



Al-Kalābādhi's Concept of *Zuhd* as Structural Antithesis to Machiavellianism: Integrating Classical Sufism and Contemporary Personality Psychology

Kholid Karomi^{1*}, Rizal Hanafi Putra Miswanto¹, Rahmat Ardi Nur Rifa Da'i¹, and Ulfatun Wahidatun Nisa²

¹ Department of Aqidah and Islamic Philosophy, Postgraduate Program, Universitas Darussalam Gontor, Ponorogo, Indonesia

² Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain

Corresponding author: kholidkaromi@unida.gontor.ac.id

Article History:

Submitted: 11 April 2025

Accepted: 16 June 2026

Published: 18 June 2026

How to cite this article:

Karom, Kholid, Rizal Hanafi Putra Miswanto, Rahmat Ardi Nur Rifa Da'i, and Ulfatun Wahidatun Nisa "Al-Kalābādhi's Concept of *Zuhd* as Structural Antithesis to Machiavellianism: Integrating Classical Sufism and Contemporary Personality Psychology" *Teosofia: Indonesian Journal of Islamic Mysticism* 15, no 1 (2026): 137-160
<https://doi.org/10.21580/tos.v15i1.33320>

Copyright ©2026 by Teosofia: Indonesian Journal of Islamic Mysticism. This publication is licensed under CC BY-SA.

Abstract: Machiavellianism describes a strategic interpersonal orientation marked by manipulation, self-interest, and moral expediency. Contemporary research has clarified how it is measured, what it correlates with, and how it manifests across contexts, but it pays less attention to the normative and spiritual orientation that guides strategic capacities. This study reconstructs the concept of *zuhd* in Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhi's *al-Ta'arruf li-Madhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf* and examines its relationship to Machiavellianism through a structural-antithesis framework. Using qualitative library research and conceptual comparison, the study analyzes four shared domains: motivational orientation, self-regulation, moral evaluation, and interpersonal orientation. The findings reveal a systematic opposition across these domains. Whereas Machiavellianism prioritizes strategic advantage, instrumental self-regulation, moral expediency, and manipulative interpersonal relations, *zuhd* redirects motivation away from worldly acquisition, disciplines self-interested desire, grounds moral evaluation in divine accountability, and promotes giving and social solidarity. This opposition reflects three reconstructed psychospiritual mechanisms: value reorientation, motivational purification and limitation, and relational restructuring. These findings establish a conceptual distinction without claiming empirical evidence that *zuhd* reduces Machiavellian traits.

Contribution: This study develops a non-reductive structural-antithesis framework that connects classical Sufi ethics and contemporary personality psychology, distinguishes their moral orientations, and provides a foundation for future interdisciplinary and empirical research.

Keywords: *zuhd*; Machiavellianism; al-Kalābādhi; Islamic psychology; structural antithesis

Introduction

Machiavellianism remains an important construct in contemporary personality psychology because it captures a strategic interpersonal orientation in which manipulation, calculated self-interest, and pragmatic moral reasoning can be used to secure desired outcomes. Since the Dark Triad formulation, research has clarified the measurement, correlates, and behavioral consequences of Machiavellianism across organizational, consumer, and interpersonal settings. Recent studies also show that its expression is context-sensitive. Leadership climate, reward structures, and social expectations can strengthen or constrain how Machiavellian tendencies are translated into behavior. These findings make Machiavellianism especially relevant to current discussions of ethical leadership, institutional trust, and interpersonal responsibility.¹

At the same time, the psychological literature has largely approached Machiavellianism through measurement, prediction, and behavioral outcomes. This has produced strong empirical knowledge, but it leaves a distinct normative question: what gives strategic capacities their ethical direction? Self-control, emotional intelligence, and social perception are not inherently prosocial. They may support cooperation, but people may also use them instrumentally. Meta-analytic work on empathy, for example, reports negative associations between Machiavellianism and affective empathy. At the same time, newer research continues to show that social and emotional capacities can coexist with dark personality features. The problem is therefore not simply whether an individual can regulate the self or understand others, but which ends organize those capacities.²

¹ Gloria Xiaocheng Ma et al., "The Effects of Employee Dark Triad Traits and Leadership Styles on Work-Related Outcomes in China: An Agency-Communion Perspective," *The Journal of Psychology* 160, no. 1 (2026): 1–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2025.2485907>. Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy," *Journal of Research in Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556–63, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566\(02\)00505-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00505-6); Fatch Mohd Khan et al., "The Machiavellian, Narcissistic, and Psychopathic Consumers: A Systematic Review of Dark Triad," *International Journal of Consumer Studies* 49, no. 2 (2025): e70018, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcs.70018>.

² Christian Blötnner, Ricarda Steinmayr, and Sebastian Bergold, "Malicious Mind Readers? A Meta-Analysis on Machiavellianism and Cognitive and Affective Empathy," *Personality and Individual Differences* 181 (2021): 111023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111023>; Meenakshi Shukla and Niti Upadhyay, "Cold Hearts and Dark Minds: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Empathy across

Islamic psychology offers a useful conceptual language for examining this motivational and moral level. Recent scholarship has moved beyond simply adapting mainstream interventions for religious contexts toward models that take Islamic theological and spiritual anthropology seriously. Rothman and Coyle argue that an Islamic psychology must be grounded in an Islamic conception of the person, including the dynamic relations among *nafs*, *qalb*, *‘aql*, and *rūḥ*, rather than treating religious values as external additions to an otherwise secular model. Related work on Islamic psychotherapy likewise emphasizes that psychological change is inseparable from moral and spiritual orientation. In Sufi discourse, this orientation develops through practices and virtues that regulate desire, intention, and the relationship between the self, God, and others.³

Within this framework, *zuhd* (asceticism) is particularly relevant because it addresses attachment to possession, status, desire, and worldly pursuits. In *al-Ta‘arruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf*, Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhi does not reduce *zuhd* to poverty or physical withdrawal. He presents a cluster of Sufi sayings that link non-attachment to freedom from acquisitive pursuit, self-restraint, giving, and social solidarity. The ethical significance of this material lies in its shift from regulating desire to reorganizing social relations. This movement makes the *zuhd* conceptually relevant to a personality orientation in which others may be treated strategically, and external advantage can become a governing motive.⁴

Previous scholarship has established al-Kalābādhi's importance in systematizing early Sunni Sufism. Riyadi reads his thought as part of Sufism's formation as an integrated system of knowledge, while Salamah-Qudsi examines the rhetorical structure of his treatment of spiritual arrival. More recent research has emphasized *al-Ta‘arruf*'s (the Introduction) apologetic and theological

Dark Triad Personalities,” *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 16 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2025.1546917>; Elena Gallitto, Alexis I. Serghanuk, and Craig Leth-Steensen, “Emotional Intelligence and the Dark Triad Personality Traits: A Latent Profile Analysis,” *Personality Science* 6 (2025): 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1177/27000710251365729>.

³ Abdallah Rothman and Adrian Coyle, “Toward a Framework for Islamic Psychology and Psychotherapy: An Islamic Model of the Soul,” *Journal of Religion and Health* 57, no. 5 (2018): 1731–44, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-018-0651-x>; Abdallah Rothman and Adrian Coyle, “Conceptualizing an Islamic Psychotherapy: A Grounded Theory Study,” *Spirituality in Clinical Practice* 7, no. 3 (2020): 197–213, <https://doi.org/10.1037/scp0000219>.

⁴ Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ishāq Al-Kalābādī, *Al-Ta‘arruf Li-Madhhab Ahl Al-Taṣawwuf*, ed. Aḥmad Shams Al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1993), chaps. 36 “Qawluhum fī al-Zuhd”.

function in articulating the compatibility of early Sufi teaching with Sunni theology. These studies clarify al-Kalābādhī's intellectual context, but they do not reconstruct his treatment of *zuhd* in dialogue with a contemporary personality construct such as Machiavellianism. Conversely, the Machiavellianism literature rarely examines classical spiritual ethics as a source for conceptualizing the moral ends of self-regulation and interpersonal action.⁵

This study addresses that gap through the analytical concept of structural antithesis. The term does not refer to an established psychometric theory and does not imply that *zuhd* has already been shown to reduce Machiavellian traits. It denotes a systematic opposition between conceptual structures when comparable dimensions are organized in contrary directions. The study, therefore, asks three questions: (1) How is the structure of *zuhd* articulated in al-Kalābādhī's presentation? (2) Across which shared dimensions can *zuhd* and Machiavellianism be compared without collapsing their different epistemological foundations? (3) What theoretical propositions follow from this comparison for Islamic psychology and personality research? The contribution lies in specifying the location and logic of the opposition, while treating practical intervention claims as questions for future empirical testing.

Literature Review

Machiavellianism in Contemporary Personality Psychology

Machiavellianism was initially developed as a construct involving cynical beliefs about human nature, manipulative tactics, emotional distance, and a pragmatic orientation toward interpersonal goals. Within the Dark Triad framework, it is distinguished from narcissism and psychopathy, even though the three traits share an antagonistic interpersonal core. Contemporary measures such as the Mach-IV, Short Dark Triad, and Dirty Dozen operationalize the construct with different emphases. Recent psychometric work, therefore, cautions against treating brief dark-trait measures as interchangeable and

⁵ Abdul Kadir Riyadi, "Jalan Baru Tasawuf: Kajian Tentang Gagasan Abu Bakr Al-Kalabazi," *TSAQAFAH* 11, no. 1 (2015): 29–50, <https://doi.org/10.21111/tsaqafah.v1i1.252>; Arin Salamah Qudsi, "The State of 'Arrival' (Wuṣūl) in the Teachings of Abū Bakr Al-Kalābādhī (d. 380/990): A Model of the Mystic Discourse and the Problems of Identifying Wuṣūl in the Sufi Works of the Tenth Century," *Al-Majalla: Journal of the Arabic Language Academy* 2 (2011): 71–100; Durdane Zeynep Tekmen, "Kelâbâzî'nin Ta'arruf'u Bağlamında Tasavvuf ve Kelam İlişkisi," *Batman Akademi Dergisi* 8, no. 2 (2025): 293–311, <https://doi.org/10.58657/batmanakademi.1441655>.

encourages attention to the substantive dimensions that recur across instruments. For the present study, this means that Machiavellianism is treated as a motivational and relational structure rather than as the score of a single scale.⁶

Four dimensions are especially relevant. First, Machiavellianism involves an instrumental interpersonal orientation in which concealment, persuasion, strategic alliance, or manipulation may be used to secure preferred outcomes. Second, it is associated with a self-interested goal orientation, particularly when control, status, influence, or material advantage becomes the dominant criterion for action. Third, its moral orientation is often expedient. This does not mean that every person high in Machiavellianism rejects moral rules, but rather that moral commitments can be subordinated to strategic utility. Fourth, Machiavellianism is associated with restricted other regard, particularly lower affective empathy. Meta-analytic evidence supports this relational pattern and shows that cognitive understanding of others should not be automatically equated with compassionate concern.⁷

A further point is crucial for comparison with Sufi ethics: Machiavellianism does not necessarily imply weak self-control. Strategic delay, situational monitoring, and calculated behavioral adjustment may be resources for successful manipulation. Recent organizational research shows that contextual cues can activate Machiavellian tendencies, while research on emotional intelligence indicates that emotional capacities do not guarantee prosocial use. Self-regulation is therefore ethically underdetermined. Its significance depends on the ends it serves. This distinction allows a more precise comparison with *zuhd*, which also regulates desire and action but does so within a different normative and spiritual orientation.⁸

⁶ Peter K. Jonason and Gregory D. Webster, "The Dirty Dozen: A Concise Measure of the Dark Triad," *Psychological Assessment* 22, no. 2 (2010): 420–32, <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019265>; Daniel N. Jones and Delroy L. Paulhus, "Introducing the Short Dark Triad (SD3)," *Assessment* 21, no. 1 (2014): 28–41, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191113514105>; Marco Tommasi, Marco Lauriola, and Aristide Saggino, "Unveiling the Dark: Exploring the Nomological Consistency of the Short Dark Triad and Dirty Dozen Scales," *Europe's Journal of Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2025): 93–108, <https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.12591>. Richard Christie and Florence L. Geis, *Studies in Machiavellianism* (New York: Academic Press, 1970); Paulhus and Williams, "The Dark Triad of Personality."

⁷ Blötnner, Steinmayr, and Bergold, "Malicious Mind Readers?"; Shukla and Upadhyay, "Cold Hearts and Dark Minds."

⁸ Ma et al., "The Effects of Employee Dark Triad Traits"; Gallitto, Serghanuk, and Leth-Steensen, "Emotional Intelligence and the Dark Triad Personal."

***Zuhd* and al-Kalābādhi in Previous Scholarship**

Al-Kalābādhi plays an important role in the consolidation of early Sunni Sufi discourse. *Al-Ta'arruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf* (The Doctrine of the Sufis) brings together doctrinal, ethical, and experiential materials in a form that presents Sufism as compatible with the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and Sunni theological commitments. Riyadi argues that al-Kalābādhi should be read within the broader development of Sufism as an intellectual system rather than as an isolated thinker. This perspective matters for the present article because it discourages the extraction of the chapter on *zuhd* from the larger ethical and doctrinal logic of *al-Ta'arruf*.⁹

Studies focusing on specific aspects of al-Kalābādhi reinforce this point. Salamah-Qudsi's analysis of *wuṣūl* (attainment) shows that al-Kalābādhi organizes Sufi discourse rhetorically and selectively rather than simply compiling disconnected sayings. Tekmen's recent study of the relation between Sufism and *kalām* (Islamic theology) in *al-Ta'arruf* likewise emphasizes the work's apologetic and integrative function. Her analysis shows that al-Kalābādhi presents Sufi teaching within the boundaries of Sunni theological commitment while preserving a distinctive domain for Sufi ethical and spiritual interpretation. Together, these studies justify reading the arrangement of Sufi statements in *al-Ta'arruf* as a meaningful conceptual structure.¹⁰

The chapter on *zuhd* is especially suitable for such reconstruction because it moves beyond a simple opposition between owning and renouncing possessions. Its transmitted definitions shift attention from material condition to the heart's pursuit, from outward renunciation to the restraint of the self, and from individual discipline to giving and *muwāsāh*. This sequence is significant for contemporary analysis because it links motivational orientation with interpersonal consequence. *Zuhd* can therefore be examined as an ethical-spiritual ordering of desire, not merely as a historical practice of austerity.¹¹

This reading also requires restraint. The present study does not treat classical Sufi concepts as premodern equivalents of contemporary psychological variables. Islamic psychology scholarship has warned against reducing Islamic models of the person to categories imported from modern psychology. Accordingly, the task is not to translate *zuhd* directly into a trait scale or to claim

⁹ Riyadi, "Jalan Baru Tasawuf: Kajian Tentang Gagasan Abu Bakr Al-Kalabazi."

¹⁰ Tekmen, "Kelâbâzî'nin Ta'arruf'u Bağlamında Tasavvuf ve Kelam İlişkisi."; Qudsi, "The State of 'Arrival' (Wuṣūl)."

¹¹ Al-Kalābādhi, *Al-Ta'arruf Li-Madhhab Ahl Al-Taṣawwuf*.

clinical efficacy from textual evidence. The task is to reconstruct the internal logic of the Sufi concept and then compare that logic with dimensions already established in personality psychology.¹²

Structural Antithesis as an Analytical Framework

The present study employs structural antithesis as an analytical construct to compare two concepts arising from different intellectual traditions. The term is not presented as an established psychological theory. It serves as a conceptual device for determining whether corresponding dimensions in two systems are systematically oriented in opposite directions. This use is consistent with conceptual framework analysis, which treats a framework as a network of linked concepts designed primarily to improve understanding rather than to produce prediction by itself. Structural antithesis, therefore, refers to the pattern of relations among dimensions, not merely to the presence of opposite value labels.¹³

Such caution is necessary because *zuhd* and Machiavellianism are epistemologically asymmetrical. Machiavellianism is a modern personality construct developed through psychometric and behavioral research. *Zuhd* is a normative-spiritual concept embedded in Islamic revelation, Sufi anthropology, and practices of moral formation. A meaningful comparison must preserve those differences. Sartori's warning against conceptual stretching is relevant here: a concept loses analytical precision when it is transferred across contexts without attention to its original boundaries and attributes. The comparison in this article, therefore, proceeds by identifying shared analytical domains rather than by claiming direct conceptual equivalence.¹⁴

Comparative scholarship in Islamic psychology provides an important precedent for this procedure. Ihsan, Mudin, and Rohman, for example, compare Ibn 'Aṭā'illāh's concept of ma'rifatullāh (the knowledge of God) with Maslow's peak experience and identify a degree of phenomenological similarity while maintaining that the two remain substantially different because they arise from

¹² Amber Haque et al., "Integrating Islamic Traditions in Modern Psychology: Research Trends in the Last Ten Years," *Journal of Muslim Mental Health* 10, no. 1 (2016): 75–100, <https://doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0010.107>; Rothman and Coyle, "Toward a Framework for Islamic Psychology."

¹³ Yosef Jabareen, "Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Procedure," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 8, no. 4 (2009): 49–62, <https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690900800406>.

¹⁴ Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356>.

distinct worldviews.¹⁵ Such a comparison demonstrates that conceptual dialogue does not require epistemological equivalence. Arroisi, Ihsan, and Abdussalam further argue that Islamic psychology must remain grounded in an Islamic epistemological framework in which God and revelation occupy foundational positions and human reality is not restricted to empirical and rational dimensions alone.¹⁶ Taken together, these studies support the methodological position adopted here: concepts originating in Islamic intellectual traditions may be placed in dialogue with modern psychological constructs, but their ontological and normative assumptions must first be preserved. Structural antithesis, therefore, operates at the level of comparable conceptual dimensions, not by reducing *zuhd* to a modern personality variable or retroactively projecting Machiavellianism into classical Sufi discourse.

Four domains organize the comparison: motivational orientation, self-regulation, moral evaluation, and interpersonal orientation. Motivational orientation concerns the ends toward which action is directed, including the place of possession, status, and advantage. Self-regulation concerns how desire, impulse, and strategic capacity are governed. Moral evaluation concerns the criterion by which an action is judged legitimate or desirable. Interpersonal orientation concerns whether people are approached primarily as instruments for personal goals or as subjects of moral responsibility. These domains are comparative axes, not predetermined findings. The specific form of *zuhd* within each domain is reconstructed from al-Ta'arruf in the Results and Discussion section.

The framework also follows a principle emphasized in contemporary Islamic psychology: concepts rooted in Islamic tradition should be interpreted within an Islamic conception of the human person before they are placed in dialogue with modern psychological models. Structural antithesis is therefore used here to enable comparison without reduction. The analytical question is not whether *zuhd* and Machiavellianism are historical opposites, but whether the organizing principles reconstructed from al-Kalābādhi provide a coherent

¹⁵ Nur Hadi Ihsan, Moh. Isom Mudin, and Abdul Rohman, "Ma'rifatullah of Ibn 'Ata'illah in the Face of 'The Peak Experience' of Abraham Maslow," *Jurnal Akidah & Pemikiran Islam* 26, no. 1 (2024): 59–88, <https://doi.org/10.22452/afkar.vol26no1.2>.

¹⁶ Jarman Arroisi, Nur Hadi Ihsan, and M. Najib Abdussalam, "The Notion of the Soul in Al-Kindi: Building the Epistemological Foundation of Early Islamic Psychology," *Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah Dan Filsafat Islam* 8, no. 2 (2023): 172–91, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jaqfi.v8i2.20556>.

counter-orientation to the motivational, moral, regulatory, and relational structure described in Machiavellianism research.¹⁷

Method

This study employs qualitative library research with a conceptual-comparative design. The primary source is the chapter on *zuhd* in Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhi's *al-Ta'arruf li-Madhhab Ahl al-Taṣawwuf*, edited by Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn. The analysis focuses on the chapter's definitions, transmitted sayings, and explanatory sequence. Secondary sources include peer-reviewed scholarship on al-Kalābādhi and early Sufism, research on Islamic psychology, and foundational and recent studies of Machiavellianism. The secondary literature provides context and enables conceptual comparison rather than serving as a dataset for a systematic review.

The analytical procedure consisted of four stages. First, close reading identified semantic units in the *zuhd* passage, particularly possession, pursuit, indifference to worldly valuation, self-restraint, giving, and solidarity. Second, these units were reconstructed into higher-order dimensions concerning motivation, self-regulation, moral orientation, and interpersonal relations. Third, the same domains organized findings from Machiavellianism research. Fourth, we compared the two conceptual structures using a dimensional matrix and interpreted them through the structural-antithesis framework. This procedure follows the logic of conceptual framework analysis, in which concepts are clarified and linked before theoretical propositions are formulated.¹⁸

Interpretive rigor was maintained by separating three levels of claim. Textual claims are limited to formulations explicitly found in or directly supported by al-Ta'arruf. Contextual claims rely on scholarship concerning al-Kalābādhi and early Sufism. Theoretical claims, such as motivational de-centering or relational restructuring, are presented as reconstructions proposed by this study. Psychological claims are anchored in established measurement literature, reviews, meta-analyses, and recent empirical studies. This separation is intended to reduce anachronism and to prevent the conceptual model from being mistaken for an empirically validated intervention.

¹⁷ Rothman and Coyle, "Toward a Framework for Islamic Psychology."

¹⁸ Jabareen, "Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Procedure."

Results and Discussion

The Structure of *Zuhd* in al-Kalābādhi's *al-Ta'arruf*

The analysis of al-Ta'arruf shows that al-Kalābādhi constructs *zuhd* through a sequence of transmitted definitions rather than through a single formal definition. The first formulation establishes a two-level structure: outward possession and inward pursuit. Al-Kalābādhi records the statement, "*al-zuhdu khulū al-aydī min al-amlāk, wa al-qulūbi min al-tatabbu*" ("Asceticism (Al-Zuhd) is the emptying of the hands of possessions, and the emptying of hearts from seeking after them"). The first clause concerns the hands and possessions, while the second concerns the heart and the act of pursuing. The sequence shifts the center of analysis from material quantity to motivational attachment. What matters is not simply whether a person owns something, but whether acquisition governs the heart and becomes a dominant object of pursuit.¹⁹

A second statement radicalizes this relativization of worldly possession. Al-Kalābādhi reports the answer attributed to 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib: "*huwa an lā tubāliya man akala al-dunyā, min mu' minin aw kāfirīn*" ("It means that you do not care who consumes [the wealth of] the world, whether they are a believer or a disbeliever"). The statement does not praise dispossession for its own sake. It weakens the world's symbolic power by refusing to treat possession as a reliable measure of spiritual or personal worth. From this perspective, competition over who possesses, consumes, or controls worldly goods loses its ability to organize moral evaluation. This is directly relevant to a later comparison with status-oriented and instrumental motivation, but at the textual level, the immediate finding is a de-centering of worldly valuation.²⁰

Al-Shibfī's rhetorical question adds a reflexive critique of ascetic identity: "*ayyu miqdārīn li-aqalla min janāhi ba'ūḍtin ḥattā yuzhada fīhā?*" ("What worth does less than a mosquito's wing have, that one should be detached from it?") If the world is too insignificant to deserve ultimate attachment, then renouncing it cannot itself become a basis for superiority. This prevents *zuhd* from becoming symbolic capital through which the ascetic seeks recognition. In analytical terms, the passage closes a possible loophole in renunciation. A person may abandon possessions while remaining attached to prestige, piety, or the social status of

¹⁹ Al-Kalābādhi, *Al-Ta'arruf Li-Madhhab Ahl Al-Taṣawwuf*.

²⁰ Al-Kalābādhi.

being recognized as a *zāhid* (ascetics). The statement redirects attention from outward performance to the deeper orientation of the self.²¹

The strongest formulation appears in the explanation attributed to al-Shiblī concerning the reality of *zuhd*: “*lā zuhda fī al-ḥaqīqah ... fa-laysa illā ẓalf al-nafs, wa badhlun, wa muwāsātun*” (“In reality, there is no such thing as [true] asceticism... it is nothing but restraining the soul, giving generously, and comforting others”). Al-Kalābādhi's presentation explains that one cannot meaningfully claim to renounce what one does not truly own, nor can one renounce what has already been apportioned. The practical content of *zuhd* therefore shifts to self-restraint, giving, and solidarity. This is where the concept clearly shifts from non-attachment to a positive ethical relation.²²

Taken together, the four formulations reveal a coherent structure. First, *zuhd* decenters possession and worldly pursuit. Second, it disciplines the self so that desire does not acquire unlimited authority. Third, it opens possession toward *badhl* (giving) and *muwāsātun* (comforting), which give the concept a social direction. These elements should not be treated as isolated virtues. Detachment without self-restraint could remain rhetorical. Self-restraint without giving could remain self-focused. Giving without a transformed orientation could become reputational or strategic. Their relation is therefore sequential and mutually corrective: detachment changes what is valued, restraint limits the claims of desire, and solidarity gives the transformed orientation an interpersonal form.

This reconstruction also clarifies the role of *ikhhlās* (sincerity). Sincerity is central to Sufi ethics and to al-Kalābādhi's broader moral world, but it is not one of the explicit lexical elements in the quoted *zuhd* triad. For that reason, the present study does not present *ikhhlās* as an independent textual component extracted from this passage. Instead, purification of intention is treated later as a theoretical implication of freeing the heart from pursuit and refusing to turn renunciation into status. This distinction keeps the finding grounded in the source while preserving the broader Sufi concern with intention.

The resulting concept is better described as ethical detachment than as simple withdrawal. Material engagement remains possible, but possession no longer determines personal worth, and acquisitive desire no longer functions as the highest criterion of action. This reading supports earlier scholarship that

²¹ Al-Kalābādhi.

²² Al-Kalābādhi.

treats al-Kalābādhī as a systematic Sufi thinker rather than a compiler of disconnected maxims. It also provides the textual foundation for the structural comparison that follows.²³

Structural Mapping of *Zuhd* and Machiavellianism

The dimensions reconstructed from al-Taʿarruf can now be mapped against recurring dimensions in Machiavellianism research. The comparison does not claim that the two constructs belong to the same ontological or methodological category. It asks a narrower question: when motivation, self-regulation, moral evaluation, and interpersonal orientation are used as shared analytical domains, how are they organized in each system? This procedure makes the comparison specific enough to avoid the vague conclusion that one concept is simply moral and the other immoral.

At the motivational level, Machiavellianism is oriented toward strategic advantage, control, status, or other personally valued outcomes. Classic and contemporary formulations consistently emphasize manipulation and the pursuit of pragmatic goals as central features. *Zuhd*, by contrast, relativizes possession and status by weakening the heart's pursuit of them as ultimate goods. The opposition is therefore not between having and not having, but between acquisitive centrality and non-domination by acquisition. A person practicing *zuhd* may still act purposefully in the world, but a higher moral and spiritual orientation constrains the value of an outcome.²⁴

At the level of self-regulation, the contrast matters just as much. Machiavellianism can involve patience, planning, and behavioral control. These capacities become problematic when they function primarily to optimize strategic advantage. In al-Kalābādhī's presentation, self-restraint works in the opposite direction. It limits the authority of desire rather than increasing the efficiency of its satisfaction. At the relational level, empathy research reinforces the contrast. Machiavellianism shows negative associations with affective empathy and can support instrumental treatment of others, whereas *badhl* and *muwāsāh* direct the fruits of detachment toward giving and shared concern.²⁵

²³ Riyadi, "Jalan Baru Tasawuf: Kajian Tentang Gagasan Abu Bakr Al-Kalabazi"; Qudsi, "The State of 'Arrival' (Wuṣūl)."

²⁴ Christie and Geis, *Studies in Machiavellianism*; Jones and Paulhus, "Introducing the Short Dark Triad (SD3)."

²⁵ Blötner, Steinmayr, and Bergold, "Malicious Mind Readers?"; Shukla and Upadhyay, "Cold Hearts and Dark Minds."

The moral domain ties the other dimensions together. Machiavellian moral reasoning is best characterized here as expedient rather than completely amoral: rules and relationships can be observed when useful and subordinated when they obstruct desired outcomes. *Zuhd* places self-limitation inside a spiritual horizon in which desire is not entitled to define the good. This does not make the two constructs mirror images, but it identifies a patterned opposition in the way similar human capacities are directed.

Table 1. Summarizes this mapping

Shared dimension	Machiavellian orientation	<i>Zuhd</i> in al-Kalābādhi	Structural opposition
Motivational orientation	Strategic advantage, control, status, material or social reward	Worldly pursuit and possession are de-centered as ultimate values	Acquisitive or status-centered motivation vs. ethical non-attachment
Self-regulation	Planning, restraint, and adaptation can optimize strategic outcomes	<i>Zālf al-nafs</i> limits the authority of desire and acquisitive claims	Strategic optimization vs. moral self-limitation
Moral evaluation	Rules and commitments may be subordinated to expediency	Action is constrained by a spiritual horizon that relativizes self-interest	Strategic utility vs. transcendent accountability
Interpersonal orientation	Others can become instruments, targets, or sources of leverage	<i>Badhl</i> and <i>muwāsāh</i> orient possession toward giving and solidarity	Instrumental relation vs. non-instrumental responsibility

The matrix makes clear that the central opposition concerns the ordering of capacities. Both structures may involve planning, restraint, and sensitivity to social conditions. The difference lies in their telos. Machiavellian regulation can serve an advantage, while *zuhd* limits acquisitive claims and links restraint to generosity and solidarity. Structural antithesis, therefore, refers to contrary orientations within comparable domains, not to a simplistic contrast between psychological skill and spiritual virtue.

Reconstructing *Zuhd* as a Structural Antithesis to Machiavellianism

The mapping supports a more precise reconstruction of *zuhd* as a structural antithesis to Machiavellianism. The first point concerns the dimensions of *zuhd* that are most relevant to an instrumental and manipulative orientation. The source material prioritizes freedom from pursuit, self-restraint, *badhl*, and *muwāsāh*. These dimensions address the same problem at different levels. Freedom from pursuit changes the motivational center, restraint disciplines the claims of desire, and giving and solidarity change the social use of possessions and capacities. Together, they stand in conceptual opposition to an orientation in which self-interest governs means and other persons become instruments.

The second point concerns the meaning of detachment. If *zuhd* were defined as rejecting wealth or social participation, its relevance to personality psychology would be limited, and comparing it with Machiavellianism would be misleading. *Al-Ta'arruf* material instead permits a relational understanding. Worldly goods are not treated as intrinsically corrupt; their authority over the heart is what is relativized. Ethical detachment, therefore, means that possession, recognition, and status are prevented from becoming ultimate standards of worth. This allows worldly engagement while limiting the motives by which that engagement is pursued.

The third point concerns the basis of action. Machiavellianism prioritizes strategic calculation and personal advantage, even when this requires treating norms flexibly. *Zuhd* introduces a different form of accountability. Because worldly outcomes are de-centered, one cannot evaluate action solely by whether it secures the preferred result. The self is required to accept limits upon its claims. In Islamic psychological terms, this introduces a vertical dimension of accountability that differs from purely instrumental evaluation. The comparison, therefore, concerns two orientations of agency: action organized by strategic utility and action organized by disciplined desire within a transcendent moral horizon.²⁶

The fourth point concerns the relation among dimensions. Structural antithesis exists here because the dimensions do not operate independently. In Machiavellianism, self-interested goals can recruit self-control, social perception, and moral flexibility into a coherent strategic orientation. In *zuhd*, de-centered desire recruits self-restraint, giving, and solidarity into a coherent ethical orientation. The opposition can be represented as two sequences:

²⁶ Rothman and Coyle, "Toward a Framework for Islamic Psychology."

- 1) Acquisitive or status-centered motivation → strategic regulation → expedient evaluation → instrumental relation
- 2) Detachment from acquisitive centrality → restraint of the self → moral self-limitation → giving and solidarity.

This sequence explains why structural antithesis is stronger than a list of opposing traits. The theoretical proposition should remain limited. The study proposes that, if operationalized validly, dimensions of *zuhd* should be inversely associated with the instrumental and exploitative dimensions of Machiavellianism. It does not claim that reading or practicing *zuhd* directly changes a stable personality trait. Such a claim would require longitudinal, experimental, or intervention research and would need to address religiosity, social desirability, cultural context, and the psychometric validity of any measure of *zuhd*. The present result is a conceptual model that specifies what future empirical work would need to test.

Psychospiritual Mechanisms of the Structural Antithesis

The comparison yields three theoretical mechanisms. The first is value reorientation. The phrase concerning the heart's freedom from pursuit suggests a shift in the hierarchy of goals. Status, possession, and external advantage may remain practical concerns, but they cease to function as ultimate values. This resembles, without being reducible to, psychological distinctions between extrinsic and internalized motivation. In the Sufi framework, however, the reorientation is explicitly moral and spiritual because the value of worldly outcomes is assessed within a relation to God.²⁷

The second mechanism is purification and limitation of motivation. The source material does not permit the claim that every form of strategic motivation disappears. Rather, *ḥalāl al-naḥs* limits the self's entitlement to pursue whatever it desires. This is important because self-control alone does not distinguish ethical discipline from Machiavellian calculation. The antithesis emerges when regulation constrains egoic and acquisitive claims. Purification of intention can therefore be understood as a theoretical consequence of the textual movement from pursuit to restraint, not as an additional empirical finding.

The third mechanism is relational restructuring. *Badhl* and *muwāsāh* prevent detachment from terminating in private inwardness. They convert

²⁷ Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being.," *American Psychologist* 55, no. 1 (2000): 68–78, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68>.

freedom from acquisitive dominance into a different relation to resources and other persons. In this model, others are not primarily evaluated by their usefulness to personal goals. They become recipients of responsibility, generosity, and solidarity. This mechanism directly addresses the interpersonal core of Machiavellianism and explains why the social dimension of *zuhd* is essential rather than secondary.

These mechanisms form a sequence rather than three independent interventions. Value reorientation weakens the motivational centrality of possession and status. Ethical self-limitation regulates the remaining desires. Relational restructuring translates the transformed orientation into social conduct. Table 2 summarizes the mechanisms and the kinds of empirical questions they generate. The table states hypotheses, not established effects.

Table 2. Summarizes the mechanisms and the kinds of empirical questions they generate

Reconstructed mechanism	Conceptual function	Future empirical implication
Value reorientation	Reduces the centrality of possession, status, and external advantage as ultimate goals	Test whether ethical non-attachment is inversely associated with Machiavellian self-interest and status motivation.
Purification and limitation of motivation	Reorients self-control from strategic optimization toward restraint of egoic and acquisitive claims	Test whether spiritually framed self-restraint predicts lower exploitative tactics beyond general self-control.
Relational restructuring	Links detachment to <i>badhl</i> and <i>muwāsāh</i> rather than private withdrawal	Test whether solidarity and prosocial commitment mediate associations between <i>zuhd</i> dimensions and non-instrumental interpersonal behavior

Dialogue with Contemporary Psychological Approaches

The structural-antithesis model can enter into dialogue with contemporary psychology without presenting Sufi ethics as a replacement for psychological science. Cognitive-behavioral approaches are useful for identifying maladaptive beliefs, learned contingencies, and behavioral patterns that sustain manipulation.

The Sufi framework adds a question that cognitive restructuring alone does not necessarily settle: toward what end are cognitive and behavioral capacities directed? A strategically sophisticated person may hold accurate beliefs and exercise strong behavioral control while still using those capacities instrumentally. *Zuhd* makes the moral orientation of regulation explicit.

Humanistic and positive psychological approaches provide another point of comparison. Humanistic psychology emphasizes authenticity, growth, and self-actualization, while positive psychology studies strengths such as self-regulation, humility, kindness, and prosocial functioning. These themes overlap with aspects of *zuhd*, especially disciplined desire and concern for others. The difference lies in the ultimate normative horizon. In al-Kalābādhi's Sufi context, human flourishing is not defined solely by subjective well-being or realization of individual potential. Moral development is ordered by accountability before God and by the transformation of the self's relation to desire.²⁸

Ihsan, Rahmadi, and Jamal have identified a comparable distinction in their analysis of Maslow's humanistic psychology and Said Nursi's Sufi psychology. They show that both perspectives recognize higher dimensions of human development, yet fundamentally differ in where they locate the ultimate source and purpose of spiritual fulfillment. Whereas Maslowian development centers on human potential and subjective self-realization, Nursi's Sufi psychology situates spirituality within a *tawhīd*-based orientation, in which human fulfillment remains inseparable from obedience and relationship to God.²⁹ This distinction clarifies the present comparison. *Zuhd* does not merely add spirituality to a psychological model of self-regulation. It modifies the normative center of self-regulation itself. Control over desire is meaningful because desire is reordered in relation to a transcendent moral horizon, rather than solely because restraint contributes to personal adjustment, subjective well-being, or successful self-actualization.

²⁸ A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation.," *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (July 1943): 370–96, <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346>; Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004).

²⁹ Nur Hadi Ihsan, Muhammad Alif Rahmadi, and Jamal Jamal, "Spirituality as The Foundation of The Hierarchy of Needs in The Humanistic Psychology of Abraham Maslow and Sufi Psychology of Said Nursi," *Afkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 18, no. 1 (2022): 1–28, <https://doi.org/10.18196/afkaruna.v18i1.14495>.

Psychodynamic perspectives also illuminate the comparison by examining unconscious motivation, defense mechanisms, and the interpersonal functions of the ego. Yansori argues that Sufism challenges approaches that treat strengthening the ego as the final horizon of psychological health and instead emphasizes forms of ego-decentering. *Zuhd* can contribute to this dialogue by specifying one concrete mode of de-centering: loosening the identification of self-worth with possession, status, and control. The concept should not be equated with ego dissolution in a clinical sense, but it provides a moral-spiritual account of the limits of egoic claims.³⁰

Jarman Arroisi and colleagues' critique of self-transcendence in transpersonal psychology further sharpens this distinction. They argue that a transcendence conception developed within an anthropocentric framework remains fundamentally different from an Islamic theocentric orientation, in which human transcendence requires not only horizontal relationships with other persons and the natural world but also a vertical relationship with God.³¹ This distinction is particularly relevant to *zuhd*. The de-centering of possession, status, and egoistic desire identified in al-Kalābādhī should not be interpreted merely as psychological self-expansion or liberation from an excessive ego. Its organizing principle is reorienting the self toward divine accountability, from which ethical restraint and responsibility toward others follow. In this respect, *zuhd's* psychospiritual significance lies in the simultaneous reorganization of self–world, self–God, and self–other relations.

The comparison, therefore, identifies both convergence and difference. Contemporary approaches offer empirically developed accounts of cognition, motivation, character, and interpersonal functioning. *Zuhd* contributes a normative anthropology that asks how these capacities should be ordered and what limits should govern desire. Islamic psychology is most productive when these levels remain in dialogue without being collapsed into one another. Classical theory can generate questions and hypotheses, while empirical

³⁰ Ali Yansori, "What Can Psychoanalysis Learn from Sufism?," *British Journal of Psychotherapy* 41, no. 4 (2025): 744–57, <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjp.12988>.

³¹ Jarman Arroisi, Husain Zahrul Muhsinin, and Ahmad Rizqi Fadlilah, "Self-Transcendence in Transpersonal Psychology: A Critical Review from the Perspective of the Islamic Worldview," *International Journal of Emerging Issues in Islamic Studies* 4, no. 1 (2024): 69–81, <https://doi.org/10.31098/ijeis.v4i1.2432>.

psychology provides methods to test whether those propositions describe measurable patterns or support effective interventions.³²

Integrative Synthesis and Theoretical Implications

The study's first contribution concerns Sufi ethics. The reconstruction shows that *zuhd* contains a social logic that is easily obscured when the term is translated solely as "asceticism". Al-Kalābādhi's sequence moves from de-centering possession to restraining the self and then to giving and solidarity. The concept, therefore, concerns the organization of desire and social responsibility rather than mere material deprivation. This reading remains anchored in the source while making the concept intelligible within contemporary discussions of motivation and interpersonal ethics.

The second contribution concerns personality psychology. Machiavellianism research provides robust tools for measuring traits and predicting behavioral correlates, but trait descriptions alone do not answer normative questions about the ends of strategic capacities. The structural-antithesis model adds a complementary level of analysis by asking how motivation, self-regulation, moral evaluation, and interpersonal orientation are ordered. It thereby distinguishes self-control as strategic efficiency from self-restraint as moral limitation, and social understanding as leverage from social concern as responsibility.

The third contribution concerns Islamic psychology. The study demonstrates a procedure for bringing a classical Sufi concept into psychological dialogue without claiming that it is a premodern version of a modern construct. The procedure begins with textual reconstruction, preserves epistemological differences, identifies shared analytical domains, and only then formulates comparative propositions. This is consistent with calls to develop Islamic psychological models from within Islamic conceptions of the person before integrating them with contemporary theory and practice.³³

Practical implications should remain prospective. Character education could test whether teaching ethical non-attachment and solidarity changes attitudes toward status, competition, and instrumental relationships. Spiritually integrated counseling could explore how clients understand acquisitive goals,

³² Haque et al., "Integrating Islamic Traditions"; Rothman and Coyle, "Conceptualizing an Islamic Psychotherapy."

³³ Rothman and Coyle, "Toward a Framework for Islamic Psychology"; Haque et al., "Integrating Islamic Traditions."

self-limitation, and responsibility to others, provided that any application is clinically appropriate and religiously informed. Organizational research could examine whether value-oriented self-regulation moderates the expression of Machiavellian tendencies in competitive environments. None of these applications is established by the present library study. They are empirical validation directions generated by the conceptual model.

Conclusion

This study reconstructed al-Kalābādhī's concept of *zuhd* from the relevant passage in al-Ta'arruf and examined its relationship to Machiavellianism through a structural-antithesis framework. The textual analysis shows that *zuhd* centers on freedom from the dominance of worldly pursuits, self-restraint, giving, and *muwāsāh*. These elements form a connected ethical structure rather than a rule of material deprivation. The social significance of *zuhd* emerges from the fact that non-attachment translates into self-limitation and solidarity.

When mapped against Machiavellianism, this structure produces a patterned opposition across four domains: motivation, self-regulation, moral evaluation, and interpersonal orientation. Machiavellian capacities may center on strategic advantage and instrumental relations, whereas *zuhd* limits the centrality of acquisition and directs regulation toward moral restraint and social concern. From this comparison, the study proposes three psychospiritual mechanisms: value reorientation, purification and limitation of motivation, and relational restructuring.

The contribution is theoretical rather than clinical. The study does not demonstrate that *zuhd* reduces Machiavellian traits, nor does it treat classical Sufi concepts as direct psychological variables. Future research should develop culturally and theologically valid measures of the reconstructed dimensions, test their associations with Machiavellianism across populations, and examine whether spiritually informed educational or counseling interventions influence relevant motivational and relational outcomes. Such work would determine whether the conceptual antithesis identified here has measurable psychological implications.

Acknowledgment

The authors thank the editors and reviewers whose comments helped sharpen the manuscript's conceptual structure, methodological language, and scope.

Funding

This article did not receive specific financial support.

Author Contributions:

All authors contributed to the conception, source analysis, conceptual synthesis, and preparation of the manuscript, and all approved the final version.

Bibliography

- Al-Kalābādhi, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ishāq. *Al-Ta'arruf Li-Madhhab Ahl Al-Taṣawwuf*. Edited by Aḥmad Shams Al-Dīn. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1993.
- Arroisi, Jarman, Nur Hadi Ihsan, and M. Najib Abdussalam. "The Notion of the Soul in Al-Kindi: Building the Epistemological Foundation of Early Islamic Psychology." *Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam* 8, no. 2 (2023): 172–91. <https://doi.org/10.15575/jaqfi.v8i2.20556>.
- Arroisi, Jarman, Husain Zahrul Muhsinin, and Ahmad Rizqi Fadlilah. "Self-Transcendence in Transpersonal Psychology: A Critical Review from the Perspective of the Islamic Worldview." *International Journal of Emerging Issues in Islamic Studies* 4, no. 1 (2024): 69–81. <https://doi.org/10.31098/ijeis.v4i1.2432>.
- Blötner, Christian, Ricarda Steinmayr, and Sebastian Bergold. "Malicious Mind Readers? A Meta-Analysis on Machiavellianism and Cognitive and Affective Empathy." *Personality and Individual Differences* 181 (2021): 111023. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111023>.
- Christie, Richard, and Florence L. Geis. *Studies in Machiavellianism*. New York: Academic Press, 1970.
- Gallitto, Elena, Alexis I. Serghanuk, and Craig Leth-Steensen. "Emotional Intelligence and the Dark Triad Personality Traits: A Latent Profile Analysis." *Personality Science* 6 (2025): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1177/27000710251365729>.
- Haque, Amber, Fahad Khan, Hooman Keshavarzi, and Abdallah E. Rothman. "Integrating Islamic Traditions in Modern Psychology: Research Trends in the Last Ten Years." *Journal of Muslim Mental Health* 10, no. 1 (2016): 75–100. <https://doi.org/10.3998/jmmh.10381607.0010.107>.

- Ihsan, Nur Hadi, Moh. Isom Mudin and Abdul Rohman. "Ma'rifatullah of Ibn 'Ata'llah in the Face of 'The Peak Experience' of Abraham Maslow." *Jurnal Akidah & Pemikiran Islam* 26, no. 1 (2024): 59–88. <https://doi.org/10.22452/afkar.vol26no1.2>.
- Ihsan, Nur Hadi, Muhammad Alif Rahmadi, and Jamal Jamal. "Spirituality as The Foundation of The Hierarchy of Needs in The Humanistic Psychology of Abraham Maslow and the Sufi Psychology of Said Nursi." *Afkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 18, no. 1 (2022): 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.18196/afkaruna.v18i1.14495>.
- Jabareen, Yosef. "Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Procedure." *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 8, no. 4 (2009): 49–62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690900800406>.
- Jonason, Peter K., and Gregory D. Webster. "The Dirty Dozen: A Concise Measure of the Dark Triad." *Psychological Assessment* 22, no. 2 (2010): 420–32. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019265>.
- Jones, Daniel N., and Delroy L. Paulhus. "Introducing the Short Dark Triad (SD3)." *Assessment* 21, no. 1 (2014): 28–41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191113514105>.
- Khan, Fatch Mohd, Areeba Khan, Sabara Soyafuddin Ahmed, Ariba Naz, Mairaj Salim, Asma Zaheer, and Umra Rashid. "The Machiavellian, Narcissistic, and Psychopathic Consumers: A Systematic Review of Dark Triad." *International Journal of Consumer Studies* 49, no. 2 (2025): e70018. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcs.70018>.
- Ma, Gloria Xiaocheng, Marise Ph. Born, Paraskevas Petrou, and Arnold B. Bakker. "The Effects of Employee Dark Triad Traits and Leadership Styles on Work-Related Outcomes in China: An Agency-Communion Perspective." *The Journal of Psychology* 160, no. 1 (2026): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2025.2485907>.
- Maslow, A. H. "A Theory of Human Motivation." *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (July 1943): 370–96. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346>.
- Paulhus, Delroy L, and Kevin M Williams. "The Dark Triad of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy." *Journal of Research in Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556–63. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566\(02\)00505-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00505-6).
- Peterson, Christopher, and Martin E. P. Seligman. *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification*. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2004.
- Qudsi, Arin Salamah. "The State of 'Arrival' (*Wuṣūl*) in the Teachings of Abū

- Bakr Al-Kalābādhi (d. 380/990): A Model of the Mystic Discourse and the Problems of Identifying *Wuṣūl* in the Sufi Works of the Tenth Century.” *Al-Majalla: Journal of the Arabic Language Academy* 2 (2011): 71–100.
- Riyadi, Abdul Kadir. “Jalan Baru Tasawuf: Kajian Tentang Gagasan Abu Bakr Al-Kalabazi.” *TSAQAFAH* 11, no. 1 (2015): 29–50. <https://doi.org/10.21111/tsaqafah.v11i1.252>.
- Rothman, Abdallah, and Adrian Coyle. “Conceptualizing an Islamic Psychotherapy: A Grounded Theory Study.” *Spirituality in Clinical Practice* 7, no. 3 (2020): 197–213. <https://doi.org/10.1037/scp0000219>.
- . “Toward a Framework for Islamic Psychology and Psychotherapy: An Islamic Model of the Soul.” *Journal of Religion and Health* 57, no. 5 (2018): 1731–44. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-018-0651-x>.
- Ryan, Richard M., and Edward L. Deci. “Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being.” *American Psychologist* 55, no. 1 (2000): 68–78. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68>.
- Sartori, Giovanni. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356>.
- Shukla, Meenakshi, and Niti Upadhyay. “Cold Hearts and Dark Minds: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Empathy across Dark Triad Personalities.” *Frontiers in Psychiatry* 16 (2025). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsy.2025.1546917>.
- Tekmen, Durdane Zeynep. “Kelâbâzî’nin Ta’arruf’u Bağlamında Tasavvuf ve Kelâm ilişkisi.” *Batman Akademi Dergisi* 8, no. 2 (2025): 293–311. <https://doi.org/10.58657/batmanakademi.1441655>.
- Tommasi, Marco, Marco Lauriola, and Aristide Saggino. “Unveiling the Dark: Exploring the Nomological Consistency of the Short Dark Triad and Dirty Dozen Scales.” *Europe’s Journal of Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2025): 93–108. <https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.12591>.
- Yansori, Ali. “What Can Psychoanalysis Learn from Sufism?” *British Journal of Psychotherapy* 41, no. 4 (2025): 744–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjp.12988>.

LEFT BLANK