

DEPICTION OF COMMON ENEMIES IN RELIGIOUS SPEECH: The Role of the Rhetoric of Identification and Purification in Indonesian Religious Conflicts

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Abstract

The role of common enemies in speech on religious issues have contributed to religious tension, conflict and even violence in Indonesia. It will select the most representative and most frequently used key terms from religiously related speeches and other texts containing the portrayal of common enemies. Using Burke's theories of identification, this paper will explain the important roles of common enemies in group unity and in achieving certain objectives.

Peran musuh bersama dalam ceramah-ceramah agama telah memberikan kontribusi untuk timbulnya tekanan, konflik, dan kekerasan di Indonesia. Bahan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah istilah-istilah kunci yang sering digunakan dalam ceramah maupun teks yang menggambarkan musuh bersama. Dengan menggunakan teori identifikasi dari Burke, tulisan ini akan menjelaskan peran penting musuh bersama dalam kesatuan kelompok dan dalam rangka mencapai tujuan tertentu.

Keywords: common enemy, religious speech, tense, conflict, violence

A. Preface

Kenneth Burke's¹ theory of identification suggests that every discourse encompasses, at least implicitly if directly, the notion of common enemies. All human communication, especially speech directed at a group of audience, tends to be aimed at creating identity, cohesion, and even strong unity among the group members; and for this purpose, confronting the audience against a common enemy is a routinely practiced human communicative strategy. While most speech does so discretely, some identifies the enemies openly, and others even suggest outright war against the identified enemies.

Typically, the rhetors do not reveal the motive for creating group unity by identifying their common enemies. However, a rare and intriguing self-revelation of a speaker's motive took place early this year (2013) in Indonesian political drama involving the PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, Prosperous Justice Party). The newly elected president of this Islamist party admitted that when he pointed at the Zionists (referring to Israel and its strong ally, the USA, as one of the most frequently mentioned common enemies in Indonesian Islamic discourse) as the culprit for the corruption charges and the arrest of the PKS former president by the KPK (the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission), he openly acknowledged that it was mainly aimed at creating unity and solidity among the party cadres, and not at creating a conspiracy theory and blaming others. Reportedly, the speech successfully stimulated emotion and strengthened courage among the attending members, many of whom cried in response to the moving speech. The speech achieved its goal, but at the same time also identified and confirmed the well-known enemy and its potential threat.² This kind of portrayal and identification of enemies is rampant in religiously related speeches that tend to augment tension and conflict in pluralistic Indonesia.

This paper discusses the portrayal and religious tension and conflict in Indonesia. Finally, it will also suggest the possible benefits of the rhetoric of

¹ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motive*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). (Original work published 1950).

² Many Indonesian newspapers and electronic media discussed this interesting event, for example, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/02/01/18061895/Air.Mata.Kader.PKS.Dengar.Pidato.Anis.Matta>

common enemies when it is used to create a sense the role of common enemies in speech on religious issues that have contributed to religious tension, conflict and even violence in Indonesia. It will select the most representative and most frequently used key terms from religiously related speeches and other texts containing the portrayal of common enemies. Using Burke's theories of identification, this paper will explain the important roles of common enemies in group unity and in achieving certain objectives. Additionally, it will explain the significant contribution of religious rhetoric of common enemies in creating of solidarity among the potentially conflicting groups.³

B. Communication and the Identification of Common Enemies

In his book *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1969), Kenneth Burke uses the term "identification" in his attempt to depart from the traditional theory of communication which emphasizes "persuasion." For Burke, the complexities of human communication cannot solely be viewed as persuasion which suggests overt and deliberate efforts to influence a specifically targeted audience. Burke explains that identification as a fundamental process in human communication arise out of division (disagreement, differences, diversity, misunderstanding, etc.), because humans are naturally separate beings since birth and, therefore, strive for identification (with e.g. families or other groups), through communication, in order to overcome division and separateness.

In addition to our biological separateness, we are also trapped in our man-made social, political, economic, ethnic and even religious divisiveness, where we struggle for identification throughout our lives. Ironically, our effort of association or identification also creates dis-identification or division. For example, an effort to identify ourselves with a particular religion will consequently separate us from certain other groups. This is the ambiguity we have to experience for being separate from yet, at the same time, united with others; or as Burke,⁴ asserted, humans are "both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another."

³ George Cheney "The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational Communication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 69, 1983, pp. 143-158.

⁴ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motive*, p. 21.

Furthermore, Burke asserts that language use creates and, at the same time, relies on hierarchies, which become the basis for human struggle to move up to a higher level of knowledge and of life. Upward movement is enabled by using language as “the negative.” Language as the negative not only allows humans to make relationships between ideas and symbols that are not related (such as labeling things that they are not), but also enables people to creatively negate what has been accepted as the standards and perceived as the truth. The process of negating and criticizing the conventional standards, and the effort to create new values and principles within this socially constructed hierarchical framework, provides humans with a cycle of order and disorder. According to Burke’s⁵ theory of Logology, this order-disorder cycle is realized in the form of “order/law-guilt-purification.” This cycle constitutes a sense of failure (sin/guilt) or inability to follow the order which leads to humans’ endeavor toward improvement and perfection (purification through redemption), thus, creating a new perfect order. At one point, however, this phase will be perceived as “not perfect enough” (creating guilt for not following the new perfect order/law); thus, people will restart the cycle toward the next ultimate perfection. This is the root of Burke’s idea of purification, i.e. sacrifice and scapegoating the sins, evils, and any source of ills and contamination, which is central in most if not all religion.

Perhaps Burke’s greatest writing of rhetorical criticism is his analysis of Hitler’s “*Mein Kampf*” (My Battle), reprinted in “The Philosophy of Literary Form” where he revealed that Hitler’s thought was similar to patterns of religious thought or cults’ way of thinking.⁶ Here, Burke analyzed Hitler’s communicative strategies to persuade the German population to follow his thoughts, where he confronted the German people with the common enemies, identifying the Aryan race as the constructive and the good versus the Jews as the destructive and the evil. According to Burke, Hitler not only successfully portrayed the Jews as the devils but also blamed the Jews for all

⁵ Kenneth Burke *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology*, (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1970), p. 21.

⁶ Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1973).

the ills and suffering of the German people. This way, Hitler made the Jews as the perfect scapegoat that should be eliminated for the wellbeing and success of the Aryan or German race. The antithesis of good vs. evil and us vs. them that are significant in Burke's theory and his analysis of Hitler's speeches are applicable to any speech that can incite human conflict.

This theory and analysis of identification and purification fit well in describing the communicative strategies of various religious speech in Indonesia as well as in the world today. Religious rhetoric is direct and overt in its motive and attitude as well as in its efforts of identification and dis-identification. In religious speech, there are blunt uses of anti-thesis: good and evil, rewards and punishments, and ultimately believers and non-believers as well as the faithful and the infidels. This identification not only affirms the separation between particular groups of religious followers from any other groups, but also points to certain other groups as the common enemies and threats. In its pursuit of the ultimate perfection, religions are filled with speech and rituals of purification in different forms. Purification is not only of sins, but also of any evils, including any individuals, groups, or institutions that may contaminate or threaten their religious beliefs and teaching which are often linked to their wellbeing. Therefore, Burke's theory confirms that human communication and especially religious communication is filled with the rhetoric of identification and purification involving confrontation against common enemies that in Indonesia have created tension, conflicts, and even violence.

Whether stated overtly or covertly, portrayal of common enemies is central in most religiously related speech, such that, no religious speech can avoid confronting its followers against the established enemies, be it Satan, sin, or even other religious groups. Other religious groups are commonly portrayed as common enemies, at least indirectly, because each religious group or sect is in competition with each other not only in trying to gain followers, but also in convincing its members of their uniquely right faith and their claims of specific truth. As religious tension, conflict, and violence have been part of human life since the existence of religions, a religious and plural nation such as Indonesia is a fertile ground for various discourses of identification and purification with depictions of common enemies.

C. The Religious Rhetoric of Identification, Purification and Common Enemies in Indonesia

While portrayal of common enemies is rampant in much religious speech, many of the commonly practiced portrayals of common enemies that may have shaped the audience awareness of the source of their life challenges may not necessarily lead to real conflicts. In addition, much of the speech containing common enemies and antithesis of good and evils may not be deemed representative of discourses that have led to conflicts. For the purpose of this study, therefore, I will focus on portrayed common enemy terms contained in speech, comments and/or documents that have incited controversies, tensions, and/or real conflicts. That is, rather than beginning with the speech which may or may not be the real perpetrator of the conflicts, this discussion of rhetoric of identification, purification, and common enemies will begin with the conflicts that have occurred and then trace back the discourses that have helped generated or worsen these conflicts.

Indonesia has been long known as a majority Muslim country with highly tolerant and peaceful religious groups. However, after the fall of the Suharto regime and especially quite recently, there has been increasing movements of Islamic conservatism and even radicalism in Indonesia. The government has been warned about this danger of polarization between the very moderate and the very radicals that can create unending conflicts. However, despite continuous and even increasing tension and conflicts, no significant step has been taken to deal with this challenging issue.⁷

Based on recent religiously related incidents in Indonesia, these conflicts include the tension and conflicts: (1) between moderate liberal and the conservative radical religious groups,⁸ e.g. Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and the

⁷ Abdurrahman Wahid, *An Illusion of Islamic State: Expansion of Transnational Islamic Movement in Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009). E-book in <http://www.libforall.org/media/press-releases/Illusion-of-an-Islamic-State-English-Excerpts.pdf>.

⁸ It can be challenging to categorize the various conflicting religious groups in Indonesia, where the most liberal versus the most radically conservatives tend to be in opposition, while the moderate and the conservatives often agree or disagree with each other depending on the controversial issues. For the purpose of this study, the various groups will be categorized into two camps that tend to disagree with each other on most controversial issues; i.e. moderate liberal versus conservative radical, with the understanding the many conflicting religious groups discussed in this paper may fall into the category of in between the liberal and the radical.

National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion (AKKBB) and sometimes GP *Ansor*⁹ versus the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and, sometimes, *Hizbut Tahrir* Indonesia (HTI) and, occasionally, IslamicUlema Forum (FUUI); (2) between conservative radical groups and minority sects of Islam, e.g. FPI versus the Ahmadiyah sect and Shi'i minority; as well as (3) between majority and minority religious groups, e.g. Muslims versus Christians. This study will only look at some of the conflicting groups that have been engaged in conflicts that most frequently made the national news.

D. Conservative Radical versus Moderate Liberal

The most commonly occurring conflicts in Indonesia can be globally categorized into conflicts between conservative radicals and moderate liberals, and these two camps are, at least most recently, best represented by the conflicts involving HTI,¹⁰ FUUI,¹¹ and FPI¹² versus JIL¹³ and multi-groups of AKKBB.¹⁴ These groups have been involved in several conflicts discursively as well as physically. While the discursive battle is widespread and will go on for a long time, the famous conflict that involved physical clashes took place in Jakarta, and are known as the Monas (national monument) clash involving FPI, where AKKBB and JIL members were severely injured.¹⁵ This conflict

⁹ GP Ansor (the youth wing of NU) also declared an anti-Islamic Radicalism movement. <http://www.voaindonesia.com/content/gp-ansor-deklarasikan-gerakan-anti-islam-radikal/1416778.html>

¹⁰ HTI or *HizbutTahrir* (*Party of Liberation*) of Indonesia is the Indonesian chapter of an international pan-Islamic political organization whose goal is that all Muslim countries unifying as an Islamic State (caliphate) ruled by Syaria (Islamic law) with a *caliph as the* head of state.

¹¹ FUUI stands for *Forum UlamaUmat Indonesia*, or the Indonesian Forum of Muslims Ulema. To learn more about its mission and rhetoric please see, for example: <http://fuui.wordpress.com/>

¹² FPI is an Islamic hardliner mass organization headquartered in Jakarta known for its violent actions against anything considered bluntly immoral in defense of Islamic conservatism.

¹³ JIL is Liberal Islam Network consisting of a groups of writers and scholars who are actively engaged in various forms of discussion on Islamic liberalism in Indonesia with the purpose of countering the radicalism of Islam in Indonesia with its official description as "a community for the study of Islamic discourse on Islamic vision that is tolerant, open and supportive for strengthening Indonesian democratization."

¹⁴ AKKBB is an alliance made up of several organizations that are concerned about freedom of religions and any faiths. It campaigns to end violence in the name of religions and oppression against minorities who practice different religions.

¹⁵ Monas incident were widely discussed and reported in various major Indonesian media, including *Kompas*, e.g. <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/06/01/19291646/insiden.monas.fpi.masih.tutup.mulut> And *The Jakarta Post*, e.g. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/04/police-arrest-fpi-members-over-monas-incident.html>. On June 1, 2008 members of FPI attacked

seems to be confined to longtime tension between JIL and FPI, when in fact this conflict also represents the complexity of major and prevalent conflicts and tension between moderate liberal and conservative radical Muslims in Indonesia. There are many speeches, comments, and publication that show the tension and conflicts between the two groups which contain key terms commonly used to identify each other indirectly, sarcastically, and bluntly. One of representative speeches containing most frequently used key terms of common enemies can be found in an interview with Munarwan, the FPI Commander, who bluntly and directly identified AKKBB and liberal Islamic groups including JIL as the common enemies. He used common enemy terms that most Indonesians are familiar with, since they can be found in numerous religious speeches in Indonesia.¹⁶ His speeches also contain terms related to hate speech that are also rampantly used among the conflicting religious groups in Indonesia to attack each other, but do directly label certain other groups as common enemies.¹⁷ There are many terms used to point at common enemies, but the most common and representative ones include: “*kafir*” (infidel); “*antek Zionist*,” “*imperialis Barat*”¹⁸ (accomplice or henchman of Zionist and the imperialist West), “*sesat*” (heretic) and “*haram*” (the forbidden). These key terms can be found in many speeches that are effective in stirring attitude and views of the majority Indonesian Muslims against any outside threads and are the terms commonly used to accuse those who are against the Islamic faith and values in Indonesia and perhaps in the world.

The term “*kafir*,” which basically means non-believer or infidel, not only can lead to exclusion as social punishments, but also can be used as a punitive term such as the term PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), a party that was banned and many of its members murdered during the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁹

activists from AKKBB injuring some 70 activists. This took place during a peaceful rally commemorating the birth of the nation’s ideology of *Pancasila*, in support of the Indonesian pluralism, and in defense minority groups including of Ahmadiyah.

¹⁶ One of the clear portrayals of common enemies can be seen, for example in an interview with Mr. Munarman of FPI concerning AKKBB in <http://dhymas.wordpress.com/indonesiaku/akbb-antek-zionis>.

¹⁷ For a list of hate speech terms, please see, for example: <http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/csc1203-fpi-hate-speech.pdf>

¹⁸ Sometimes “*antek Barat*” is used, which already implies that is also the imperialist.

¹⁹ The Radical Muslims labeled JIL as “*kafir*” that is worse than PKI. <http://www.satamedia.info/2012/03/ustadz-baasyir-jil-kafir-lebih-bahaya.html#.UWsv2LWG28A>

Labeling any individual or groups as “*kafir*” not only stripped them from their Islamic identity, but in many cases also subjected them to expulsion from the community, because they are viewed as having defamed religion, one of the worse transgressions in Islam, and, therefore, are in some cases punishable according to the law.²⁰ While there is a debate among Muslims themselves as to whether or not non-Muslims are considered *kafir*, people without faith and religion are definitely labeled as “*kafir*.” On the other hand, the term “*kafir*” has also become a buzz word, which is used by various Muslims and other religious groups to insult or attack each other, which create or worsen the conflicts among themselves.²¹

“*Antek Zionist*” or “*Accomplice of Zionist*” that usually refers to different individuals or organizations secretly assisting or are being used to expand the influence and power of Jewish movement not only in establishing and expanding its homeland but also all over the world. Labeling anyone or group as “*antek Zionist*” is identifying them as the long time worst enemy of Islam and Muslims in the world. Not surprisingly PKS successfully used this term to stir the emotion of its cadres to a commonly known enemy, away from the internal problem of the party.

“*Antek Zionist*” has been effectively used in many religious speeches and mass media and is usually used interchangeably with the term “*antek Barat*” referring mostly to the US that has been commonly associated with Zionist. But “*antek Barat*” has a wider connotation and is commonly used by conservative radicals to label moderate liberals, for at least two reasons. *First*, the moderate and liberals are accused of embracing views, principles, and ideologies invented and practiced by the Western nations especially the US. Debates on basic issues ranging from democracy and human rights to emancipation and religious freedom as well as, quite recently, pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, usually separate the moderate liberals that mostly agree with these principles from conservative radical that mostly disagree with them. *Second*, the conservative radical groups tend to associate the other

²⁰ See a case of religious blasphemy for being an atheist: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/14/minang-atheist-sentenced-25-years-prison.html>

²¹ See for example a discussion among Muslims on the use of the word “*mengkafirkan*” (to label someone as “*kafir*”): <http://www.voa-islam.com/islamia/jihad/2013/01/06/22640/mujahid-gampang-mengkafirkan-telah-merusak-dakwah-dan-jihad/>

groups as pro-western not only due to their views, principles, and theories using the Western sources for and methods of interpretation and analysis, but also some of the moderate liberal groups are accused of receiving supports, often in the form of funding from organizations linked to western nations or the USA.²² AKKBB and JIL fall into this category of groups depicted as “*antek Barat*”, thus, identifying AKKBB and JIL as common enemies of Indonesian Muslims.

The depiction of moderate and liberal groups such as AKKBB and JIL is also enhanced by to the discourse of the conservative Indonesian Council Ulema (MUI) when it issued a fatwa (edict) against liberalism, pluralism, secularism, perceived to be Western values that are embraced by the moderate and the liberals. From the other side, the moderates and the liberals continue their publications and discussions on various forums fostering liberalism, pluralism, and secularism. While the resulting conflicts are not necessarily physical clashes between, for example, JIL and FPI, there was death threat against Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a JIL co-founder;²³ there were several physical attacks involving members of JIL, such as the Monas clash mentioned above; and there were also several other intimidations by the radical groups.²⁴

E. The Conservative Radicals and Minority Islamic Sects

In addition to “*kafir*”, one of the most common key terms that points to common enemy and creates or escalates conflicts is the term “*sesat*” (heretic, deviant) or “*aliransesat*” (heretic group/sect). Once the public is convinced that a group is labeled as “*sesat*,” criticism, anger, insults, and threats spread through various public discussion and religious speeches that often led to

²² There are several speeches, writings, and forums discussing the link between the West (USA) and progressive Islamic groups in Indonesia including JIL, confirming the common enemy key terms used, i.e. JIL and other progressive groups are “*antekimperialis Barat*,” because they receive supports and funding from among others, Asia Foundation. <http://aidctranslate.wordpress.com/2009/02/10/jil-cia-asia-foundation-rancak-serang-muslim-indonesia/>

²³ Islamic Ulema Forum (FUUI) of West Java in 2003 issued a fatwa, or edict, ordering Ulil's death just a year after he wrote a supposedly “heretical” opinion column titled “Rejuvenating Islamic Understanding” for *Kompas*. <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/bomb-target-ulil-once-had-fatwa-on-his-head/429307>

²⁴ See for example, the incident of IshardManji's book tour, in <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/05/groups-denounce-irshad-manji-incident.html>

violent attacks. And throughout the religious history of Indonesia, there have been numerous incidents against those who are labeled “*sesat*”; since 1989, MUI has issued edicts confirming several groups as heretics.²⁵ JIL is one of those listed by MUI as “*sesat*,” partly because JIL is a strong supporter of pluralism including protection for religious minorities such as those who are considered “*sesat*.”

One of the sects labeled as “*sesat*,” whose religious freedom was defended by, among others, JIL and AKKBB, is *Ahmadiyah*.²⁶ Since its arrival in Indonesia, some mainstream Islamic religious leaders have denounced *Ahmadiyah* and its teachings as ‘deviant’. Most prominent among its opponents is the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) which issued a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) against *Ahmadiyah* in 1980 and again in 2005. Many radical Islamic groups continue to express their opposition against *Ahmadiyah* in the form of demonstrations and violent attacks. After violent attacks against the *Ahmadiyah* sects, there are always speeches and formal documents published by governments or religious institution that confirm the fact that *Ahmadiyah* is heretic and deviant.²⁷

The portrayal of *Ahmadiyah* as the common enemy by labeling it as heretic and deviant (*sesat*) are well documented in the increasing number of provincial and district regulations that seek to ban *Ahmadiyah*, with at least 40 district or provincial governments passing bans on the group’s activities since the 1970s. Decrees and regulation portraying *Ahmadiyah* as common enemy obviously only led to increasing violence from three incidents in 2006 to 50 in 2010, according to the Setara Institute, a non-governmental group that monitors religious freedom.²⁸ This confirms that depiction of common enemies (in speeches or decrees) is the same as incitement of conflicts and worse deadly attacks.

²⁵ See, for example: <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2007/11/02/055110679/MUI-Ada-9-Aliran-Sesat>

²⁶ *Ahmadiyah* or *Ahmadiyahya* is an Islamic reformist movement founded in India by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) who believed in the Day of Judgment as predicted by various religions and bring about the final triumph of Islam as per Islamic prophecy. He claimed to be he was the divine reformer and the promised Messiah promised to Muslims. The history of the spread of *Ahmadiyah* in Indonesia began in the 1920’s.

²⁷ For one of the most widely published attacks by FPI against *Ahmadiyah*, see, for example: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/mob-hits-mosque-in-latest-attack-on-ahmadiyah/498848>

²⁸ See Setara Institute Report in <http://www.setara-institute.org/en/content/report-freedom-religion-and-belief-2010-0> and <http://www.setara-institute.org/en/content/indonesia-revoke-provincial-decrees-ban-faith>

Ahmadiyah is not alone. A Shia group in Sampang, Madura, East Java, was also a victim of the common enemy labeling. Branded as “*sesat*” by local political leaders, government agents, and/or the majority Indonesian Muslims not only resulted in the “heretics” as a common enemy, but also become a justification for conservative radical group to spread hatred and conduct violent attack, with limited or no police interference and even ending with the perpetrator of the attacks being vindicated.²⁹

F. Majority versus Minority Religious Groups

One of the most prominent and widely published reports of religious tension and conflicts has been between Muslim and Christian groups that took place between 1999 and 2002, killing about 5000 people. While sporadic tension and conflicts still occur until today in that region, there has been difficult to solve conflicts between the two religious groups in western Indonesia metropolitan areas, especially in West Java that mostly centers on the closure of churches.³⁰

The hatred between these conflicting groups can also be traced through the key term of common enemy that is frequently used to identify other groups, i.e. “*kafir*”. It is not only used in online discussion forums, but also in formally recorded speeches. For example, one of the blunt identification using “*kafir*” took place during the election of political leaders when one of the candidates was a Christian Chinese. As a Christian candidate was more likely to win the election of the Jakarta vice governorship, the labeling of “*kafir*” became more intense. Indonesia’s most popular singer, Rhoma Irama gave sermons in a number of the capital’s mosques, warning against voting for a “*kafir*.” Even, the House speaker, Marzuki Alie, stated that any Jakartan Muslims voting for a non-Muslim was also a “*kafir*” and MUI in Medan mobilized an anti-*kafir* vote.³¹

²⁹ See an example of a report on the worse attack against Shia in Sampang, Madura, East Java: <http://dawn.com/2012/12/10/indonesian-shias-persecuted-as-heretics-live-in-limbo/> and see <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/surabaya-court-acquits-rois-in-sampang-shiite-attack/586098>

³⁰ For more information on the legal dispute and the conflicts between the two religious groups, see, among others: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/26/gki-yasmin-filadelfia-churches-another-christmas-persecution.html>

³¹ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/09/18/anti-kafir-politics-local-elections-jakarta-and-medan-cases.html>

Christians are often associated with the Jews, which led to labeling them as "Zionist".³² Frequently portrayed as common enemies, some Christian groups are discriminated and sometimes intimidated and attacked.³³ The discourse also points to this common enemy as contaminants of Islamic faith, as shown in the rhetoric of purification when, for example, banners and discussions on the prohibition of Muslims from sending their children to Christian Schools³⁴ as well MUI's fatwa or edict on forbidding Muslims from wish "Merry Christmas" to Christians.³⁵ This discourse of faith contaminant urges purification of faith that not surprisingly, inspires sermons that provide justification to intimidate and in some cases even attack this portrayed source of ills.³⁶ Another term commonly used to label actions that contaminate the clean liness of faith is "*haram*" (forbidden). Although in many cases it is used to label consumption of the forbidden (not kosher) foods, the terms are also used to label actions that can contaminate faith such as sending children to different religious schools, attending different religious ceremonies, or joining inter-religious group prayers.

G. Uniting Indonesian Religious Group against Common Enemies

Based on the theory that identification where terms of identification and common enemies can create unity,³⁷ the depiction of common enemies in religious speech can focus on the enemies of all religions, by emphasizing the similarities of the goals of all religious groups in Indonesia and avoid portraying any religious group as an enemy to build tolerance and peaceful relationship. Religious speech in many forms has portrayed common enemies

³² See a discussion on the enemy of Islam in, for example: <http://syiarislam.wordpress.com/2012/09/13/musuh-islam-yang-utama-adalah-yahudi-dan-nasrani/>

³³ Se, for example, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/02/08/intolerance-greater-jakarta-increases.html>

³⁴ <http://annis-nurul.blogspot.com/2010/09/hukum-jual-beli-jangkrik-hukum-masuk.html>

³⁵ <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/merry-xmas-not-for-muslims-conservatives-insist/562695>

³⁶ <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/asia-pacific/2012/08/201281863111986193.html>

³⁷ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motive*; Cheney, "The Rhetoric of Identification..."; Ysseldyk, Renate; Matheson, Kimberly; & Anisman, Hymie, "Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion from a Social Identity Perspective," *Personality & Social Psychology Review*. February, vol. 14 no. 1, 2010, pp. 60-7.

that can unite them. One example of such rhetoric can be seen in a speech by Din Syamsudin, a Muhammadiyah leader when he stated: *"Musuh bersama umat beragama bukanlah pemeluk agama lain, tetapi masalah-masalah umat manusia dan kemanusiaan, seperti kemiskinan, kebodohan, keterbelakangan, kesenjangan, ketidakadilan dan kekerasan"* (The enemies of religious group members are not the other religious groups, but the problems of humanity such as poverty, backwardness, the disparity or gaps, injustice and violence).³⁸ In addition to "violence," other religious leaders frequently mentioned "corruption" as the common enemies.³⁹ Another term that can be used to unite various religious groups would be "terrorism". Although "terrorism" can be used to attack other religious group as common enemies, a prominent leader of one of the largest Islamic groups in Indonesia supported the idea that "terrorism" is the enemy of all religious groups.⁴⁰ Another term that has been used as common enemy in many sermons of different religious groups is *"narkoba"* (illegal drugs).⁴¹

In addition to uniting various groups against common enemy, these groups can also identify with each other by focusing on common goals. This can be realized through religious humanitarian activities, such as helping the poor or those who are suffering from a natural disaster. This may be an interesting opportunity for peace-building, because even the supposedly radical Islamic group like FPI can also participate.⁴²

Emphasizing similar goals of various religious groups and having the same common enemies might help build tolerance and peaceful relationship. However, such speeches are often overshadowed by statements, governmental decrees, and fatwas or edicts that make a clear separation. These include those

³⁸<http://www.rmol.co/read/2011/11/23/46627/Din-Syamsuddin-Musuh-Bersama-Kita-Bukan-Umat-Agama-Lain>

³⁹ See, for example: <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/12/13/21145991/>

⁴⁰ The head of Nahdatul Ulama (PBNU) KH Said Agil Siradj suggested that all Muslims and the Indonesian society should make "terrorism" as the common enemy: <http://id.berita.yahoo.com/ketua-pbnu-jadikan-terorisme-musuh-bersama-012007449.html>

⁴¹ See, for example, <http://www.ujungpandangekspres.co/kapolda-nyatakan-narkoba-musuh-bersama/>

⁴² Despite the fact that FPI is known for its intimidating speeches and sometimes violent actions, its members were also active in assisting the victim of Jakarta flood of 2012. <http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesiana/2013/01/19/22817/salut-21-posko-fpi-masih-bertahan-melayani-bantuan-korban-banjir/>

that label certain groups as “*sesat*” (heretics) and “*kafir*” (infidel), as well as acts of tolerance that are considered “*haram*” (religiously forbidden). For example, although controversial and many disagree, MUI consider interreligious group prayers as “*haram*.”⁴³ Unfortunately, in most cases the victims of intimidation and violent attacks are blamed, as shown in the comments and decrees condemning the victims.⁴⁴

H. Conclusion

The rhetoric of common enemies has always been part of religious speech due to the importance of antithesis: good versus evil, heaven versus hell, believer versus non-believer that ascertains the separateness a particular religious group from the others, due to the belief that one’s religion is the only “true” one. While it is important for the discourse of religious identification to strengthen faith and unites each group, this kind of rhetoric has led to identification of common enemies that, in turn leads to conflicts among some religious groups in Indonesia.

There are many different terms that are used to point to common enemies, but the most frequently used ones that have been parts of the discursive as well as physical conflicts as well as violence in the Indonesian religious interactions include: “*kafir*”, “*sesat*,” “*antek Zionist*” and “*haram*.” The minority groups under threads that are commonly labeled as “*kafir*” and “*sesat*” include the liberal and critical groups such as JIL and the Islamic sect considered heretics such as *Ahmadiyah*. In addition, the term “*kafir*” is also frequently used to label non-Muslims including Christians. The term “*antek Zionist*” or just “*Zionist*” is used to label critical liberal groups such as JIL due to embracing western humanistic views of religions as well as Christians because, among others, they are associated with Judaism. Finally, the term

⁴³ See for example, <http://news.detik.com/read/2005/08/07/173236/417601/10/sby-pertanyakan-fatwa-mui-soal-pengharaman-doa-bersama?nd771108bcj>

⁴⁴ See for example, how Christian minority groups are blamed after being attacks: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/02/minister-christians-bring-discrimination-themselves.html>

<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/26/gki-yasmin-filadelfia-churches-another-christmas-persecution.html>

and how the attacked *Ahmadiyah* and other minority groups are blamed: <http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/religious-deviancy-and-law>

"haram" is commonly used to identify actions, such as inter-religious prayers and wishing Merry Christmas, that are forbidden and can influence one's faith.

Different groups, such as AKKBB, JIL, and GP Ansor, are fighting for the protection of any groups considered *"kafir"*, *"sesat"*, and *"antek Zionist"*, and those doing anything *"haram,"* but is very difficult without the support of the government and the police, because being identified as common enemies and contaminants can be sacrificed for the purity of the majority and dominant religious groups. While secular groups can also use common enemy terms to create identification and confront common enemies to create conflicts (Cavanaugh, 2009), the religious common enemy terms mentioned above are also commonly used by the secular group in political arena to win votes.

Religions and its key terms for common enemies may be used for different groups to create hatred and wars against the depicted enemy such as in the case of Hitler's speech (Burke, 1973). However, Burke (1969) describes that the rhetoric of identification can also be used to create unity, for example, by confronting the Indonesian potentially conflicting groups against a common enemy. This has been done when Indonesian religious leaders pointed to common enemy terms such as "corruption", "illegal drugs", and "terrorism," as the common enemies of all religions. Focusing on these enemies that are common to all religious groups may help reduce conflicts and strengthen peaceful inter-religious relationship, unless there are leaders, groups, or government agents that focus on the rhetoric of purification and have no interest in tolerating the existence of diverse religious groups in Indonesia.[w]

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