# Al-Qaeda, Islamists and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Lesson from the Past

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Abstract: This article aims to explore the involvement of the Al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 21st century. As an international terrorist organization with sufficient financial and human resources, Al-Qaeda's arrival in Southeast Asia came as a major shock to the local communities affected by it—an injustice caused by the capitalist regimes in the region. The methods used in writing this article are case studies and historical analysis. This article will provide specific examples of Al-Qaeda involvement in several countries in Southeast Asia, such as the case in Poso. Indonesia, where Al-Oaeda members Omar Bandon and Jusuf Galan from Spain provided military training and funding to militant Islamic groups in Malaysia. This article will also discuss Al-Qaeda's involvement in the Philippines, where they formed cells and networks with the Abu Sayyaf and other extreme Islamic groups. The results of this research show that the entry of the Al-Oaeda network in this area has caused terrorism problems and resulted in quite large losses in the form of property and lives. It is hoped that this article will provide new insights and policy recommendations to strengthen counterterrorism efforts in the future.

Keywords: Al-Qaeda, Islamist, Southeast Asia, terrorism, radicalism, ideology

#### A. Introduction

According to a number of organizations, specialists, and researchers, there was no organizational structure for al-Qaeda groups in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia and the Philippines. Al-Qaeda is like Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk-OTB

(Formless Organization), say Muhammad Fachry and Fauzan al-Ansari<sup>1</sup>. Assuming it passes muster at the first cluster, the Southeast Asian group next makes a public proclamation and sends out what amounts to an al-Qaeda establishment request.<sup>2</sup>

Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaeda started establishing ties in Asia in 1998 through personal networks. The two terrorist organizations' shared goal in the area is to fortify and broaden their political foothold in Asia.

Up until now, the al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia has been under the radar. But there are hints that this movement may exist (through a clandestine underground organization), so it's not completely out of the question. This is demonstrated by terrorists who have attacked Western citizens and had links to the Afghan War. All Americans and Jews, civilian and soldier alike, should be killed in a worldwide holocaust, according to Bin Laden.

Here, the West and the US characterize al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization. This uprising was dubbed by Dilip Hiro as "Islamist terrorism" or Musliminitiated acts of violence. "Terrorism perpetrated by those Muslims who stress Islam as a political ideology" is one possible definition of "Islamist Terrorism" suggested by Hiro (2002)<sup>3</sup>. In this light, it follows that al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups are politically motivated by Islamic ideology.<sup>4</sup>

Since the terrorists' ideology or religion provides them with a sense of justification for their actions, it is common for discussions about terrorists and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Interview with Muslim activists, Muhammad Fachry and Fauzan al-Ansari in Jakarta, early June 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This paper is a part of our field research in the Southern Philippines in 2017-2018. The Philippines is an archipelago with 7,107 islands, with a population of around 60 million, using 87 different language dialects that reflect the number of ethnic groups and communities. Muslims in the Philippines call themselves "Moro". But this name is actually political, because in reality Moro consists of many ethno linguistic groups, for example Maranow, Maquindanau, Tausuq, Somal, Yakan, Ira Nun, Jamampun, Badjao, Kalibugan, Kalagan and Sangil.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Hiro, Dilip. War Without End: the Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response. London & New York: Routledge, 2002. Zainuddin, AR. Pemikiran Politik Islam: Islam, Timur Tengah dan Benturan Peradaban. Jakarta: Pensil-324, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Sydney Jones (2009) , https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/01/28/generationsonline-in-2009/ accessed on March 3, 2019.See, Sydney Jones (2009) , International Crisis Group, Reports, 2008. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/international-crisis-group-annual-report-2008 accessed January 8, 2018.<u>https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ BB88F99BBCD8946C492575B4000B3B31-ICG%20annual%20report%202008.pdf</u> accessed March 3, 2019.

their motivations to center on these topics. Because of its constitutional power and sovereignty, the state can justify the use of violence or fear. Alternatively, community organizations often draw support for their cause from the ideology or faith they espouse. We need a deeper dive into the "Islamic terrorism" question to find out if Islam condones or condemns state-sponsored or non-state terror.

Terrorism as a term, according to Noam Chomsky, refers more to acts of violence carried out by anyone (state or not) for certain political purposes. Chomsky's (1991)<sup>5</sup> definition is more neutral and important to put forward because in the development of terrorism studies, the term often shifts and has different meanings according to who is dominant, especially the state. At least, in his study, the term terrorism first appeared in the 18th century as an act of violence committed by the state against its people to guarantee its obedience. Meanwhile, Walter S. Jones (1993)<sup>6</sup> sees that there is a link between terrorism committed by the state and non-state. According to Jones, terrorism can be carried out by national and transnational extremist groups, as well as involving the state as its sponsor. State involvement can range from (financial) to legal protection.

The difference between the two (state and non-state) lies in the ease of identifying who the actors are. Nainggolan et al. (2002) writes:

"Terrorism committed by a country is more easily identified than is done by the community. The difficulty of this identification is because terrorists who come from community groups are transnational in nature so that it has implications for the legal issues that govern them such as citizenship status and place of occurrence in different countries. This is especially true in cases of aircraft hijacking, or perpetrators or victims whose targets are from other countries. "<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Chomsky, N. "*Power and Terror: Post 9/11 Talks and Interviews*" —terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Walter S. Jones, *Logika Hubungan Internasional : Kekuasaan, Ekonomi-politik Internasional, dan Tatanan Dunia*, Jakarta: Gramedia ,1993

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Nainggolan, Poltak Partogi, (ed.). *Terorisme dan Tata Dunia Baru.* Jakarta: Tim Peneliti Hubungan Internasional P31 DPR-RI, 2002, (p. 79-80).

In the view of Lewis (2003)8 and Huntington<sup>9</sup>, the roots of terrorism committed by adherents of Islam are not because of Islam as a religion, but because of Islamic militant movements. That is, that in this context, a movement back to the understanding held, and influenced by social and political developments that occur in the world.

Where do the roots of terrorism come from? According to Chomsky (2003)<sup>10</sup>:

"The root of terrorism is due to injustice between developed countries and developing countries which causes feelings of humiliation among Muslims, the majority of whom are residents of developing countries. In the view of the Islamic side, the roots of terrorism are said to originate from the West, especially America, as was the fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden who said that the major terrorists on earth today are America and its allies." (Daulay, 2009: 92-93).<sup>11</sup>

#### B. Method

In order to describe and summarize the whole scope of the research at hand, this study employs qualitative approaches. Research that aims to comprehend something through the eyes of research participants is known as qualitative research (Moleong, 2014)<sup>12</sup>. Qualitative research focuses on the big picture, including how people think, act, and what drives them.

By accumulating material in great detail, qualitative research methods striv e to provide a full understanding of a phenomenon. The focus of qualitative resea

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Islam dalam Krisis Antara Perang Suci dan Teror Kotor.* Surabaya: Jawa Pos Press, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Huntington, Samuel, et.al. Amerika dan Dunia: Memperdebatkan Bentuk Baru Politik Internasional (America and the World: Debating the New Shape of International Politics—terj. Yusi A. Pareanom & A. Zaim Rofiqi). Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005. See, Huntington, Samuel. Benturan Antar Peradaban dan Masa Depan Politik Dunia (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking og World Order—terj. M Sadat Ismail). Yogyakarta: Qalam, 2007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Chomsky, N. "Power and Terror: Post 9/11 Talks and Interviews" —terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Daulay, Richard. Amerika VS Irak: Bahaya Politisasi Agama. Jakarta: Penerbit Libri, 2009

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Moleong, Lexy J. Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2005

rch is on witnessing events unfold and delving deeper into their meaning. In ord er to learn how individuals in a given area feel about specific topics. Here, it is vit al for the researcher to realize and possess appropriate knowledge about the sub ject that will be examined. Qualitative research cannot be undertaken if the resea rcher has no clue what he is seeking to explore. In addition to that, researchers ca n collect precise data, limit assumptions to a minimum, and write persuasively to transport readers to the same place.

The author uses a historical approach here, which supports looking at how Osama/Al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist relations have altered throughou t time. According to this school of thought, the past may teach us a lot about the p resent and the future of Al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorist. One technique to investigate Al Qaeda and Southeast Asian terrorism is from a historical viewpoit. This involves researching primary sources and other sources that provide infor mation them from the past. By doing so systematically, one can obtain a deep un derstanding of the past, present, and future of these themes.

#### **C. Findings and Discussion**

The New York Times main columnist Thomas L. Friedman13 sees the issue of terrorism - especially after 9/11 - as "Islam versus Modernity". Quoting Friedman, Bruce B. Lawrence writes, "We are modern, not Muslims". Friedman's book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, which discusses the striking difference between pre-modern Muslim Arab societies and Japan, as well as other modern capitalist societies. During his visit to Egypt, Friedman noticed that the elevator operator still had to pray before pressing the button. According to Friedman, "For Westerners, it is annoying to see operators who must pray first every time they want to close their doors"<sup>14</sup>.

Terrorism which found its great momentum through the tragedy of 9/11 was the culmination of the accumulation of injustice felt by Muslims. The leader

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Thomas L. Friedman The Lexus and the Olive Tree, London : Harper Collins., 1999

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Permata, Ahmad Norma (ed.). Agama dan Terorisme. Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2006

of Tanzim al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, gave his statement regarding the incident. Bin Laden (2004)15 writes as follows:

"What is felt by America today is very small compared to what we have felt since decades. Our grace, for eighty years, felt this humiliation. Our children are killed, blood is shed, sacred ground is stained, and we are forced to apply laws other than those passed down by God, but no one cares and reacts." (p. 183).

In another statement, Laden also said that killing Americans and Jews was the greatest obligation. According to Laden (2004)<sup>16</sup>:

"And know that killing Americans and Jews everywhere is one of the greatest obligations and worship of God, and I also advise you to gather around the true ulama and the sincere and charitable preacher. The Messenger of Allah said, The disbelievers will not gather in hell with those who kill them. " (p. 175).

The 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1979 seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran brought Islamic fundamentalist terrorism to the forefront of global politics, say Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand (2002)<sup>17</sup>. In the time after, Islamism gained momentum, and the Western world's political and ideological responses to terrorism ultimately failed. Its reach is extensive, touching not only the Islamic crescent spanning the western African countries of Nigeria and Morocco and the eastern Asian countries of Malaysia and Mindanao, but also numerous regions of India, the United States, Europe, and even western China.

The two Iranian historians agreed that terrorism was often considered as a product of modern ideology prior to the Iranian Revolution. But fundamentalist Islamist terrorists say they are fighting based on religious principles, citing specific

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Laden, Usamah bin.*Nasehat dan Wasiat Kepada Umat Islam dari Syaikh Mujahid Usamah bin Laden*. Solo: Granada Mediatama, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Ibid, (p. 175).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ladan Boroum and Roya Boroumand, "Terror, Islam, and Democracy", Journal of Democracy, April 2002

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passages from the Qur'an and the sunnah. Allusions to religion, including "infidels," "polytheists," "crusades," "martyrs," "jihadists," "holy lands," "enemies of Islam," "religious groups," "Allah," and "the Antichrist," reveal the ideology's framework. But if terrorism is so deeply ingrained in Islamic theology, the two writers wondered, based on the vocabulary alone, why it took until 1979 for international terrorism to emerge?

Unchecked violence like that perpetrated by Pakistani al-Qaeda or Lebanese Hezbollah has never been seen in Islamic history, claims Lewis (1987)<sup>18</sup>. According to Huntingtonet al<sup>19</sup> (2002), who cite Lewis, not even the Shia Ismaili group referred to as the "killers" randomly employ individuals who are willing to die to eliminate their opponents. In reality, Islamic norms and traditions are at odds with the kind of terror that kills without discrimination, taking the lives of women, children, and people of all faiths and socioeconomic backgrounds (p. 340-342).

However, Lewis's statement, indirectly, was answered by Bin Laden in his exclusive interview with journalist Al-Jazeera. When asked about the law of killing children and women in war, Bin Laden said that the argument for the banning did exist.

Bin Laden's argument (2004) <sup>20</sup> departs from Muslim hadith from Buraidah that the Prophet (s) gave a will to the commanders of his forces and sariyahsariyah with his saying, "Fight in the way of Allah in the name of Allah, fight those who disbelieve in Allah, fight and do not do ghulul , don't break promises, don't chop and don't kill children. "In another narration, the Prophet also said," Tell Khalid not to kill women and workers.".

However, according to Bin Laden, this prohibition is not absolutely in nature. There are other arguments that exclude this prohibition, such as the word of Allah Almighty, "And if you reply, then retaliate in kind" (Surah an-Nahl: 126). This

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Islam dalam Krisis Antara Perang Suci dan Teror Kotor.* Surabaya: Jawa Pos Press, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Huntington, Samuel, et.al. *Amerika dan Dunia: Memperdebatkan Bentuk Baru Politik Internasional* (America and the World: Debating the New Shape of International Politics, 2002, —terj. Yusi A. Pareanom & A. Zaim Rofiqi). Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Laden, Usamah bin.*Nasehat dan Wasiat Kepada Umat Islam dari Syaikh Mujahid Usamah bin Laden*. Solo: Granada Mediatama, 2004

means that Western actions against Muslims, for example in the case of Palestine, Western (American) aid have resulted in many Palestinian Muslims being killed. So, the revenge carried out by al-Qaeda is merely to repay the actions of the West with something that makes him afraid and shocked. Quoting Ibn Qayyim, al-Qurthubi, and several other scholars, Laden also stated that if the infidels kill our children and women, then it is permissible for us to do the same as a lesson for them to stop them (p. 202-203).

According to Saikal (2006),<sup>21</sup> there are at least three major issues in the Muslim world that also influence Muslim politics, namely: the 1979 Iranian revolution which gave the political spirit of Islam after the era of Western colonialism; the Palestinian issue which has not been resolved until now, and the conflict in Afghanistan which has become a field of jihad for Islamic Mujahideen in Islamic countries (p. 145).

On the scale of Southeast Asia many parties claim that this region is not the center of terrorism. Southeast Asia is a region far from acts of terrorism. In the survey between 1984 and 1996, the Southeast Asian region experienced only 186 acts of international terrorism. This is in stark contrast to higher acts of terrorism of 2,073 in Europe, 1,621 in Latin America, 1,292 in West Asia and 362 in Africa. However, Southeast Asia is a region that holds enormous potential for the emergence of terrorism because of dissatisfaction with government policies.

Rohan Gunaratna<sup>22</sup> found evidence of an al-Qaeda network and movement in Southeast Asia (2002). He made it clear that al-Qaeda and its network expanded their influence in Southeast Asia through infiltrating non-governmental Muslim organizations, training activists in Afghanistan, importing extremist religious leaders into the region, and using the internet. Among the Southeast Asian countries where he claims al-Qaeda was involved were the Philippines, Poso (Indonesia) in the year 2000, Malaysia, and Singapore (Nainggolan, 2002: 139-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Saikal, Amin. *Islam & Barat: Konflik atau Kerjasama (Islam and West: Conflict or Cooperation—*terj. Abdul Halim Mahally & Tubagus Mundzir). Jakarta: Sanabil Pustaka, 2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror First Printing Edition, Columbia University Press; First Printing edition (June 27, 2002). Conboy, Ken. Intel II: Medan Tempur Kedua (The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network—terj. Syahrini Dyah N). Jakarta: Pustaka Primatama, 2008

141, Hendropriyono, 2009: 201)<sup>23</sup>. Spanish al-Qaeda members Jusuf Galan and Omar Bandon oversaw this training and financing.

Azyumardi Azra<sup>24</sup> finds it extremely challenging to provide a definitive response to the question of how terrorist groups in Southeast Asia are linked. "Is there an al-Qaeda connection in Southeast Asia?" Azra asked. The professor from Jakarta State Islamic University claims that "the answer to this question" can change drastically according on who provided the response. This is similar to the case of A.M. Hendropriyono, the former head of BIN, who claimed, without providing sufficient proof, that "international terrorism" had a military training ground near Poso. This claim was later withdrawn following a rebuttal by National Police Chief Da'i Bachtiar and harsh criticism from different Muslim groups.

Zachari Abuza<sup>25</sup> shown the presence of links based on his research. Abuza is a professor in Simmons College's Department of Politics and International Relations in the US. This is what Abuza "proves" in his lengthy paper "Tentacles of Terror: al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Linkages" (Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 190, 21 February 2002) at the conference "Transnational Violence and Semams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism".

The organization in question is al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, a fractional organization from the Darul Islam (DI) founded by Abdullah Sungkar's group when a dispute occurred with the leader of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). The organization's relationship with al-Qaeda is only based on equality in religion, ideas and ontological beliefs, not formal organizational relations. Thus, the unity between al-Qaeda and JI is at the philosophical level, while at the practical level such as conducting bombings is coordinating like coordination in education and training (Hendropriyono, 2009: 230)<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Hendropriyono, A.M. Terorisme Fundamentalis Kristen, Yahudi, Islam. Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2009

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Azra, Azyumardi. Konflik Baru Antar Peradaban: Globalisasi, Radikalisme & Pluralitas. Jakarta: PT. RajaGrafindo Persada, 2002

<sup>25</sup> Zachari Abuza , Tentacles of Terror: al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Linkage, (Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 190, 21 February 2002)

<sup>26</sup> Hendropriyono, A.M. Terorisme Fundamentalis Kristen, Yahudi, Islam. Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2009

### Al-Qaeda, Profile of Osama and Southeast Asia

To find out the al-Qaeda movement, it requires historical understanding of the figures behind the movement. In this section Osama's history will be explained, the networks he created, and the ideas that exist within the al-Qaeda organization. This description helps in understanding the al-Qaeda movement.

Al-Qaeda is now a movement that is still being sought and destroyed by America. During the leadership of Barack Obama, which was initially persuasive, in the end launched an attack by adding 17,000 troops which had previously been around 136,000 in Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda cells. The war on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is a more expensive war than the war to bring down Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

Osama bin Laden's name was plastered all over the news after the 9/11 catastrophe, which claimed the lives of 2,000 people (including 19 hijackers). According to reports, the Saudi national was the primary planner behind the 9/11 attacks that brought down the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City and portions of the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia.

Who was Osama bin Laden? The following was written by John L. Esposito<sup>27</sup>, an expert in international politics and Islamic studies at Georgetown University: "The journey of his life from a man of wealth and privileges, as a descendant of a multimillionaire Saudi family who has close ties with the king and the royal family, to caves and training camps in Afghanistan it seems more like a fiction than a true story."

Osama bin Laden was born on June 28, 1957, in the Saudi Arabian city of Riyadh. The seventeenth of fifty-two siblings, he was. Muhammad bin Laden Sr. was an illiterate worker who came to Saudi Arabia in the 1930s from South Yemen. He was his son's father. He started out with a small construction company and worked his way up to become one of the richest men in Saudi Arabia. He was able to get exclusive contracts thanks to his royal family connections.

In the 1950s, his father laid the groundwork for the al-Hada roadway, which allowed Muslims from Yemen to travel there. He hired his father's business to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Esposito, John L. Saatnya Muslim Bicara. Bandung: Mizan, 2008. See, Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Teror Atas Nama Islam (Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam—terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003

restore and expand the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. The projects were valued at multi-billion dollars apiece. The outcome was an increase in the company's visibility outside of Saudi Arabia and a surge in its repute throughout the Islamic world.

The Bin Laden Group was a massive financial and industrial conglomerate that the Bin Laden family established. A major player in the Middle Eastern construction industry, the company's reach includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the entirety of continental Europe. Unilever, Cadbury Schweppes, Motorola, Quaker, Nortel, and Citigroup are among the family's commercial associates, as reported in the British daily Guardian. A variety of American institutions, Barclay's Bank in London, Credit Giro in Vienna, and a slew of banks in Dubai and Malaysia all received deposits from the Ladens family's enormous fortune.

Friendships, cross-marriages, and economic relationships were all weakened by the Bin Laden clan's affiliation with the royal family. The princes of the royal family sent their kids to the same schools in the United States and Europe, where they studied and received scholarships. Oxford, Harvard, and Tufts are all recipients of scholarships from this family. Osama bin Laden's brother Bakar Mohammad bin Laden started donating to Harvard in 1994. The scholarship was utilized by the Harvard Law School to support visiting scholars who were invited to study Islamic law. The Harvard Faculty of Design was also the recipient of multiple scholarship prizes.

What little is known about bin Laden's early life is inconsistent, and there is little known about him overall. From what I hear, he was once a morally upright young man whose marriage to a Syiah girl at a young age protected him from the perils of moral decline. According to another source, he joined the other young men of his generation in visiting Beirut in the early 1970s, calling it the "Paris of the Middle East" due to its vibrant nightlife and diverse culture.

Bin Laden entered college in 1976 and completed his undergraduate education in public administration in 1981 from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. During his studies, Laden became more religious because he was influenced by various endless events in Saudi Arabia in particular, and the Islamic world in general. His worldview is influenced by Wahhabism adopted in Saudi Arabia. Later, in his life journey, this view had a big influence on him (Wright, 2006: 90, Esposito, 2003: 1-3)<sup>28</sup>.

An important point in bin Laden's life when transforming into a mujahid was during the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Isham Darraz mentioned that Bin Laden came to Pakistan only 17 days after the attack. Darraz<sup>29</sup> (2001) writes that Bin Laden has never heard much news about the development of Afghanistan so far, except he is only a Muslim country to which there are superior horses, because bin Laden is a person who likes horses (p. 37).

Laden<sup>30</sup> remarked, "The life I spent two years there was not equivalent to a hundred years elsewhere" when asked about his time in Afghanistan. Among the first to visit the Afghan refugee camps in Peshawar (Pakistan) to meet with the mujahideen commanders, Bin Laden was instrumental in mobilizing Muslims to fight against the "godless" state. Between 1979 and 1982, Laden made multiple trips between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, gathering resources for jihad. Laden openly participated in the jihad in Afghanistan in 1982, bringing with him substantial sums of money and building equipment.

According to Nasir Abas<sup>31</sup>, Mujahideen Aghanistan consists of seven organizations or seven groups which in Afghan (Poshtun or Persian) are called "tanzim" which means organizations or organizations. These tanzim are representatives of all the tribes in all of Afghanistan, the majority of which are the northern parts of the Persian nation and the southern Posthun nation. Some Tanzim with their leaders who existed at that time were Ittihad al-Islami (Abdur Robbir Rasul Sayyaf), Hizb al-Islami (Maulawi Yunus Kholis), Harakah al-Islami (Burhanuddin Robbani), Hizb al-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), Harakah al-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Vintage Books, 2007.See, Esposito, John L. *Unholy War: Teror Atas Nama Islam (Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*—terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Darraz, Isham. Sosok Mujahid Sejati: Usamah bin Muhammad 'Awad bin Ladin (Usamah bin Ladin Yarwi Ma'arik Ma'sadah al-Anshar al-'Arab bi Afghanistan—terj. Alimin). Jakarta: Cendekia Sentra Muslim, 2001

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Laden, Usamah bin.*Nasehat dan Wasiat Kepada Umat Islam dari Syaikh Mujahid Usamah bin Laden*. Solo: Granada Mediatama, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Abas, Nasir, Jamaah Islamiyah, Penerbitan : Jakarta : Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005. See, Abas, Nasir. Memberantas Terorisme, Memburu Noordin M. Top. Jakarta: Grafindo, 2009 See, Abas, Nasir. Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI. Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007

Islami -Jihad al-Islami (Mujaddidi), Harakah al-Jihad al-Inkilabi (Maulawi Jailani) and Maulawi Muhammad Prophet's group.

The establishment of an Islamic state was the ultimate goal of the Mujahideen's fight. As an example, we must fight against governments that either do not adhere to Islamic law or that use laws other than Islam as their foundation. "Since the beginning of the Afghan Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan, these seven groups have fought against the same enemy, the Russian army and the communist government of Kabul and with the sole purpose of defending Islam and upholding Islamic sharia. in an Islamic state," Abas<sup>32</sup> wrote about the struggle's vision. Combinations of assault operations are common, with the seventh tanzim being one example and combinations of a few tanzins being another.

In around 1989, after the Russian army took the decision to leave Afghanistan, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan continued their struggle against communist government forces. The aim is to bring down the government of Najibullah (President of Afghanistan)."

In order to participate in the Afghan jihad, in 1984, Bin Laden established Bait al-Anshar (a helper house) or also called Ma'sadah al-Anshar in the city of Peshawar to accommodate and train volunteer military personnel from various countries before descending into battle. At the same time, Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) who was a teacher of Bin Laden also established Maktab al-Khidmat (service office) in Peshawar. The two institutions work complementary and synergistically, but do not blend into one.<sup>33</sup>

Maktab al-Khidmat undertook publications and information, raised funds, and encouraged Muslims - especially Arabs - to wage jihad with wealth and lives in Afghanistan. Maktab has many branches, including in the United States, one of which is the Masjid al-Farouk in New York.<sup>34</sup> Abu Muhammad as-Suri said that the first person responsible for this school was a young man from Jordan, Abu

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  Nasir Abas , <a href="https://www.vice.com/id/article/ae5gke/jalan-hidup-baru-sang-guru-militan-asia-tenggara">https://www.vice.com/id/article/ae5gke/jalan-hidup-baru-sang-guru-militan-asia-tenggara</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Suradji, Adjie. *Terorisme*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> As-Suri, Abu Mush'ab. Perjalanan Gerakan Jihad (1930-2002): Sejarah, Eksperimen, dan Evaluasi (Da'wah al-Muqawwamah al-Islamiyyah al-'Alamiyyah Bab: Hashad as-Shahwah al-Islamiyyah wa at-Tayar al-Jihadi—terj. Agus Suwandi). Solo: Jazera, 2009

Akram al-Urduni. Because he always complained about the lack of work discipline and rigid centralization from Amir Maktab (Abdullah Azzam), al-Urduni returned to Jordan. Aside from al-Urduni, those who had been administrators at Maktab were Abu Usamah al-Falishini, Abu Hijir al-Iraqi, Abu Daud al-Urduni, and Abu Muhammad as-Sudani. According to as-Suri, although there were some weaknesses, it was this Maktab that made the Arabs succeed in achieving jihad. Darraz (2001)<sup>35</sup>, writes:

"Maktab al-Khidmat is like a big guest house, because he has managed to rent a villa big enough for young Arabs who will come and settle. Structurally, it consists of military, administration, training, and departure sections. Every month, Bin Laden hands over 500,000 Rupees (around 25,000 US dollars) to meet the needs of Maktab. Because the needs of Maktab continued to grow in 1985-1986, Bin Laden decided to attend and stay permanently there. Together with that, Bin Laden built roads in the mountains, dug underground roads, tunnels and large hiding places to protect the mujahideen from air bomb attacks. This project was built with his brother in the Bin Laden company by sending heavy equipment such as large bulldozers and electric generators to Afghanistan." (p. 39-41).

The Bait al-Ansar mission was to accept volunteers, provide military training, and arrange technical and scheduled departures for the battlefield. In his interview with Isham Darraz, Laden said that in 1984 he sought permission from the Amir Islamic Union (al-Ittihad al-Islami), led by Abdur Robbir Rasul Sayyaf, to establish a headquarters for the acceptance of brothers from Arab countries. This was done so that the potential of Arab fighters was utilized as well as possible and as a campsite in an area close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The number of Arab mujahidin who joined the camp at that time was only 100 people. According to Bin Laden, it was caused by young Arabs accustomed to living away from jihad and protecting religion, while others considered that jihad was a practice of sunnah. When summer passed, the young men mostly returned to their respective countries to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Darraz, Isham. Sosok Mujahid Sejati: Usamah bin Muhammad 'Awad bin Ladin (Usamah bin Ladin Yarwi Ma'arik Ma'asadah al-Anshar al-'Arab bi Afghanistan—terj. Alimin). Jakarta: Cendekia Sentra Muslim, 2001

continue their studies, until there were left when there were less than ten people (Darraz: 2001: 43-44).

In this intensive collaboration between Maktab al-Khidmat and Bait al-Anshar / Ma'sadah al-Anshar, Laden studied a lot of theoretical and practical jihad from Azzam. Aside from being known as a figurehead of Afghan jihad, Azzam is also known as an intellectual who is often referred to, especially his fatwa on jihad. He completed his doctoral education at al-Azhar University in the field of Usul Fiqh in 1973 and wrote books on jihad (Whittaker, 2003: 41-41, Fachry, 2008: 41).<sup>36</sup>

A number of Muslim nations, including Saudi Arabia, have expressed their approval of Bin Laden's actions; these nations, along with the United States, have pledged to assist Arab volunteers. Bin Laden developed recruiting centers in over fifty countries to oppose the Soviet Union, with the help of American aid (Hussain, 2003: 281-282).<sup>37</sup>

This is a "good jihad" for the United States, according to Esposito (2003:10). Despite the fact that the United States was worried about the Islamic Revolution in Iran and other jihadist groups' violent and terroristic actions in Egypt, Lebanon, and elsewhere, our government was pleased and backed the Afghan mujahideen, providing them with funds and CIA advisors. Everyone is in agreement with everyone else. The Afghan struggle to drive outsiders from Islamic land is indeed in line with Islamic teachings, according to Osama bin Laden, Saudi Arabia, and Muslims globally.

In 1989, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia and worked on the family business. Although initially welcomed as a hero, speaking in mosques and limited meetings, he was involved in a dispute with the royal family. He has repeatedly warned of the possible danger of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia - together with the United States and Kuwait - for many years (especially during the Iran-Iraq war) was a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Whittaker, David J, (ed.). The Terrorism Reader: Second Edition. London & New York: Routledge, 2003. Fachry, M. In the Heart of al-Qaeda: Biografi Usamah bin Ladin & Organisasi Jihad al-Qaeda. Jakarta: Ar-Rahmah Media, 2008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Hussein, Fuad. *Generasi Kedua al-Qaidah: Apa dan Siapa Zarqawi (az-Zarqawi: al-Jail al-Tsani li al-Qa'idah*—terj. Ahmad Syakirin). Solo: Jazera, 2008. See, Husain, Mir Zohair. *Global Islamic Politics*. New York: Longman Publisher, 2003

strong supporter of Iraq led by Saddam Husein because he saw his role as a deterrent to Iran led by Ayatullah Khomeini.

When Iraq actually invaded Kuwait in August 1990, bin Laden wrote a letter to King Fahd offering to take the Afghan mujahideen to Saudi Arabia to defend the kingdom. But the silence on the part of the kingdom was suddenly stopped by the news that American troops would protect the kingdom. With the entry of foreign troops in the holy land and their permanent placement after the Gulf War, Bin Laden later said, had changed his life completely and placed him in a position that clashed with Saudi and Western governments. Loudly, Bin Laden opposed the alliance.

In 1993, when Sudan was included in the list of countries supporting terrorism by the US State Department, Bin Laden was also among those identified by the US as supporting terrorist training camps. Although he denied being directly involved and was never formally charged, he expressed his support for the bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993 and the killing of US troops in Mogadishu, Somalia.

In 1994, because of the relationship that did not improve with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, then Bin Laden's citizenship was revoked. Its assets in Saudi are also frozen. Since then, his criticism of the Saudi government has intensified. He also joined with other dissident activist groups and clerics to form the Advice and Reform Committee, which was established in Arabia but was later forced to move to London. This opposition group strongly criticized Saudi Arabia, but outwardly did not support violence.

A series of events also made his name more famous. US intelligence sources in 1995 claimed that Bin Laden had established extensive training operations in North Yemen near the Saudi border. Investigators also alleged that Ramzi Yousef (mastermind of the captured WTC bomber) had lived in a shelter funded by Bin Laden. In these moments, Laden sent a letter to King Fahd which contained statements of support for guerrilla attacks to drive US troops out of the kingdom. That same year he was accused of having links to the failed assassination plot in Adis Ababa of President Husni Mubarak in Egypt. Responding to the increasing international pressure - especially from the United States and Saudi Arabia - the Sudanese government expelled Bin Laden and offered to extradite him to Saudi or America, but the two countries refused. Bin Laden finally returned to Afghanistan. Shortly after, in June, a large truck loaded with bombs destroyed the Khobar Tower, a US military settlement in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) which killed 19 workers. Bin Laden praised those who did that, but he denied he was directly involved, as in his statement, "... I am very respectful of those who do this. What they are doing is a great honor which I myself did not get the opportunity to get involved in. "In June 2001, it was proven that the perpetrators of the blasts were from Saudi Hezbollah members from the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia.<sup>38</sup>

In May 1996, Bin Laden chartered a jet to Afghanistan and arrived in Jalalabad along with other mujahideen. He stayed with full protection from the Shuro Jalalabad Council until the success of the Taliban mujahidin conquered Kabul and Jalalabad in September 1996. In August of that year, he issued a declaration of jihad against America for the first time because it had occupied two holy lands (al-haramain).

Because of his opposition to America, by the superpower, Bin Laden gained a new status as the most significant financial sponsor of Islamic extremist activities in the world (the most significant person in the financial sponsorship of Islamic extremist activities in the world). Bin Laden is accused of financing terrorist camps in Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan. America also freezes its assets. In 1997, the CIA designed a capture and abduction operation for Osama bin Laden. The team landed in Peshawar to further pressure Afghanistan and Pakistan to help, but the two countries did not heed the invitation.<sup>39</sup>

At the end of 1997, Bin Laden took fatwas from around 40 (forty) Pakistani and Afghan clerics who supported the declaration of jihad against infidels in the Arabian Peninsula, which he had previously delivered. To further strengthen his movement, then on February 23, 1998, Bin Laden announced the establishment of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Crusaders and Jews).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Esposito, John L. Saatnya Muslim Bicara. Bandung: Mizan, 2008 See, Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror Atas Nama Islam (Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam—terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Esposito, John L. Saatnya Muslim Bicara. Bandung: Mizan, 2008 See, Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Teror Atas Nama Islam (Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam—terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003

This front was established after one of the leaders of the congregation present at the meeting succeeded in convincing Bin Laden to expand the concept of war against America because it had declared war on God and the Prophet. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the decision of the front was a call to kill every American "any where on earth (at any location on earth). This task, according to alQaeda, is "...as the individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it" (as an individual assignment for every Muslim who can do it in any place where it is possible to do it)<sup>40</sup>.

Two weeks after the fatwa circulated, Bin Laden gave a video recording to A BC News with the same slogan, adding that "we don't differentiate between those dressed military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this fatwa "(we do not distinguish between those dressed in military and civilian uniforms; they are all targets in this fatwa) (9/11 Commission Report: 86). In the third month after the fatwa was spread, when interviewed in Afghanistan by ABC-TV, Bin Laden said, "it is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities" (much better for anyone to kill one American soldier instead of wasting his efforts on other activities).

When asked about why he approved of terrorism by attacking civilians, he immediately replied, "We believe that the worst are today in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind "(we believe that the worst thieves and terrorists in the world today are America. Nothing can stop you except perhaps in the form of retaliation)  $(9/11 \text{ Commission Report: } 64).^{41}$ 

Those who convinced Bin Laden of the expansion of the concept of target provided shar'i (religious) and siyasi (political) justification. In religious terms, the actions taken have a theoretical basis and are justified in religion. While the political basis means that these actions will have implications for world politics. Hussein (2008) writes that sharply, according to al-Qaeda, the American government has occupied two holy cities (Mecca and Medina). In addition, because Americans and Jews kill Muslims in all places and times. They justify the blood of Muslim civilians. So, killing Americans and Jews is something that is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> 9/11 Commission Report (Laporan Komisi 9/11) p.64

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> 9/11 Commission Report (Laporan Komisi 9/11)

permissible (permissible) wherever and whenever. While the reason for its siyasi is that America is now the first enemy of Islam and has always targeted active Muslims and Islamic congregations. There is no more power over the United States. Therefore, it is common for Muslims to feel that they are enemies of America. And this problem is a priority problem for all Muslims in all corners of the Islamic world.

Together with Bin Laden, the leaders of the movement that signed this front were Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of al-Jihad al-Islami, Egypt), Abu Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Thaha (leader of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah, Egypt), Mir Hamzah (secretary of Jami'at al-Ulama, Pakistan), and Fazlurrahman (leader of Harakat al-Jihad, Bangladesh), leader of the Kashmir Islamic movement and a commander from Pakistan. This front will become an organization that houses radical movements throughout the world.<sup>42</sup>

The front statement was then distributed and published by the mass media. According to Hussein (2008:228), this is a sign of a major change for Bin Laden, at least from three sides. First, the statement was a stepping from what was originally only a matter of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula to an international scale issue. Secondly, this statement is considered by some as an attitude of caution that has been held by Osama in matters of shari'a law, namely by broadening the scope of those who are considered halal to be killed. Third, for the first time Osama entered the Islamic coalition consisting of jama'ah-jihadists. Whereas before he had worked only with his group and refused to form a coalition openly. He was willing to cooperate and coordinate, but not for an open alliance.

Important issues and themes in the message delivered by Bin Laden reflect the roots of his growing intimacy and awareness in the broader Islamic community. His main focus was initially the presence of foreign troops in the Arabian peninsula, the overthrow of the Saudi regime, and the Palestinian-Israeli

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Hiro, Dilip. War Without End: the Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response. London & New York: Routledge, 2002. See, Fachry, M. In the Heart of al-Qaeda: Biografi Usamah bin Ladin & Organisasi Jihad al- Qaeda. Jakarta: Ar-Rahmah Media, 2008. See, Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror Atas Nama Islam (Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam—terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003. See, Dreyfuss, Robert. Devil's Game: Orchestra Iblis, 60 tahun Perselingkuhan Amerika-Religious Extremist (Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam—terj. Asyhabudin & Team SR-Ins Publishing). Yogyakarta: SR-Ins Publishing, 2007

conflict, Bin Laden called America and Israel as Crusaders and Jews and Zionists and condemned the corrupt and corrupt Saudi regimes. Then he extended his accusation over the death of an Iraqi innocent by Western sanctions, as well as the struggles of Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir.

Esposito (2003) writes that Osama played the feelings of Muslims regarding oppression, occupation and historical wrongs committed by Westerners. After September 11, he stated, "What is felt by the United States today is very small when compared to what we have felt for decades. Our nation has felt humiliation and harassment for more than 80 years." He wrote a world where Islam and the Muslims were in danger.

On another occasion, Laden also told about the dangers that befall Muslims around the world. America and its allies are massacring Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq. According to Laden, Muslims have the right to attack America in return. The September 11 attacks were not aimed at women and children. However, the real targets from aircraft hijacking to crashing into the twin WTC and Pentagon buildings are icons of American military and economic power.

Osama's messages consistently also spoke of attacks by Jews and Zionists against Muslims. His statement clearly describes the anger of many in the Arab and Islamic world over Israeli policies and the involvement of the international community, which we can see as follows:

"For more than half of Arabs, Muslims in Palestine have been slaughtered, attacked, and robbed of their honor and property. Their houses have been burned, their crops destroyed. But strangely, whatever acts they do to defend themselves or get rid of the tyrannies that have befallen them have caused severe agitation at the United Nations which immediately convenes emergency meetings only to punish the victims and condemn those who are wronged and wronged whose children have been slaughtered and their results his crops were destroyed and his fields ransacked."

In Laden's view, the attack on "terrorism" is indeed appropriate in the midst of a world filled with immorality and oppression. He described the world at two poles, between believers and infidels, and Islam and Muslims today are in danger. Bin Laden said again, "They are robbing us of our wealth, resources and oil. Our religion is in danger. They kill and slaughter our brothers. They jeopardize our honor and dignity and if we dare to issue just one protest speech against this tyranny, we are also called terrorists."

What Laden did by terrorizing Western powers, he said was "praiseworthy" terrorism. (Esposito, 2003) . Scaring innocent people, according to him, is a tyranny, but terrorizing the oppressors is a necessary thing:

"There is no doubt that every country and every civilization and culture must resort to terrorism in certain circumstances with the aim of eliminating tyranny and corruption ... The terrorism that we practice is a praiseworthy form because it is directed at tyrants, traitors who commit treason against their own countries, their own religion, their own prophet, and their own nation. Terrorizing them and punishing them is an action that needs to be taken to correct and improve the situation."<sup>43</sup>

In 2001, after the 9/11 tragedy, Osama bin Laden became a suspect as the intellectual brains behind the fateful event. The posters are displayed in many places. In the Muslim world, criticism of him came, as well as support for him for having succeeded in attacking America in his own country. This attack, has proven that American intelligence cannot control its own country from mujahideen attacks.

On the FBI website, in the "Most Wanted Terrorists" section the name Bin Laden is displayed with photos, descriptions and rewards for those who can get information that leads directly to Bin Laden. Laden was named as the man behind the 7 August 1998 incident, namely the bombing of the United States Embassy in Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. This attack killed more than 200 people. In addition, Bin Laden is a suspect in other terrorist attacks throughout the world.

In the Justice Program, the United States Department of State offers a gift of up to 25 million US dollars for those who provide information that leads directly to an understanding or belief in the position and position of the man born in 1957. Not enough with the rewards, for an additional 2 million US dollars the prize was

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Teror Atas Nama Islam (Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam—terj. Syafruddin Hasani). Yogyakarta: Ikon Teralitera, 2003, p. 25-28.

also given by the Airline Pilots Association and the Air Transport Association (FBI Website, 2009).

The Global Jihad's adherents, according to Sageman (2004),<sup>44</sup> can be seen as influential nodes linked together by linkages in a network. A hub is any node in a network that connects to other nodes. Osama bin Laden's worldwide jihadist organization, al-Qaeda, has issued fatwas mandating the elimination of Jews and Americans worldwide and at any time since 1998.

Clusters of interconnected nodes also constitute networks, as stated in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). The analysts states that there are four clusters formed around nodes in the worldwide network of al-Qaeda.

A plethora of committees report to the Shuro Assembly. Abu Ubaidah al-Panjshiri was the head of the Military Committee from 1996 until his death in a drowning accident in a Victoria fund in Tanzania. Also, a US fighter hit Abu Hafez in Kandahar, and he was leading the charge. The current leader of this committee is Saif al-Adil, a former Egyptian colonel. Combating terrorism, training new recruits, and rejuvenating existing ones are all functions of the Military Commission.<sup>45</sup>

For the Indonesian context, the military training was held in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Poso conflicts occur between Muslims and Christians. In 2000 under the supervision of al-Qaeda cadres from Spain named Omar Bandon and Jusuf Galan, the exercise was carried out. His second trip from Madrid to Poso via Bali, was guided by an al-Qaeda link named Parlindungan Siregar by managing funds which were only around 50 million US dollars before 9/11.

Abu Faraj al-Yamani, Abu Qatada, Abu Hajar, Fadel al-Misiri, and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the joint chairmen of the al-Qaeda Fatwa Committee. The Fatwa Commission is concerned with the Islamic legal arguments that inform Islamic political practice. Abu Mush'ab, sometimes known as Abu Reuters (after the Reuters news agency), heads the media-focused Information Committee. For the goals of promoting and elevating Muslims and publishing relevant information for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Sageman, Marc , Understanding Terror Networks, Unabridged, April 16, 2004.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 45}\,$  Whittaker, David J, (ed.). The Terrorism Reader: Second Edition. London & New York: Routledge, 2003

the global population, the Information Commission handles matters pertaining to the Muslim environment.

For the goals of promoting and elevating Muslims and publishing their stories to the global audience, the Media Commission handles matters pertaining to the Muslim environment. The duties, salary, and places of its staff are determined by the command system, which operates from the top down, on this inner axis. Hendropriyono argues that a military-style command and control system allows for more organizational agility and responsiveness.<sup>46</sup>

In this regard, Ayman al-Zawahiri headed al-Jihad. The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 was the first major achievement of the al-Jihad movement, according to CDI. As a subset of the Muslim Brotherhood, this organization has been going strong since the '70s. Egyptian authorities took up the role of Geras in the 1980s, locking up members of the group in which including countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. Initially this movement stood alone, but on September 13, 2006 a movement called Jama'ah as-Salafiyyah Li ad-Da'wah wa al-Qital or in French was called "Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat" (GSPC) (Salafi Da'wah Movement and Jihad) under the leadership of Abu Musaab Abdul Wadud joined al-Qaeda.

In this regard, this movement has been instrumental in recruiting and supporting al-Qaeda in Europe in recent years. A breakaway group from the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), this movement is fighting to topple Algeria's secular government at the same time. In 1996, the GSPC separated from the GIA. Attacks on innocent people were pledged to cease by the movement in 1998.

### D. Conclusion

A profound and sad lesson has been left among the people and leaders of Southeast Asia by the entrance of al-Qaeda around the turn of this century. Prior to the stunning advent of al-Qaeda, the indigenous population in Southeast Asia was already hurting from the injustice and disappointment brought forth by corrupt capitalist administrations. This occurred because global terrorist groups

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 46}$  Hendropriyono, A.M. Terorisme Fundamentalis Kristen, Yahudi, Islam. Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2009

are able to assemble networks of followers, sympathizers, and financiers. The mission to provide militant Islamic groups in Indonesia and Malaysia with military training and financial support was assigned to two Spanish nationals, Jusuf Galan and Omar Bandon, in the year 2000 in Poso, central Sulawesi, Indonesia. This is just one aspect of al-Qaeda's engagement in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda, the Abu Sayaf, and other extremist Islamic groups have all set up shop in the Philippines.

Terrorism issues and relatively high casualties and property damage have occurred from Al Qaeda's entrance into Southeast Asia, which the people and leaders of the region can learn greatly from. However, with strong cooperation among Southeast Asian countries, in the end Al-Qaeda, its cells, supporters and networks can be paralyzed, although not completely destroyed. []

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