Narratives on the 212 Movement and Tauhid Flag Transformation from the Boudieusian Perspective

The so-called Tauhid flag was exclusively known as HTI's (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) symbol of Islamic caliphate re-establishment. However, after its burning incident in 2018, the flag appears to be one of the symbols of post-Islamist populism. By using the Bourdieusian perspective's framework, this study aims to understand the prior narrative of the Tauhid flag, the narrative of the 212 movements, and how the narrative of the 212 movements influenced the transformation of the narrative of the Tauhid flag. The data in this study were taken from 180 sampled tweets using proportionate stratified random sampling. The data were elaborated with related news and publications and then condensed, codified, and categorized. This study revealed that the prior narrative of the Tauhid flag was the narrative of institutional Islamism, aiming to re-establish the Islamic caliphate through a peaceful act. Meanwhile, the 212 movements represent the narrative of post-Islamist populism. When the Tauhid flag became the central issue in several 212 movements, the flag's narrative transformed into post-Islamist populism. It means that the widespread acceptance of the Tauhid flag has a little impact, if none, on HTI's caliphate campaign.


Introduction
No less than 13 series of mass rallies under the main name of Aksi Bela Islam (Action to Defend Islam) have been conducted during 2016-2019. The first one occurred on 14 October 2016, organized by Gerakan Muslim Jakarta (Jakarta's Muslim Movements/GMJ), led by Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS) (Tempo.co, 2016). Thousands of Muslims gathered at Jakarta's Town Hall in the interest of imprisoning Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (then known as Ahok, now preferred to be called BTP). The former Jakarta governor who nominated himself for the next 5-years of his reign was accused of insulting the Quran due to his speech in Kepulauan Seribu on 27 September 2016 (Tim NN, 2018). Indonesia's Council of Ulama (MUI) under the leadership of Ma'ruf Amin issued a fatwa accordingly on 11 October 2016 (Tempo.co, 2017a).
Islamist groups then used the fatwa as a justification to form Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa MUI (The National Movement to Safeguard Indonesia's Ulama Council Edict/GNPF MUI). On 4 November 2016, the group organized Aksi Bela Islam Jilid II (Action to Defend Islam Chapter II) which was also known as Aksi 411 (Action 411), Aksi Bela al-Qur'an 233 (Action to Defend Quran), and Aksi Damai 4 November (4 November Peaceful Action). The rally used Bundaran Hotel Indonesia (Hotel Indonesia Roundabout), Bank Indonesia, and Presidential Palace as its locations. The number of participants is believed to have increased although an exact amount is difficult to trace. Almost a month later, on 2 December, Aksi 212 (Action 212) or Aksi Bela Islam Jilid III Super Damai (A Super Peaceful Action to Defend Islam Chapter III) was conducted in Monumen Nasional (National Monument/Monas). GNPF MUI claims that 7 million people joined the demonstration. The use of 'super peaceful' as an attribute to its action appears to counter the narrative that the Islamists are violent and/or promoting violence. According to Fealy (2016), the demonstration went peacefully. As the demonstration attracted national and international attention, it transformed into a movement and a community. The '212' configuration, along with 'Aksi Bela Islam', appears to become its foremost identity.
In 2017, five series of Aksi Bela Islam were conducted. Four of them aimed to ensure the imprisonment of BTP. On 11 February, nearly 200.000 people gathered at Masjid Istiqlal (Taher, 2017). Ten days later, the second chapter of Aksi 212 was conducted in front of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative/DPR) and the Ministry of Home Affairs, organized by Forum Umat Islam (Islamic Community Forum/FUI) (BBC News Indonesia, 2017). The rally was joined by only around 15.000 people (Taher, 2017). Following the dynamic of the case maintained by the Aksi 212, BTP was terminated as Jakarta's governor. On 31 March, another demonstration called Aksi 313 was conducted. FUI, the initiator, claimed that the demonstration was joined by no less than 100.000 people (Nailufar, 2017). A screenshot of a pornographic chat between HRS and Firza Husein was leaked during that period. For the Islamists, the HRS case means the criminalization of the Ulama by the government. On 26 April, HRS flew to Saudi Arabia to avoid the case. His camp claimed that the trip to Saudi Arabia was for doctoral study purposes.

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On 5 May, another demonstration was conducted next to the Supreme Court. Four days later, BTP was found guilty and sent to 2-years imprisonment (Tempo.co, 2017b). Twenty days later, HRS was found guilty of the pornographic chat. The imprisonment of BTP during the election of Jakarta's governor has seen the winning of Anies Baswedan. On 30 October, GNPF MUI changed its name to GNPF Ulama. Bachtiar Nasir states that the change was decided in the interest of lifting the pressure out of MUI's shoulders (Fajar, 2017). However, it is understood that the change was a response to the resignation of Ma'ruf Amin from the movements. Around a month later, Presidium Alumni 212 was founded. Its first event was the Reuni Akbar Alumni 212 (The Great Reunion of 212's Alumni). The rally was held in Monas, joined by around 35.000 to 45.000 people. As the case of BTP has closed, the number of supporters has decreased. The movements, then, appear to be maintained merely in the interest of winning the presidential election in 2019.
In 2018, Sukmawati Soekarnoputri recited a poem called Kidung Ibu Pertiwi and was perceived to conduct blasphemy through her poem. This triggered an Aksi Bela Islam on 6 April in front of the Criminal Investigation Agency. On 22 October, during the National Santri Day, a group of Santri burnt what they perceived as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)'s flag yet was then constructed by the Islamists as the Tauhid flag. The burning incident has regained support for the 212 Movements in which they started to use Aksi Bela Tauhid (The Action to Defend Tauhid) as its main jargon. After its first demonstration before the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs on 26 October, another one was conducted on 2 November at Masjid Istiqlal and before the presidential palace. Interestingly, although the demonstration was claimed to be defending the Tauhid, the #2019GantiPresiden (Replace the Current President by 2019) chanting was evident (Friana, 2018). It is understood that the candidate to be supported was Prabowo Subianto. On 2 December, Reuni Akbar Mujahid 212 (The Great Reunion of Mujahid 212) was held. It sees the shift of discourse from "alumni" to "mujahid". Bernard Abdul Jabar claimed that the rally was joined by 8 million people.  (Abdulsalam, 2018).
The beginning of 2019 was nuanced by the debate between the president and vice president candidates. There was no mass rally until the election on 17 April. On 30 June, Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin were officially the President and Vice President of Indonesia. On 23 October, it was politically clear that Prabowo joined Jokowi's administration as the minister of defense (Ramadhan, 2019). On 2 December, a Reuni 212 Munajat untuk Keselamatan Negeri (212 Reunion Pray for the Safety of the Country) was conducted. Anies Baswedan stepped in as its main, if not sole, political figure following the recent development. His socio-political position was getting stronger when Sandiaga Uno officially became the minister of tourism and creative economy in December 2020, replacing Wishnutama (Prasetia, 2020). On some occasions, Anies was frequently called either Muslim governor or governor of Indonesia, highlighting the Islamists' opposition and their reluctance of accepting Jokowi's administration.
From the articulation above, it can be argued that the triggering issues changed over time, and so did the composition of social agents, the name of the mass rally's organizer, and the location. It can be argued as well that the Tauhid flag narrative has helped restore the support to the 212 Movement. On the other hand, the 212 Movement has made the Tauhid flag very popular, although such popularity has melted its Islamism narrative. Nevertheless, such a dynamic is often analyzed under the lenses of Islamic or political studies. While such analysis has brought about a comprehensive understanding, an additional perspective will provide a critical review and/or bring about novelty. Besides, the Bourdieusian perspective will be of some help to understand the subtle narrative and symbolic power constructing the logic of practice of the movements.
While digging deep into the subtle and symbolic part of the events, the study will focus on three research questions. Firstly, what is the prior narrative of the so-called Tauhid flag? Secondly, what is the main narrative of the 212 movements? Thirdly, how and to what extent, if any, 236 has the narrative of the Tauhid flag transformed through the 212 movements? To answer such questions, the study uses content analysis with Twitter as the main content source. The reason to use tweets as the main data is because the dissemination of the narrative of the 212 movements and the Tauhid flag was hugely conducted through social media, specifically Twitter. The study uses proportionate stratified random sampling to select the sample among millions of tweets as the population. Firstly, the tweets were filtered using the hashtags #aksibelaislam #belatauhid, and #benderatauhid. Secondly, on each hashtag, the tweets were filtered based on the year they were posted: 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. Thirdly, fifteen tweets were randomly selected on each matrix of hashtags and year-of-post. In total, the study has 180 sampled tweets. The study also gathered secondary data from news and publications to comprehend the data required. Since the study uses content analysis as the analysis method, the raw materials were then condensed into some ideas. The ideas were codified into some subtle narratives. The narratives were categorized into some categories. Afterward, the conclusion is drawn.

Assessing the Prior Narrative of the Tauhid Flag
To answer the first research question, the study will assess the narrative of the so-called Tauhid flag. In so doing, the study will be begun by addressing the narrative of the notion of Tauhid and how it differs from the narrative of the Tauhid flag. The notion of "Tauhid", alongside the notion of "Sunnah", is often referred to in the Salafi Wahabi school of thought as it campaigns the Islamic purification. However, what it means as Islamic purification is often criticized as built upon a strict, ahistorical, and literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah, influenced by Arabic patriarchy (Smith & Woodward, 2013). Through its campaign on "getting back to Tauhid" and "getting back to Sunnah", Salafi Wahabi tends to selfclaim its Islamic understanding as to the rightest Islamic school of thought. As a consequence, Salafi sees the mainstream Islam in Indonesia as syncretic given the accommodation to the local wisdom and culture (Abaza, 2011).
Salafi Wahabi is often identified as a conservative or ultra-conservative Islam. It is the influence of Salafi, it appears, that encourages the conservatization of Indonesian Islam. According to Bruinessen (2013), conservative Islam is the bottom layer of moderate Islam that shares similar characteristics with radical Islam, consisting of fundamentalism and Islamism. He further characterizes fundamentalism by its literal and strict interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah to reject established Islamic practices considered to be lacking a scriptural foundation. Meanwhile, Islamism is identified solely by its aim of enacting an Islamic State. Given its standpoint on manifesting Islam as a state ideology or political system, Islamism can be categorized as political Islam. For Hadiz (2011), political Islam uses Islam's ideal, notion, and symbol as the response to sociopolitical inequalities and unjust power distribution.
According to Tibi (2015), Islamism can be of two kinds. The first is jihadism which undergoes violent endeavors to achieve its goal. The likes of ISIS and Jemaah Islamiyah can be articulated as examples. The second is institutional Islamism, which is willing to utilize the current system, such as democracy, as it can help enact an Islamic caliphate. HTI is arguably one of its kind. HTI believes that Muslims have an obligation to implement the Islamic state as part of their Islamicity. HTI sees Indonesia's political ideology and the governmental system as not compatible with Islam (Amin, 2012). As the institutional Islamist, HTI spreads ideas through book writing and publication, seminar, discussion, organizational strengthening, and demonstration, which has been frequently done through the 212 Movements. Felix Siauw, HTI's frontline celebrity, was understood as actively involved in the movement and al-Khathah, an ex-chief of HTI, who was a general secretary of FUI.
Interestingly, although Salafi is rarely categorized as the Islamist, its strict standpoint can be found in the likes of pan-Islamism organizations such as HTI (Smith & Woodward, 2013). However, despite the similarity between Islamism and Salafi, the notion of the Tauhid flag is lesser-known for Salafi. Instead, it is identical to HTI's aim of caliphate enactment. Although the flag was identical to HTI, the latter often denied having such an official flag (Heriyansyah, 2018). The denial can also be found after the incident of the Tauhid flag burning when the flag reached a widening acceptance and support. HTI insisted that the flag represents ar-Rayah and al-Liwa. Ar-Rayah means the prophet's flag while al-Liwa means the prophet's banner (Ahmadi, 2017). The former was believed to be black containing the text of the Tauhid on white, while the latter was believed to be white containing the text of the Tauhid on black (Sasongko, 2017). Interestingly, Masduqi (2017) states that the color of the prophet's flag is still debatable. Nonetheless, despite the diverse opinion on the flag's color, it can be said that ar-Rayah and al-Liwa were identical to war and were waived by the bravest soldier/commander. This is to say, although HTI did not choose war as its path, it used a war-symbol flag to accentuate its narrative of institutional Islamism.

Bourdieusian Field: Concept and the 212 Movement Context
Now that the prior narrative of the Tauhid flag has been identified, the study shall analyze the subtle narrative and the symbolic power of the 212 Movements. In so doing, the study will start by elaborating on the Bourdieusian field. This is to dig deep into the social relation of the selected physical location of the rallies. According to Thomson, Bourdieu uses the French word 'le champ' to describe the field. Le champ means "inter alia, an area of land, a battlefield, and a field of knowledge" (Thomson, 2008). For Bourdieu, the field is a social space in which the investigated objects or activities occurred with the influence of symbolic systems. When talking about social space, Bourdieu (1989) emphasizes the social position and social relation between social agents in a given social space. Imagine a physical space where two social agents are located. They have a physical distance that could be measured by math as well as having social distance relative to each other, influenced by each social position and social relation. Such a social space, for Bourdieu, is not value-free. The logic of practice bounds it and at the same time accommodates the dynamic between capital and habitus. He believes that the field shapes social phenomena, and at the same time, shape the field.
Bourdieu uses three analogies for further explanation regarding the field (Thomson, 2008). First is a football field. A football field is more than just a playing ground. It is a social space where a rule of the game is constraining and shaping the way the players play. On the other hand, the field is also shaped by the process of the game given the intervention, strategy, and playing style of the people involved, from players to the audience. On the field, social agents with different habitus (disposition) and capital, interact and intervene in their agenda/strategies within the limitation or constraint of the field's rules. The field's rule is shaping the way the interaction occurred and vice versa. The question is: what is the field's rule?
To answer the question, Bourdieu's second analogy has to be provided. He calls the field a science fiction-force field (Thomson, 2008). The bottom line is that each field has its own 'logic of practice' pattern that distinguishes the inside and outside of the field. This is not fixed. In contrast, it is perceived to be semi-autonomous. When an individual enters the field, she adjusts her practice to the field's logic of practice. Given that, it can be assumed that the logic of practice is the field's rule. When the players enter the football field, they adjust themselves to the rules of the game.
The third is a force field. Bourdieu describes a social space as "a square consisting of two intersecting axes: one axis was economic capital (from plus to minus) and the other cultural capital (from plus to minus)" (Thomson, 2008). The plus gives an advantage in which the social agent acquires more power and position. The social agent's location within this axis represents her social position. The distance between two or more social agents in this axis constitutes social relations relative to each other. From this perspective, Bourdieu sees social space as hierarchical where those having a huge amount of capital could stir, to some degree, the dynamic of the game.
To contextualize the concept above, the study has identified the social position of each physical space used as the location of the mass rally as can be seen in the Table 1. As can be seen above, the 212 Movements always took place in Jakarta despite the variety of the exact location. The locations were selected, more or less, due to their socio-political relation relative to the narrative of the movement or the triggering issues. Interestingly, if the location is categorized, the category would consist of four domains: government offices, Masjid Istiqlal, law enforcement offices, and Monas. Targeting the government offices has helped deliver its Islamic populism standpoint. Law enforcement offices were chosen to put pressure on the development of the triggering issues. Masjid Istiqlal was selected as this is the symbol of religiosity, suitable for stating the socio-political position of religious fundamentalism. Lastly, Monas was selected, despite its historical narrative as the national symbol, because of its amplitude as a strategic public sphere, relative to the location of government offices and Masjid Istiqlal. The amplitude of Monas has been used to accentuate the numbers of the participants, despite this being merely a matter of self-claim.

The Logic of Practice as the Subtle Narratives of the 212 Movements
The study defines the Bourdieusian logic of practice as the rule of the game. When it applies to the 212 Movements, the rule of the game appears to be its subtle narratives. To figure them out, the study condensed the raw materials from data gathering and the results can be seen in the Table 2. 1. Maintaining the spirit of 212 and its narratives Note: taken from various sources As shown in Table 2 above, the narrative of defending Islam was developed as the response to the blasphemy cases. Although, the response to the BTP's case was far larger than to Sukmawati. The distinction appears to be influenced, more or less, by political consideration. Included in this is the negative sentiment over Jokowi's administration perceived as anti-Islam. Jokowi and BTP were then a pair of Jakarta's governor and vice governor before the former campaign for his first presidency in 2014 accompanied by Jusuf Kalla.
Notwithstanding this, it is clear that while the issues triggering varied, the narratives share similarities. Therefore, it is essential to have these condensed narratives codified and categorized (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017) so that the symbolic system constructing the reality of the field can be indicated. The results are decribed in Table 3. Table 3, the study finds five codified narratives which can be categorized into three categories. The first three are: 1) the opposition to the government (Islam vs the state); 2) the marginalization of Muslims; and 3) Islamic revivalism/liberation. The study perceives these three codified narratives as the characteristic of Islamic populism. According to Rakhmani and Saraswati (2021), populism speaks about the mobilization of "the people" against the "elite" as the result of socio-economic inequalities brought about by global neoliberalism. However, what is meant by the people is a fraction of a society considered "the true people", irrespective of the fact that this could be merely a self-claim. When it comes to Islamic populism, the people to be represented are the Muslims, the ummah. That was why the 212 Movements always made a self-claim to represent the whole Indonesian Muslims, accusing those who did not support the rally as not true or devoted Muslims.

From the
By using the claim of representing the ummah, it developed the narrative that Muslims are socio-politically and economically weakened, oppressed, and/or marginalized by the elites (Garadian, 2017). Therefore, an effort for Islamic liberation/revivalism is necessary. In the case of the 212 Movements, Rakhmani and Saraswati (2021) argue that the ummah created a cross-class coalition with the conservative ulama and was supported by some political parties: Gerindra, PKS, and PAN. While the elites as the subject of criticism are the government considered as anti-Islam and tend to discriminate against ummah and criminalize the ulama.

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there is "a 'gradual change in the nature of Islamism' [that] has taken place as it has moved 'from a political project challenging the state to one concerned with personal piety" (Muller, 2013). Such a transformation, Muller added, has seen the accommodation of democracy or democratization by the post-Islamist groups. For Mahdavi (2011), post-Islamism is a transformation of Islamism due to complexities and challenges both externally and internally. Likewise, Islamism, it embraces public piety, admiring a more Islamic society. However, unlike Islamism, it rejects the idea of the Islamic State. Unlike Islamism which aims to enact a global caliphate, post-Islamism appears to be more contextual in responding to local issues.
Given its accommodation of public piety, it can be argued that post-Islamism constitutes what Hasan (2012) states as religious fundamentalism. In short, religious fundamentalism can be understood as the expression of piety that is not solely inward-looking and personal. It has an intention to influence socio-cultural and political support of whom the expression of religiosity resonated. As can be noted easily, the 212 Movements use religiosity as its language. Its actions, more or less, always involve an expression of religiosity, from performing prayer together to dhikr akbar (gathered and collective remembrance). The hashtags #putihkanmonas or #putihkanbioskop when the movie "212: the Power of Love" was released have created a sense of purifying the religiosity of Indonesian Muslims. Pious as it might seem, it can be argued that the expression generates socio-culture and political implications.
Going back to post-Islamism, when it comes to the 212 Movements, such a situation appears to be well-resumed by the term "NKRI Bersyariah", coined by HRS. The term is not about enacting a caliphate, or the Islamic State of Indonesia. Instead, it intends to establish a more Islamic version of Indonesia's democracy. From HRS perspective, reading through the narratives of NKRI Bersyariah on sampled posters published by his camp, the more Islamic version of Indonesia's democracy can be indicated by, firstly, the obligation to implement the Tauhid given that the Tauhid is the essence of Pancasila. Secondly, the recall of the 'seven words' ("the obligation of implementing sharia for the Muslims") to the first pillar of Pancasila. Thirdly, the condemnation of communism, marxism, Leninism, secularism, pluralism, liberalism, and all aberrant sects. Fourthly, the punishment for the wrongdoings from drugs to LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender). Fifthly, the alignment between Islamic sharia with the product of law in the form of Perda Syariah (Sharia-based Perda).
The idea of NKRI Bersyariah, more or less, appears to be well resumed with a red-and-white flag caricatured by Tauhid sentences, brought by the demonstrators during the Aksi Bela Tauhid. In Bourchier's terms, such a situation can be seen as "the convergence of religious and nationalist conservatism to produce a new brand of religious nationalism" (Bourchier, 2019).

The Transformation of the Tauhid Flag Narrative
From various publications, the study finds that the Tauhid flag was evident here and there in the first Aksi 212 in 2016 (Hadi, 2018); Aksi 112 (Ratnasari, 2017), Aksi 313 (Habsy, 2017), and Reuni Aksi 212 in 248 2017 (Gunadha & Saleh, 2017) although the #AksiBelaTauhid (Act to Defend Tauhid) was formulated in October 2018. In September 2018, a month prior to the burning incident, Yaqut Cholil Coumas criticized the use of Tauhid hats by a team member of Ustaz Abdul Somad given its identical similarities with HTI's Tauhid flag. His comment created tension among the Islamists to an extent that the Indonesian National Police had to issue permission to wear attributes or wardrobes related to the Tauhid. This means the commodification of Tauhid has occurred despite reaching only a small market.
When the burning incident happened on 22 October, not only did it generate the high selling of the Tauhid flag but also witnessed the use of the 'Tauhid flag' as the main narrative of Aksi Bela Islam or the 212 Movements. As to counter the critics on how the flag is representing the ideology of Islamism of HTI, the Tauhid flag in various colors was found. This is not to mention the red-and-white flag containing the text of the Tauhid. The hype of the narrative has seen the growing market of Tauhidrelated wardrobes, specifically during the first and the second Aksi Bela Tauhid on 22 October and 2 November respectively (Adji & Aminah, 2018).
The widespread acceptance of the so-called Tauhid flag, the growing market of Tauhid-related wardrobes, and the colorizing of the Tauhid flag appear to indicate the transformation of the Tauhid flag. It seems that the Tauhid flag is not seen as the symbol of caliphate enactment. Instead, it is seen, firstly, as the symbol of Islamic revivalism in the form of a more Islamic Indonesian democracy. Secondly, it seems to be the symbol of public piety. Wearing the Tauhid-related wardrobe might be seen solely in the interest of expressing religiosity in the public sphere. This expression of religiosity, given its association to the narrative of the 212 Movements, has political implications indeed. Although it could be the case as well that the grassroots did not share such affection thoroughly as they wore the wardrobe for the religious joy of the hype only. Nevertheless, whatsoever the cases, such a situation was constructed within the Islamic populism logic of practice. Therefore, it can be argued that through and by the 212 Movements, the narrative of the Tauhid flag was transformed from the narrative of HTI's institutional Islamism to post-Islamist populism. Source: Hadi (2018) Such a situation appears to be made possible, firstly, by the intervention of the logic of practice of the 212 Movements to the capital of HTI's Tauhid flag within the scope of Aksi Bela Tauhid's field. Secondly, by the Weberian Charisma of HRS. Since the very beginning of the mass rally, HRS has become the main social agent of the movement. With such a capital, HRS is capable of dictating the logic of practice of the movements. Although, it is difficult to know whether the dictating force is solely made by HRS or through the influence of the unseen oligarchs and pragmatist politicians behind closed doors. Irrespective of that, it is understood that HRS declared the aspiration to a more Islamic version of Indonesia's democracy in the form of what he calls NKRI Bersyariah, not to an Islamic state or caliphate. The dominating power of HRS and his FPI as the main social agents of the 212 Movements field has seen the marginalization of the caliphate's narrative that plays around in the field. The dissolution of HTI appears to weaken HTI's capability of optimizing the hype because its maneuver has to be under the radar or else it will mean a backlash.

Conclusion
The study argues that prior to Aksi Bela Tauhid as part of the 212 Movement, the narrative of the Tauhid flag represents the ideal Islamic State campaigned by HTI although it denied the flag as its symbol. Given that narrative, it is no surprise if the flag was circulated and used exclusively within the circle of HTI. On the other hand, the 212 Movements as a social space appears to be constructed by a subtle narrative and symbolic power of post-Islamism and Islamic populism, given its approach to public piety and support for a political aspiration as a means of Islamic revivalism in the form of NKRI Bersyariah. As the characteristics of the concept overlap, the study uses the terms of post-Islamist populism in which post-Islamism is situated as the objective and populism as the force and rationale. When the Tauhid flag enters the social space of the 212 Movements, its narrative appears to adjust and synchronize to the movement's logic of practice. The process of adjustment of synchronization was strengthened by the dominating power of HRS as the "great Imam" campaigning for post-Islamism and representing the spirit of Islamic populism. It can be said as well that the HTI's ban limited its maneuver. Given that, it can be concluded that the spreading and widening acceptance of the so-called Tauhid flag has put little, if no, impact on the campaign of HTI's Islamic caliphate. In fact, it could be the case where the widening acceptance of the Tauhid-related wardrobes was merely a hype of Islamic pop culture with no great impact on religiosity or political ideology. In this case, another study will be required. [w]