First, emphasizing the values of love for local culture, so that foreign cultures that do not conflict with the local culture can be adopted (Cheon & Hong, 2018). This can be strategically accommodated by the Indonesian Embassy in each destination country for Islamic studies in the Middle East, with regular monthly activities in the form of cultural galleries, customs, or regional specialties by each student according to their region of origin in the country. so that their nationalism is maintained with each other.

Second, inculcates religious insights as a whole to comprehensively understand the close relationship between religion and tradition (Nilemar & Brown, 2017). This can be done in the form of Islamic studies by referring to scientific literature so that their Islam is pure, but still respects tolerance, as in previous Islamic teachings.

Third, negotiations between outside ideology and culture and local culture and ideology (Gao, 2020). Fourth, self-awareness of love for one's nation from various sectors including in terms of ideology and culture. This can be realized in the form of discussions regarding current issues being faced by every country in the world where Islam has an important role in it, based on rational, scientific thinking, and according to Islamic scholarship.

Conclusion

The Middle East has a very strategic position in the muslimworld. As a center for Islamic studies, countries in the Middle East Region have not been replaced in the eyes of Muslims, especially Indonesia. However, these students abroad (in this case including Saudi Arabia and Iran) not only adopted their scientific studies but also tended to adopt ideology and culture, so Islam emerged which imposed Middle Eastern ideology and culture where they studied to be implemented in a homeland with a different climate, by putting aside tolerance, so that it becomes a trigger for divisions. Indonesia itself with its eastern customs and Pancasila ideology is the spirit of Islamic values themselves. For this reason, students in the Middle East, whose aim is to create generations of people who are thorough in science and Islam and who are expected to be able to contribute positively to this nation, must be directed from the time they start while they are undergoing, and until they finish their studies at The Middle East. There are at least three things that can be done, namely: first, emphasizing the values of love for local culture, secondly, inculcating religious insights as a whole, and third, negotiating between outside ideology and culture and local culture and ideology.

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