

Counter-Discourse on The Criticism of Ibn Rushd Toward al-Ghazali

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Abstract: Al-Ghazali's intellectuality and capabilities have been recognized worldwide until he was nicknamed *Hujjatul Islam*. Therefore, if there are people who refute his thinking in many ways, then the refutation needs to be investigated further. In this case, Ibn Rushd rejected and blamed al-Ghazali's criticism of the peculiarities of the philosophers on three things, namely nature's immortality, God's knowledge, and physical resurrection. This study aims to find a clear position regarding the controversial discussion between Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali. Both had different views on these three issues. This qualitative discussion with a critical hermeneutic approach presents various analyzes of the arguments of the two figures, especially concerning Ibn Rushd's criticism toward al-Ghazali. This study resulted in a conclusion that Ibn Rushd's criticism toward al-Ghazali can be said to still have gaps in his argumentation. When Ibn Rushd presented a proposition in the form of verses of the Qur'an, the verse he delivered supported al-Ghazali's opinion if analyzed in more depth and was cross-checked with other verses.

Keywords: nature's immortality, God's knowledge, and physical resurrection

A. Introduction

Considering the capacity and capability of al-Ghazali (1058-1111) who was recognized by the world and hold the title *Hujjatul Islam*, it would be naive if his thoughts criticizing the peculiarities of the philosophers on three crucial issues were rejected outright by Ibn Rushd. The three crucial things are nature's immortality, God's knowledge, and physical resurrection. However, it was hard to accept Ibn Rushd's criticism, which easily concluded that al-Ghazali was always wrong in understanding the philosophical concepts he criticized. Therefore, the academic anxiety that arises is how far Ibn Rushd's reasons or arguments for his criticism toward al-Ghazali. Therefore, several analyzes are needed to counter Ibn Rushd's criticism.

Solving academic issues in this study uses the analytical-qualitative method and critical¹ hermeneutic² approach developed by Karl Otto Apel. This approach is an interpretive effort that considers the extralinguistic factors that shape and determine the context of thought and actions.³ This method seeks to understand the text and the author simultaneously, open and explore the truth contained in it in depth to look for something that is distorted from a normal understanding or interaction. This analysis is very useful to find out how far the truth value of Ibn Rushd's criticism toward al-Ghazali is under Islamic rules.

This study attempts to provide an analysis in digesting the arguments of Ibn Rushd who vehemently opposes the ideas of al-Ghazali who was already known as a phenomenal Islamic thinker. From here, it is hoped that there will be a proportional strengthening of arguments for the construction of accountable thoughts so that Muslims are not confused by the controversy of opinions from the two figures. This is very important because it has an impact on the beliefs of Muslims.

Studies related to the discussion of Ibn Rushd's criticism of al-Ghazali can be put forward several theories from various related studies. Armin Tedy uses a comparative theory of thought in the field of faith between al-Ghazali's *Tahafut al-Falasifah* and Ibn Rushd's *Tahafut al-Tahafut*.⁴ Then Akilah Mahmud put forward

¹ This critical hermeneutic method is a combination of Emilio Betti's hermeneutic theory and Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy. Apple's critical hermeneutic method was originally born as a critique of the two schools. Hermeneutic theory emphasizes interpretation purely based on the author's mind (author-oriented). The hermeneutic philosophy emphasizes subjective interpretation (subject-oriented), even though this theory introduces an intersubjective understanding. See Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique* (London: Routledge 6 Kegan Paul, 1980), 1-3.

² The hermeneutic method is generally used to explore the contents of the book as accurately as possible in order to be able to express the meaning of the descriptions presented in the book. See Anton Bakker, *Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1989), 69.

³ Anton Bakker, *Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat...*, 3. This critical hermeneutic approach is also known as depth hermeneutics. In the process of interpretation, an interpreter is required to try to understand and translate what is written or what the author thinks and wants. Therefore, the interpreter must understand the psychological condition of the author when he wants to write his ideas. These steps are carried out to capture something that is not translated or pure language, or also called meta-empirical thinking contained in a text. See Anton Bakker, *Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat...*, 143.

⁴ He discussed Ibn Rushd's criticism toward Ghazali in three cases; 1) the immortality of nature; 2) Allah does not know the aspects of *juz'iyat*; and) the resurrection of the body from the grave and life after death. See Armin Tedy, "Kritik Ibnu Rusyd terhadap Tiga Kerancuan Berfikir al-Ghazali."

a comparative theory of thought about destiny contained in *Tahafut al-Falasifah* and *Tahafut al-Tahafut*.⁵ In addition, Nurul Hidayat's study emphasizes the theory of interpretation of the texts or verses of the Qur'an which have significant differences as read in *Tahafut al-Falasifah* and *Tahafut al-Tahafut*.⁶

In this study, Michel Foucault's counter-discourse theory is used as a data analysis tool to counter Ibn Rushd's criticism toward al-Ghazali regarding the discussion of the immortality of nature, knowledge of God, and the resurrection of the human body. This counter-discourse theory aims to represent a view differently, namely a representation that is not only contrary to the dominant discourse, or negates a statement, but seeks ways to detect, diagnose, and navigate the dominant discourse codes so that it functions to project subversion of those codes.⁷

The development of this counter-discourse theory states that this theory does not need to be separated from the dominant discourse or against it, but it can simultaneously accommodate and reject the dominant discourse.⁸ So, the discourse that Ibn Rushd put forward as a form of criticism toward Ghazali will be studied in the same discourse but with an approach and reasoning that counters Ibn Rushd's thoughts.

B. Al-Ghazali's Argumentation

Imam al-Ghazali was a popular Sufi figure in the 5th century Hijri or 11th century AD. He had experienced periods of doubt about the truth of the knowledge he had acquired. In the end, his doubts were paid off by his practice of

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⁵ She compared al-Ghazali's thought which he considered to represent Jabariyah, with Ibn Rushd's thought which represented Qadariyah. See Akilah Mahmud, "Jejak Pemikiran Al-Ghazali dan Ibnu Rusyd dalam Perkembangan Teologi Islam." *Jurnal Sulesana* 13, no. 2 (2019): 183-198.

⁶ She presented an argument between Ghazali and Ibn Rushd about the immortality of nature. This difference of opinion between philosophers and theologians leads to differences in interpreting the meaning of qadim itself. See Nurul Hidayat, "Bantahan Ibnu Rusyd terhadap Kritik al-Ghazali Tentang Keqadiman Alam." *Jurnal Ulumuna* 11, no. 2 (2007): 373-388. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujs.v11i2.407>.

⁷ Richard Terdiman, *Discourse/Counter-discourse: The Theory of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth Century France*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 149.

⁸ Lila Abu-Lughod, "The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin Women." *Journal American Ethnologist* 17, no. 1 (1990): 41-55.

Sufism as a period of spiritual transition, so he wrote many works on Sufism.⁹ His decision on the path of Sufism is the best way to find the ultimate truth. The privilege of a Sufi practitioner cannot be achieved only by studying knowledge but must be through personal practice and experience, inner disclosure, spiritual state, and the replacement of characters.¹⁰

Al-Ghazali's scientific transformation resulted in the completion of a work entitled *Tahafut al-Falasifah* (The Confusion of Philosophers), whose content criticizes certain views of philosophers. However, the existence of this work was also criticized by Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 AD) through his work, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*. These two works are very popular in the world of Islamic philosophy, even in Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages. The first book was written in 484 AH / 1091 AD, while the second book was written approximately one hundred years later.

In the closing part of *Tahafut al-Falasifah*, al-Ghazali dialogically disbelieves the philosophers, thus claiming the death penalty for anyone who follows them. According to him, these philosophers deviate in three ways. First, his views on the eternity of nature, and all of the farrs are immortal as well. Second, that God's knowledge is only a matter of *kulliyat*, and does not reach *al-juz'iyat al-hadithah min al-ashkhas*. Third, his views on the resurrection of the spirit and the body that will be gotten together in the field of *mahshar* (posthumous).¹¹ These three views were refuted by Ibn Rushd as well as a defense of the views of the philosophers.

The first two things were believed by the philosophers, while the third (resurrection of the body) was rejected or not believed by the philosophers. From this way, it can be stated that the three points of criticism of al-Ghazali are in line with the Islamic principles adopted by the majority of the people theologically. On the other hand, Ibn Rushd's criticism of al-Ghazali is assumed to be contrary to the general principles of Islamic theology.

Al-Ghazali accused such philosophers of having deviated from the right path. Because of this, al-Ghazali was involved in a very great posthumous polemic with

⁹ Tim Penyusun, *Ensiklopedi Islam*, (Jakarta: PT Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2002), 85.

¹⁰ Abu al-Wafa al-Ghanimi al-Taftazani, *Sufi dari Zaman ke Zaman: Suatu Pengantar tentang Tasawuf*, terj. Ahmad Rofi', (Bandung: Pustaka, 2003), 165.

¹¹ Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al-Falasifah*, (Kairo: Dar al Ma'arif, 1966), 307-308

Ibn Rushd. This happened because Ibn Rushd tried to refute al-Ghazali's accusations, with the conclusion that al-Ghazali was wrong in both religion and philosophy.¹² According to the study of Athal Ibrahim, it was stated that Ibn Rushd was right in defending the philosophy, research, thoughts, and lessons of his predecessors. But he exaggerated too much by considering the philosophy and teachings of his predecessors as a religious obligation. Ibn Rushd was considered wrong in forming the face of religion in two forms; the outside is logical, while the inside is misleading.¹³

Although in the capacity of ordinary people who cannot be separated from mistakes and forgetfulness, but seeing the capacity and capability of al-Ghazali which is recognized by the world, it is hard to accept Ibn Rushd's criticism which easily concluded that al-Ghazali always fails to understand the philosophical concepts he criticized. This is the basis for further excavation of Ibn Rushd's critique of al-Ghazali. It means that this study provides a space to give rise to a strengthening or justification of al-Ghazali's opinion regarding his criticism toward Ibn Rushd.

On the other hand, al-Ghazali lived in an atmosphere of Islam that was divided into various sects, ethnicities, languages, and others. The area of Persia (Iran) in al-Ghazali's time was still a Sunni sect, not yet a Shia. In historical records, that which made Persia in Shia sect was the Safavid dynasty which ruled between 1507-1732 AD. Therefore, socio-political fragmentation and uncontrolled thinking styles emerged, so that the period after al-Ghazali can be called a period of Islamic decline.

Although some considered that al-Ghazali had killed the tradition of speculative-rational thought in Islam, as developed by philosophers. However, this assessment is not entirely correct, because even though al-Ghazali rejected philoso-

¹² This can be seen in Ibn Rushd's conclusion in *Tahafut al- Tahafut* with the statement: "There is no doubt that this man (al-Ghazali) made a mistake against religion (*ash-shari'ah*) as he made a mistake with philosophy (*al-hikmah*). Allah is the guide to the righteous, and the Giver of special gifts of righteousness to those who are willed."

¹³ Athal Ibrahim Hussein, "Philosophical Controversies between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd." *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change* 11, no. 9 (2020): 653-665.

phy, his rejection was only in the metaphysics section. While in other parts, especially formal logic (Aristotle logic), he not only accepted that knowledge, but he also helped develop it, as his works in his biography.

C. Writing *Tahafut al-Tahafut*

Ibn Rushd's name in Latin is often called Averroes. His full name is Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd or Abu al-Walid.¹⁴ He was born in Cordoba in 520 AH/1126 AD and died in 595 AH/1198 AD.¹⁵ He was born about 15 years after al-Ghazali's death. His father was a judge (*qadhi*), while his grandfather was a supreme judge (*qadhi al-qudhat*) in Andalusia. The city of Cordoba at that time was the center of knowledge and the residence of scholars and scholars.¹⁶

Ibn Rushd was known for his many and varied works in various disciplines. A French researcher, Ernest Renan managed to classify the works of Ibn Rushd according to his field. In the field of philosophy as many as 39 books, science of kalam as many as 5 books, fiqh as many as 8 books,¹⁷ astronomy as many as 4 books, nahwu as many as 2 books, and medical science as many as 20 books.¹⁸ His scientific and family environment is in line with his intelligence and perseverance,

¹⁴ Abid al-Jabiri, "Muqaddimah" dalam Ibn Rusyd, *Fasl al-Maqal fi Taqdir Ma Baina al-Hikmah wa al-Syari'ah min al-Ittisal*, (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Arabiyyah, 1997), 5.

¹⁵ Zaynab Mahmud al-Khadiri, *Atsar Ibnu Rusyd fi Falsafah al-Ashr al-Wustha*, (Beirut: Dar al-Tanwir, 2007), 20.

¹⁶ Muhammad Yusuf Musa, *Baina al-Din wa al-Falsafah fi Ra'yi Ibni Rushd wa Falasifah al-Asr al-Wasith*, (Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, t.t.), 27.

¹⁷ Ibn Rushd managed to publish his monumental work, *Bidayah al-Mujtahid*. This last book specifically examines the rational reasoning of *fiqh al-ikhtilaf*. See Hamadi al-Abidi, *Ibn Rushd wa Ulum ash-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1991), 39. At first it was thought that *Bidayah al-Mujtahid* was not Ibn Rushd's work, but his grandfather. After the book was added to the chapter on *Haji*, it was believed that the work was written by Ibn Rushd. See Ernest Renan, *Ibn Rushd wa al-Rushdiyyah*, terj. Adel Zwaitir, (Kairo: Maktabah ath-Thaqafah al-Diniyyah, 2008), 440.

¹⁸ For details, see Ernest Renan, *Ibn Rushd wa al-Rushdiyyah ...*, 80-93. Meanwhile, Sulaiman Dunya in his introduction to the work of *Tahafut al-Tahafut* lists Ibn Rushd's works only as many as 47 titles. However, among the works he listed, there were two titles of books that Muhammad Yusuf Musa said were not the work of Ibn Rushd, but the work of his grandfather, namely *Kitab at-Tahsil* and *Kitab Al-Muqaddimat fi al-Fiqh*. See Sulaiman Dunya, "Muqaddimah" in Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, (Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1974), 11-14.

thus providing opportunities for him to master various disciplines in the fields of literature, law, theology, philosophy and medicine.¹⁹

In the study of divinity, Ibn Rushd wrote down the main points of his thoughts in his trilogy of monumental works; namely *Fasl al-Maqal*, *Manahij al-Adillah* and *Tahafut al-Tahafut*. All three was seen as the works of Ibn Rushd that present philosophical issues with divine nuances, so that some consider that the issues discussed are the theological-philosophical discourses.²⁰ The three books have their characteristics, both in terms of method and presentation system.

1. *Fasl al-Maqal*

The full title is *Fasl al-Maqal fi Taqirir Ma Baina al-Hikmah wa al-Syari'ah min al-Ittisal* (differentiation on the relationship between philosophy and Shari'ah). This book is allegedly an introduction to the book *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, as al-Ghazali wrote the book *Maqasid al-Falasifah* before writing *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. This book serves as a general framework of thought proclaimed by Ibn Rushd for people who want to study philosophy and religion that the two are not contradictory, and can even coexist in harmony, reinforcing each other in an integral scientific synergy.

2. *Manahij al-Adillah*

The full title of this book is *Al-Kashf 'an Manahij al-Adillah fi 'Aqaid al-Millah*. This book was written by Ibn Rushd while he was *qadhi* in Seville for a second term, 1179-1180. This book presents theological problems with a philosophical approach, which consists of 5 chapters. First, it presents the theme of proving the existence of Allah with the postulate of *al-'inayah* and the proposition of *al-ikhтира'*. Second, it presents a discussion of the oneness of Allah by presenting the *Asy'ariyah* argument. Third, it presents a discussion of the attributes of God. Fourth, it presents a discussion about *tanzih*, that Allah is spared from physical elements and

¹⁹ For his abilities in various fields, Ibn Rushd was referred to as a *faqih*, supreme judge, philosopher, as well as an expert in *usul fiqh*. Even his status as an expert in *usul fiqh* preceded his status as a philosopher. See Jamaluddin al-'Alawi, "Kata Pengantar" dalam Ibnu Rusyd, *Al-Dharuri fi Usul fiqh aw Mukhtasar al-Mustashfa*, (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islamiy, 1994), 19.

²⁰ Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 273.

likeness to creatures. Fifth, it discusses *Afal* Allah, which includes the discussion of divine justice and eschatology.

3. *Tahafut al- Tahafut*

This book was written by Ibn Rushd in response to Al-Ghazali's attack through his book *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. In this book, Ibn Rushd wanted to reconstruct various true philosophical views, as he found in the works and thoughts of Aristotle, and tried to reject the errors brought by the Platonic philosophers which he considered to be damaging to Aristotle's thinking. Furthermore, Ibn Rushd saw that what al-Ghazali called not all philosophers, but philosophers who think Neo-Platonic, although al-Ghazali viewed that all philosophers from Aristotle to Ibn Sina²¹ were the same.

Ibn Rushd realized that there was a kind of dividing line between Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali in understanding and adapting classical philosophy into Islam. According to al-Ghazali's theory, as explained in his main work, *Ihya' Ulum al-Din*, that the world is divided into three structures; explicit and real structures, spiritual structures, and hidden otherworldly structures. These ideas are believed to be uninnovative, being borrowed from and linked to Ibn Sina's principle of emanation.²²

On the other hand, Ibn Rushd also saw that it was precisely al-Ghazali's view as outlined in the book *Tahafut al-Falasifah* that was ambiguous.²³ Of the 20 points raised by al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd studied it point by point. Based on the numbering

²¹ According to Janssens' study, Ibn Sina was not Ghazali's target for his criticism of the philosophers' thought in *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. According to him, the real target was the classical philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. If Ibn Sina was the main target of *Tahafut al-Falasifah* as is the way of thinking of most intellectuals today, why does al-Ghazali use a very different terminology, which characterizes the earlier philosophical period and is believed to refer to Aristotle. Ghazali chose the classical philosophers here while stating the purpose of writing *Tahafut al-Falasifah* as a denial of the classical philosophers (*raddan 'ala al-falasifah al-qudama*). See Jules Janssens, "Al-Ghazali's Tahafut: Is It Really a Rejection of Ibn Sina's Philosophy?." *Journal of Islamic Studies* 12, no. 1, (2001), 1-2..

²² Mustafa Bilalov, "Ontological and Epistemological Discordsroots in Islam." *Journal The European Proceedings of Social & Behavioural Sciences* (EpSBS), (2019): 430-436. <https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2019.12.04.59>.

²³ In Muliati's study, various criticisms of al-Ghazali were presented on twenty issues as stated in *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. There were seventeen issues that are considered as heresy, and there were three issues that were considered to be *kufir*. See Muliati, "Al-Ghazali dan Kritiknnya terhadap Filosof", *Jurnal Aqidah-Ta* 2, no. 2, (2016): 77-86. <https://doi.org/10.24252/aqidahtav2i2.3436>.

written by Sulaiman Dunya, there are no less than 221 problems in the book *Tahafut al-Falasifah* reviewed by Ibn Rushd. It turns out that not all of the issues discussed by al-Ghazali were refuted by Ibn Rushd, but there were some of al-Ghazali's judgments or rejections that were justified by Ibn Rushd. This shows that the book *Tahafut al-Tahafut* is not all the discussion is a rejection of the writings of al-Ghazali.

In contrast to al-Ghazali in naming his book, Ibn Rushd took the name from the title of al-Ghazali's book, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*. When compared with the way of presenting the problem, al-Ghazali based on what he found on the work of two Muslim philosophers, namely al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. This is because according to al-Ghazali, both of them are people who are most inclined to Aristotle's thinking. So what is meant by the word "al-falasifah" is al-Farabi and Ibn Sina.²⁴

Meanwhile, Ibn Rushd seemed more careful in naming the title of his book. He knew that al-Ghazali was a prominent scholar and thinker who had many works. Therefore, what he criticized was only one of his books, entitled *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. He did not want to use the word *Tahafut al-Ghazali*, instead, he chose the title *Tahafut Kitab al-Ghazali al-Musamma bi Tahafut al-Falasifah*, which is abbreviated as *Tahafut al-Tahafut*.²⁵

D. Ibn Rushd's Criticism toward al-Ghazali

Ibn Rushd not only criticized al-Ghazali but also the philosophers who were criticized by al-Ghazali, namely al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. He considered both of them less precise in articulating and interpreting Aristotle's thoughts. Initially, al-Ghazali focused his criticism on Aristotle. However, because the translators of Aristotle's works cannot be separated from various errors in the interpretation process so that there were many very sharp differences. According to him, among the Muslim philosophers who were best at copying and editing Aristotle's views were

²⁴ Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al-Falasifah*, (Lebanon: Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani, 1993), 31. Al-Ghazali's full statement: "Thumma al-mutarjimun li kalam Aristotalis lam yanfakku kalamuhum min tahrif wa tahlil muhwaj ila tafsir wa ta'wil, hatta athara dzalika a'idan niza'an bainahum. Wa uqawwimuhum bi an-naqli wa at-tahqiq min al-mutafalsifah fi al-Islam; Abu Nasr al-Farabi wa Ibn Sina".

²⁵ Sulaiman Dunya, "Muqaddimah" ..., 16-17.

al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Therefore, to reject or criticize Aristotle's views, it is enough to quote them from the two Muslim philosophers.²⁶

At this point, Ibn Rushd considered that al-Ghazali had generalized in naming the title of his book. According to him, it would be more appropriate if al-Ghazali named his book *Tahafut al-Farabi*, or *Tahafut Ibn Sina*. Because what is read and commented on by al-Ghazali is what came from al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, not from the philosophers whom he mentioned generally in his book. Whereas according to Ibn Rushd, many things quoted by al-Ghazali were not true from Ibn Sina, but he called this opinion the opinion of philosophers, including Aristotle.²⁷

As well known, al-Ghazali emphasized his criticism toward the philosophers in three points, as written at the end of his book, *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. The first, concerning the eternity of nature and all its substances; second, God's knowledge only reaches universal things and does not reach particulars; and third, the denial of the philosophers to the resurrection of the body on the Day of Resurrection.²⁸ Against these three problems, Ibn Rushd carefully and meticulously wrote his refutation in his books, namely *Tahafut al-Tahafut* and *Fasl al-Maqal* about these three problems.

1. Nature's Immortality

Regarding the issue of immortal nature, between theologians and philosophers, there were indeed differences about the meaning of *ihdas* and *qadim*. For theologians, *ihdas* means to create from "nothing". Meanwhile, according to the philosophers, the word means to create from "being". The term *'adam* (nothing) according to Ibn Rushd cannot be changed to "being". But what happens is that the form changes into a form in another form.²⁹

Likewise, for theologians, that "qadim" means something tangible without a cause. For philosophers, "qadim" does not necessarily mean something tangible without a cause, but may also mean something tangible with a cause. In other words, even if something was caused or there was a cause, then it can be qadim,

²⁶ Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al-Falasifah ...*, 77-78.

²⁷ M. 'Athif Al-Iraqi, *Al-Manhaj an-Naqdi fi Falsafah Ibn Rushd*, (Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1980), hlm. 200.

²⁸ Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al-Falasifah ...*, 307-308.

²⁹ Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut...*, 362.

namely, it has no beginning in the form of qadim. Thus, qadim is an attribute for something that is in eternal occurrence, namely, an event that does not begin and does not end.³⁰

In al-Ghazali's thought, when God created nature, there was only God. There is nothing but God. Against al-Ghazali's thoughts, Ibn Rushd argued that when God created nature there was already something else besides God. It means that God created nature from something that already existed and was created. To strengthen his rebuttal, Ibn Rushd put forward several verses in the Qur'an:

*"And He it is Who has created the heavens and the earth in six Days and His Throne was on the water, that He might try you, which of you is the best in deeds".*³¹

The verse, according to Ibn Rushd, explains that when God created the heavens and the earth there was already something besides God, namely water. This view is confirmed in the following verse:

*"Then He rose over (Istawâ) towards the heaven when it was smoke, and said to it and to the earth: "Come both of you willingly or unwillingly." They both said: "We come willingly".*³²

From these verses, it can be concluded that before the earth and sky were created, there were other objects, namely water and steam, so they were not created from anything. Therefore, these elements of nature were eternal from the past, namely qadim. This issue is indeed crucial, and according to Ibn Rushd, it is permissible for people to practice ijihad to determine their position on this issue. If his ijihad was correct, he will be rewarded, and if he was wrong, hopefully, he will be forgiven.³³

³⁰ Harun Nasution, *Filsafat & Mistisisme dalam Islam*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1990), 53.

³¹ QS. Hud (11): 7.

³² QS. Fushshilat (41): 11.

³³ Ibn Rusyd, *Fasl al-Maqal fi Taqirir Ma Baina al-Hikmah wa al-Syari'ah min al-Ittisal*, (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirasat al-'Arabiyyah, 1997),40-43.

2. God Doesn't Know *Juz'iyat*

Allah knows everything in the heavens and the earth, even the size of the *dzarrah*, as a condition that has been clearly outlined in the Qur'an. This has become a consensus among Muslims. It's just how God knows the partial things (*Juz'iyat*) there are different answers from some circles.³⁴

Against al-Ghazali's accusation that God does not know the details that exist in this world, Ibn Rushd said that al-Ghazali misunderstood because the philosophers never said that.³⁵ According to Ibn Rushd, God knows something by His essence. God's knowledge is neither *juz'iy* nor *kulliy*. God's knowledge cannot be the same as human's knowledge, because God's knowledge is the cause of existence, while human knowledge is the effect.³⁶

This view was middle lined by the study of Baharnejad and Narges that Islamic intellectuals do not deny that God does not know the particular, but they, especially theologians, argued that God knows both the universal and the particular. The difference between philosophers and theologians is that according to philosophers, God's knowledge includes particular things by knowing their causes. In the sense that God's knowledge of the particular is universal and unchanging.³⁷

Human knowledge is new and God's knowledge is *qadim*, namely, since the beginning God knows all things that happen in the universe, no matter how small.³⁸ So, according to Ibn Rushd, that God does not know small events. God does not know the details with new knowledge, where the condition of the new knowledge is with the novelty of these events and details, because God is the cause (*illat*) for these details, not the effect. (*musabbab*) from it, as the case with new knowledge. God's knowledge is *qadim* and does not change due to changing events. This is intended to maintain the holiness of God who knows everything.

³⁴ Ahmad Daudy, *Kuliah Filsafat Islam*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1986), 176.

³⁵ Harun Nasution, *Filsafat & Mistisisme ...*, 53.

³⁶ Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut ...*, 711.

³⁷ Zakrya Baharnejad & Narges Sanobari, "A Study on Seyyed Jalaluddin Ashtiani's Critics on Ghazali's Objections Regarding Knowledge of Particulars by God." *Journal Ontological Researches* 8, no. 15 (2019): 1-4.

³⁸ Harun Nasution, *Filsafat & Mistisisme ...*, 53.

In the book *al-Najat*, Ibn Sina explicitly stated that, if someone knew the motion of the sky objects entirely, then he will know every eclipse event, every linkage and separation that occurs in particular. Likewise, Allah knows the universal, nothing physical object escapes His knowledge, and nothing is hidden from His knowledge even as small as an atom, whether in the heavens or on the earth.³⁹

3. Physical Resurrection

Al-Ghazali showed his criticism of the philosopher who said that humans in the afterlife will be resurrected in a spiritual form, not in a physical form. Based on this belief, they and the adherents of this opinion are considered infidels by al-Ghazali,⁴⁰ because the Qur'an explicitly stated that humans will experience various physical pleasures later in heaven.

According to Ibn Rushd, this physical resurrection in the afterlife is only a theoretical matter.⁴¹ Ibn Rushd stated that the statement of al-Ghazali who disbelieved al-Farabi and Ibn Sina in this matter was not a *qath'iy* statement. Ibn Rushd stated that what people talk about eschatology, and the day of resurrection is to motivate a person to do the main deeds. He said that is the issue regarding the afterlife which is more conducive to doing various main deeds. Therefore, the depiction of the afterlife with things that are physical-empirical is easier to understand than those that are abstract-spiritual.⁴²

Ibn Rushd explained that the philosophers did not mention the problem of physical resurrection. All religions according to Ibn Rushd recognize the existence of a second life in the afterlife, although there are differences of opinion regarding its form.⁴³ Therefore, Ibn Rushd in his book, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, put forward the

³⁹ Ibn Sina, *Al-Najat fi al-Hikmah al-Manthiqiyyah wa al-Thabi'iyah wa al-Ilahiyyah*, Ed. Majid Fakhri, (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1982), 172.

⁴⁰ In Agus Fawait's study, it was stated that Ibn Rushd defended philosophy as a truth, and not heresy. This defense is a counter peace between the conflict of thoughts of al-Ghazali, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. In addition, this defense is also a parallel to the thoughts of philosophers who were considered infidels. See Agus Fawait, "Rancang Bangun Pemikiran Ibn Rusyd dalam Pembelaan atas Filsafat", *Jurnal Islamic Akademika* 6, no. 1 (2019): 23-31. <https://doi.org/10.230303/staiattaqwa.v6i1.73>.

⁴¹ Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, ed. Sulaiman Dunya, (Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1974), 873.

⁴² Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut...*, 870.

⁴³ Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut...*, 864-866.

word of Allah which means the parable of heaven for the muttaqin with Allah, the rivers that flow under it. Likewise, the words of the Prophet Muhammad stated that what in heaven is what the eye has never seen, and the ear has heard, and has never crossed the human heart. Ibn Rushd argues that in heaven, humans are not in the form of bodies, and what the Qur'an teaches about heaven and its contents must be understood metaphorically. The *mufasssir*, Ibn Abbas said that in the afterlife there will be nothing clean in this world except for the name, life in the hereafter is higher than life in this world.⁴⁴

From the descriptions above, it can be concluded that the conflict between Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali revolved around the interpretation of the basic teachings of Islam, not about accepting or rejecting the basic teachings themselves. Ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali were only involved in differences in *ijtihad*, and differences in *ijtihad* are normal in Islam, which does not lead to disbelief, and even get rewarded even if they are wrong in their *ijtihad*.

E. Counter-discourse toward Ibn Rushd's Critique

Al-Ghazali's criticism toward philosophy through his book *Tahafut al-Falasifah* made him unfairly accused of being the main cause of the decline of Islam at that time. According to the study of Kirabaev and al-Janabi, al-Ghazali's criticism toward Muslim philosophers is not as a "destruction" of philosophy, and a continuation of the tradition of confrontation of kalam and philosophy. For him, philosophy ceased to have an independent status and became an important part of the universal-ideological alternative for all areas of thought.⁴⁵

Al-Ghazali indeed criticized the philosophers, but in fact, his attacks were only limited to three problems, namely understanding the immortality of nature, God's knowledge of *kulliyat* only, and physical resurrection. His criticism was later criticized by Ibn Rushd.⁴⁶ In this study, several counter-discourse efforts are

⁴⁴ Ibn Rusyd, *Tahafut al-Tahafut ...*, 870.

⁴⁵ N.S. Kirabaev & M. Al-Janabi, "Prolegomena to Metaphysics of al-Ghazali." *RUDN Journal of Philosophy Вестник РУДН, серия Философия*, no. 4 (2016): 9-15.

⁴⁶ In a study conducted by Taha Yasin, he mentioned that al-Ghazali used only one method of thinking into a collection of opposing thoughts, namely the method of criticism. Meanwhile, Ibn Rushd used two methods, namely the method of criticism and criticism of criticism. See Nawal Taha Yasin, "Ibn Rushd Criticism to al-Ghazali Criticism As a Sample." *Journal Adab al-Basrah* 68, (2014): 355-410.

proposed that legitimize al-Ghazali's opinion on Ibn Rushd's criticism regarding these three issues.⁴⁷

1. Nature's Immortality

Ibn Rushd critiqued al-Ghazali's thought which stated that when God created nature, there was only God. There is nothing but God. Ibn Rushd refuted this with the opinion that when God created nature there was already something else besides God, or nature was created from something that already existed. This opinion is reinforced by the verse in the Qur'an:

وهو الذى خلق السموات والارض فى ستة ايام وكان عرشه على الماء ليبلوكم ايكم احسن عملا

*"And He it is Who has created the heavens and the earth in six Days and His Throne was on the water, that He might try you, which of you is the best in deeds."*⁴⁸

Ibn Rushd stated that the verse describes the existence of something that existed before, namely water when God created the heavens and the earth. But the verse narrows his view of nature, which is not just heaven and earth.

The term nature, in *Tafsir al-Mizan*, refers to everything that exists, and all the smallest and largest parts of that thing that exists. For example, nature for inanimate objects, nature for plants, nature for animals, nature for humans, and all kinds of human communities, such as the Arab world and the Ajam world.⁴⁹ Therefore, verse 7 of the letter *Hud* which is used as the basis or argument of Ibn Rushd weakens his argument.

The weakness of Ibn Rushd's criticism was based on several arguments that in the verse there are three main creations, namely the heavens and the earth (السموات الارض), Throne (عرشه), and water (الماء). So, apart from the heavens and the

⁴⁷ These three problems, because there is no text of the Qur'an or hadith of the Prophet that confirms them, then this requires human creative thinking to understand them. Because in principle, all Muslims recognize the creation of nature by Allah, the all-knowing nature of Allah, and the existence of human resurrection in the hereafter. See, *Zainuddin Hamkah*, "Ibnu Rusyd: Pembelaan Terhadap Para Filosof," *Jurnal Ash-Shahabah* 4, no. 1 (2018): 49-54.

⁴⁸ QS. Hud (11): 7.

⁴⁹ Muhammad Husain al-Thabathaba'i, *Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an*, (Beirut: Muassasah al-A'lamiy: 1997), 24.

earth, the Throne and water are also tangible objects that fall into the category of the Throne realm and the water realm. Therefore, both of them are also part of the universe.

It is known that the Throne is a creature of God. In the view of traditional scholars, the Throne has a very large form, it has several pillars that make the Throne the roof of the universe, namely as part of the universe. This form is recorded in several authentic hadiths.⁵⁰ Because the Throne is so big, that there are special angels in charge of carrying this Throne at the command of Allah SWT.⁵¹ Thus, Ibn Rushd has not been able to break al-Ghazali's opinion that Allah created this world from nothing, because the Throne and water are also part of nature.

If Ibn Rushd insists on the argument that the heavens and the earth were created from something that already exists, namely water, then the question that arises is; From what element did God create water? From what element did Allah create the Throne? Because both are God's creatures and part of the universe. The two questions will not be answered completely, because they will experience a deadlock in logical thinking, as in the theory of the impossibility of *daur* and *ta-salsul* (cycles and chains that have no end and no beginning). There is no convincing reference to the origin of water and the Throne, so the logical consequence is that this universe—including the Throne, water, heaven and earth—was created from nothing.

Then the second verse that was used as the basis for his criticism toward al-Ghazali is the following verse:

ثم استوى إلى السماء وهي دخان

“Then He rose over (*Istawâ*) towards the heaven when it was smoke”.⁵²

According to Ibn Rushd, this verse stated the existence of steam before the creation of the heavens and the earth. This verse strengthens his argumentation in verse 7 of the Surah *Hud* above. The steam (دخان) is an integral part of the process of formation or creation of the sky.

⁵⁰ Hamid Sulthan, *Ahkam al-Qur'an al-Dauliy al-Shari'at al-Islamiyyah*, (Kairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Hadithah: 1965), 12.

⁵¹ Ahmad Sonhaji, *Al-Ajrumiyyah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Hifdi Salafiyah, 2006), 65.

⁵² QS. Fushshilat (41): 11.

However, if it is true that the sky was created from steam, then was the earth also created from steam, or other elements? Of course, this statement contradicts the first statement of Ibn Rushd that the heavens and the earth were created from water. If it is true that the earth was created from water, then of course the sky was not created from steam, but water (according to verse 7 of the letter *Hud*). This is the contradiction of Ibn Rushd's argumentation for his criticism toward al-Ghazali.

From the verses above, it can be concluded that the universe was created from nothing because it is a new creature of Allah. It is illogical to say that the Creator and creation are both eternal. Therefore, this universe cannot be immortal. Because the only immortal thing is Allah, the Creator, which includes His essence, nature, name, and words. So, it is only natural that al-Ghazali disbelieves in people who believe in the eternity of nature because this belief is judged as a form of severe violation in the frame of monotheism.

In addition, the provisions for the coming of the Day of Judgment as mentioned in the Qur'an and hadith also oppose the way of thinking of Ibn Rushd. Because on that day, the universe will all perish, except for some of God's creatures that He wills, such as Heaven, Hell, the Throne and the angels supporting the Throne. So, the theory of the eternal nature of Ibn Rushd is normatively contradictory.

2. God Doesn't Know *Juz'iyat*

Ibn Rushd said that al-Ghazali misunderstood his accusation that the philosophers believed that God did not know the details of this universe because the philosophers never said so. According to Ibn Rushd, God knows something by His essence. God's knowledge is neither *juz'iy* nor *kulliy*.

It is precisely when analyzed that Ibn Rushd himself misunderstood al-Ghazali's criticism. Al-Ghazali's expression—that the philosophers believe that God knows *kulliyat* only, not *juz'iyat*—does not mean giving *kulliy* or *juz'iy* qualities to God's knowledge. It is impossible for al-Ghazali to draw the nature of God, namely knowledge to the plains of *hawadis* (something new/creations) which also causes *kufri*. So, al-Ghazali's criticism remains as it is for the philosophers.

The second counter, if God only knew *kulliyat* not *juz'iyat*—although Ibn Rushd did not say that God does not know *juz'iyat*—then this means that God

does not care about *juz'īyyat* problems or the details of all His creations. It's as if the little things had no meaning, or that only big things or *kullīyyat* means anything. In fact, in the *Surah az-Zalzalâh*, even the smallest thing as *dzarraḥ* will not escape His calculation. So, Ibn Rushd's statement in this regard is very ambiguous.

In the Qur'an it is stated:

الذين يحملون العرش ومن حوله يسبحون بحمد ربهم ويؤمنون به ويستغفرون للذين آمنوا ربنا وسعت كل شيء رحمة وعلما فاغفر للذين تابوا واتبعوا سبيلك وقهم عذاب الجحيم

*"Those (angels) who bear the Throne (of Allâh) and those around it glorify the praises of their Lord, and believe in Him, and ask forgiveness for those who believe (in the Oneness of Allâh) (saying): "Our Lord! You comprehend all things in mercy and knowledge, so forgive those who repent and follow Your way, and save them from the torment of the blazing Fire!"*⁵³

This verse explains that Allah's knowledge covers everything. Everything here includes everything that exists, whether big or small, empirical or unseen, in this world and in the hereafter. Muhammad al-Razi Fakhruddin explained this discourse in his commentary, that:

قوله (وسعت كل شيء رحمة وعلما) يدل على كونه سبحانه عالما بجميع المعلومات التي لانهاية لها من الكليات والجزئيات

*"Allah's word (You comprehend all things in mercy and knowledge) shows the existence of Allah SWT who knows everything that is known without limit, both kullīyyat and juz'īyyat"*⁵⁴

Al-Razi very firmly stated that Allah is All-Knowing of everything, both particular and universal. This matter shows that Allah's knowledge is unlimited, so it would be naive if Ibn Rushd stated that Allah's knowledge is only aimed at *kullīyyat* matters. While the matters that are in *juz'īyyat*, Ibn Rushd has no comment. This is what makes his statement odd.

3. Physical Resurrection

⁵³ QS. Al-Mu'min (40): 7.

⁵⁴ Muhammad al-Razi Fakhruddin Ibn Dhiya'uddin Umar, *Tafsir al-Fakhr al-Razi*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1981), 37.

Al-Ghazali showed his criticism toward the philosopher who said that in the afterlife humans will be resurrected in a spiritual form, not in a physical form. Based on this belief, they and the adherents of this opinion are considered infidels by al-Ghazali, because the Qur'an explicitly states that humans will experience various physical pleasures later in heaven.

Ibn Rushd argued that in heaven, humans are not in the form of a body but only spiritually, and what the Qur'an teaches about heaven and its contents must be understood metaphorically. However, life in the afterlife is not always interpreted metaphorically, because some verses of the Qur'an are *muhkamat* and can be interpreted essentially, not *majaziy*. Here are some analyzes that counter Ibn Rushd's statement:

a. Allah's Word:

كما نضجت جلودهم بدلناهم جلودا غيرها ليذوقوا العذاب

*"As often as their skins are roasted through, We shall change them for other skins that they may taste the punishment."*⁵⁵

The changing skin of the inhabitants of Hell is meaningful, not metaphorical interpretation. Skins that have been burned for a long time will be numb, so the punishment of Hell will be lessened if their skins are not replaced. Meanwhile, Allah wants the inhabitants of Hell to feel the punishment every time by changing their skin. Therefore, if the verse was interpreted metaphorically, then the purpose of this skin change will be lost, namely to feel the punishment. So, if the verse is interpreted metaphorically, then the verse becomes *mulghah* or useless, and this is impossible.

b. Allah's Word:

هذان خصمان اختصموا في ربهم فالذين كفروا قطعت لهم ثياب من نار يصب من فوق رؤوسهم الحميم. يصهر به ما في بطونهم والجلود

"These two opponents (believers and disbelievers) dispute with each other about their Lord; then as for those who disbelieved, garments of fire will be cut

⁵⁵ QS. An-Nisa' (4): 56.

out for them, boiling water will be poured down over their heads. With it will melt (or vanish away) what is within their bellies, as well as (their) skins.”⁵⁶

This verse describes the physical side of the disbelievers as the inhabitants of Hell who are receiving painful torment. Their stomachs and skins were crushed with hellish hot water. This matter shows that the torments of Hell are physical, not spiritual. No reference has been found that explains that the human spirit has skin and stomach or other body parts that can feel the torments of Hell.

In the hadith of the Prophet SAW, it was explained that when humans go to Hell, they will be tortured with Hellfire except for certain parts, as the Prophet SAW said:

عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه، يقولُ النبيُّ صَلَّى اللهُ عليه وسلَّمَ: تَأْكُلُ النَّارُ ابْنَ آدَمَ، إِلَّا أَثَرَ السُّجُودِ، حَرَّمَ اللهُ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ عَلَى النَّارِ أَنْ تَأْكُلَ أَثَرَ السُّجُودِ.

“From Abu Hurairah RA., the Prophet SAW said: The fire of Hell devours the bodies of the descendants of Adam, except for the marks of prostration. Allah has forbidden Hell from eating the marks of prostration.”⁵⁷

The hadith implies that humans will be resurrected in the hereafter because this body is intended to feel the torment in the hereafter due to their mistakes in the world. The believer who goes to Hell will be tortured all over his body except the part of the body that has the marks of prostration; which includes the forehead, nose, palms, knees, and toes. After his punishment was finished, he will be expelled from Hell and then processed to Heaven.

This argument certainly undermines Ibn Rushd's criticism which stated that there is no physical resurrection in the afterlife, that the traces of human prostration will not be found if the human body is not resurrected in the hereafter. The formers of prostration are not owned by the spirit, but by the body. So, Ibn Rushd's criticism above will only contradict the hadith of the Prophet SAW above. In addition, it is too forced and very complex if the above verse and hadith are interpreted metaphorically.

⁵⁶ QS. Al-Hajj (22): 19-20.

⁵⁷ Abul Husain Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj ibn Muslim al-Qushairi al-Naisaburiy, *Sahih Muslim: Kitab al-Iman*, (Beirut: Darul Kitab al-'Alamiyyah, 1992), 182.

c. Allah's Word:

حتى اذا ما جاؤها شهد عليهم سمعهم وابصارهم وجلودهم بما كانوا يعملون

*"Till, when they reach it (Hell-fire), their hearing (ears) and their eyes and their skins will testify against them as to what they used to do."*⁵⁸

This verse clearly explains the body parts that are the main witnesses to the actions of every human being, namely the eyes, ears, and skin. The eye sees the action that is seen, the ear sees the action that is heard, and the skin sees the action that is felt. So, the witness was not a close member and was present at the time of the incident, so it is logical that the three organs of the body will be questioned and testified because they can speak later in the afterlife. On the other hand, the human mouth is not trusted as a witness in the afterlife, in fact, he will be silent to hear the testimony of the three members of the body. This is made clear in the words of Allah SWT:

اليوم نختم على أفواههم وتكلمنا أيديهم وتشهد أرجلهم بما كانوا يكسبون

*"This Day, We shall seal up their mouths, and their hands will speak to Us, and their legs will bear witness to what they used to earn."*⁵⁹

There are still many verses of the Qur'an that talk about the physical and spiritual return of humans in the afterlife. This at the same time silences Ibn Rushd's criticism which said that humans in the hereafter are not in physical form, but only spiritually.⁶⁰

According to Yusuf Qardlawi, the correct way to understand the text is to leave it by its outer meaning, which shows its original meanings, as understood from the context of the Arabic language used. If this is not the case, then confidence in the language and its task is lost. But that does not mean that doing *takwil* on the texts by diverting them from the essential meaning to the meaning of *majaziy* or *kinayah* is not allowed. If there is a proposition or *qarinah* that requires a diversion

⁵⁸ QS. Fushshilat (41): 20.

⁵⁹ QS. Yaasiin (36): 65.

⁶⁰ In a study conducted by Fauziah, she ended up with a statement that the difference of opinion between al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd regarding the resurrection of the body only lies in the difference in the interpretation of related verses in the Qur'an. See Ruhyatul Fauziah, "Kebangkitan Manusia di Akhirat menurut al-Ghazali dan Ibnu Rusyd", *Jurnal Aqlania* 9, no. 2 (2018): 193-221. <http://dx.doi.org/10.32678/aqlania.v9i02.2066>.

from the original meaning, then *takwil* can be done.⁶¹ While interpreting clear and *muhkam* verses, and then transferring their meanings to other meanings, this action can undermine the foundations of Islamic law.

For example, the *takwil* for the command to cut off the hands of thieves in Surah al-Maidah verse 38. According to some people who call themselves contemporary thinkers, the word "*aydiyahuma*" in this verse can be interpreted with the meaning of *majaziy*, namely ability and power. Therefore, the punishment for a thief does not have to be cut off his hand, but can be imprisoned, as long as it can eliminate their ability to commit the act of stealing. This opinion is a form of *takwil* which has no basis. If there was a pronunciation that can be interpreted with the essential meaning and *majaziy*, then it must be interpreted with the essential meaning.⁶² The true meaning is the origin of kalam, while *majaziy* is different from the origin. Therefore, the meaning of *majaziy* is only determined if there are obstacles to its true meaning.⁶³

From the verses above which are used as arguments against Ibn Rushd's criticism, they are classified as *muhkamat* verses which have no obstacles to be interpreted essentially. This condition means that the metaphorical interpretation of these verses—as stated by Ibn Rushd—has not yet been justified as long as there is no strong *illat* or obstacle to interpreting it essentially.

From the various descriptions above, what al-Ghazali offered as an expert in philosophy and religion, especially in the field of *'aqidah* and Sufism, has been accepted by many Muslims in the world than what Ibn Rushd offered. Wohlman's studies had concluded that history continues to show that al-Ghazali's subtle offer that integrates deep philosophical impulses into faith is more effective than Ibn Rushd's tougher offer. The impact of Ibn Rushd's philosophical thought was largely confined to medieval Europe, while in the Islamic world his main legacy was as a jurist.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Yusuf al-Qardhawi, *Berinteraksi dengan al-Qur'an*, terj. Abd al-Hayyi, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2000), 407.

⁶² Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Al-Shakhsyiyah al-Islamiyyah*, (Beirut: Dar al-Ummah, 2003), 135.

⁶³ Wahbah az-Zuhaili, *Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1986), 303.

⁶⁴ Avital Wohlman, "Al-Ghazali, Averroës and the Interpretation of the Qur'an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam", *Journal of Qur'anic Studies* 15, no. 1 (2013): 142-146. DOI: 10.3366/jqs.2013.0081.

F. Conclusion

Ibn Rushd's criticism toward al-Ghazali can be said to be still weak in his argumentation. When Ibn Rushd presented several arguments, especially the verses of the Qur'an, the verses he conveyed support al-Ghazali's opinion precisely when it was analyzed more deeply with critical hermeneutics.

First, Ibn Rushd's theory of nature's immortality had problems in understanding creatures. The earth and sky which were created from water do not mean that water is immortal because it is a creature. Khaliq and the creature can't be eternal. Second, the knowledge of God which was considered by Ibn Rushd to focus on universal matters only turns out to be contrary to the verses of the Qur'an, because Allah's knowledge includes both universal and partial matters, as explained by *Tafsir al-Razi*. Third, the physical resurrection in the hereafter which Ibn Rushd opposed turns out to be based on his metaphorical interpretation model of verses related to the resurrection of the human body. However, this metaphorical interpretation has not yet been accompanied by strong reasons, so that interpretation is invalid according to the rules of interpretation of the Qur'an. Moreover, many muhkamat verses talk about the resurrection of the human body and spirit in the afterlife.

Thus, the findings presented from this study present a critical analysis of the data used as argumentations or propositions by Ibn Rushd to be re-understood as argumentations that support al-Ghazali's opinion, and undermine Ibn Rushd's argumentations.

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