Muhammadiyah and Civil Society: Critical Network, Patterns of Criticism, and Challenges

Ozi Setiadi*  
1Islamic Political Thought Study Program, Faculty of Islamic Da’wa and Communication, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Kudus, Kudus, Indonesia

Abstract

Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization that aims to form a charitable civil society and has a productive and independent network from the state. Muhammadiyah carries out a critical function in carrying out checks and balances for the state. This is done by using the criticality network. This study discusses critical networks, patterns of spreading criticism, and challenges for Muhammadiyah. This research is library research with a qualitative approach. The data collection technique used is a literature study, which is strengthened by interviews with related elements. The results of this study indicate that Muhammadiyah’s critical network is divided into two, namely formal and non-formal networks. The pattern of spreading criticism is in the form of a pyramid. Nevertheless, Muhammadiyah faces challenges such as the exclusivity of thought, accommodation to “progressive” institutions affiliated with Muhammadiyah, and debates over concepts that are generally born from the womb of Western thought. This research shows that Muhammadiyah as civil society has a productive network to carry out checks and balances to the state. As a developing civil society, it still has challenges to overcome.

Muhammadiyah adalah ormas Islam yang memiliki tujuan membentuk masyarakat madani yang beramal, memiliki jaringan yang produktif dan mandiri dari negara. Muhammadiyah menjalankan fungsi kritis dalam melakukan check and balances bagi negara. Hal ini dilakukan dengan menggunakan jaringan kritisismenya. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membahas jaringan kritis, pola, penyebaran kritisisme, dan

Keywords: civil society; Muhammadiyah; critical network

Introduction

Muhammadiyah is a civil society with an important role in carrying out checks and balances against the state. It can carry out criticism with the support of its critical network. Muhammadiyah makes several efforts to carry out these checks and balances. Muhammadiyah made an effort known as constitutional jihad. Muhammadiyah has challenged laws, including Law Number 24 of 1999 concerning the Foreign Exchange Traffic System and Exchange Rate System, Law Number 25 of 2007 concerning Investment, and Law Number 30 of 2009 concerning Electricity. It was done after Muhammadiyah won a lawsuit against Law No. 22 of 2001 on Oil and Gas and Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources (SDA). As a result, as a consequence of the Constitutional Court's decision, BP Migas was dissolved (Haq, 2015).

Baidhawy said that what Muhammadiyah did could be seen from at least two things. First, in the political field, Muhammadiyah has utilized the public sphere and public opinion to democratize the state and public institutions, regulate moderation and decency in diversity, and influence the direction of state policy. Second, in the economic sphere, and economic welfare through the development of religious-social philan-
thropy; to represents himself as an articulator and advocate for the benefit of marginalized people, and building a healthy business for social welfare (Baidhawy, 2015, pp. 69–91). Alfian further mentions that Muhammadiyah’s political behavior is changing in Indonesian politics. The political variations of Muhammadiyah, especially during the colonial period, can be divided into three. Firstly, the attitude of anti-establishment and anti-colonialism. Secondly, the attitude of Muhammadiyah in the Indonesian nationalist movement. Thirdly, the rise of Muhammadiyah to carry out active and independent activities in Indonesian Muslims (Alfian, 2010, pp. 289–392). Therefore, jihad is a phenomenon that arises in the context of criticism of the state.

In addition to ensuring that it is a civil society, Muhammadiyah prioritizes its obligations toward religion, as stated by Eunsook Jung. For Jung, Muhammadiyah places religious and social obligations above political interests. He also said that religious organizations are not static in the face of political change. They adapt to a changing environment (Jung, 2014, pp. 73–86). As for Syamsuddin, Muhammadiyah carried out pluralistic assimilation or tolerance of Islamic puritanism. Muhammadiyah also has a strategy in building awareness of multiculturalism, which is closer to cultural treasures.

This study discusses the critical network of Muhammadiyah as a civil society. Muhammadiyah’s critical thinking ability is a characteristic born of independence, productive networks, and self-reliance, brotherhood. In line with what was stated by Western and Muslim thinkers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Jhon Locke, and Ernest Gellner, and Ryaas Rasyid, AS. Hikam, Azyumardi Azra, and Sukron Kamil. According to them, civil society has characteristics that make it independent and not dependent on the state (Setiadi, 2013, pp. 25–30). Therefore, this research is unique by examining more deeply the criticism network owned by Muhammadiyah.

This research will discuss the Muhammadiyah critical network. The theory used in this research is the theory of civil society. Research on the Muhammadiyah critical network is essential to understand how the criticism carried out by Muhammadiyah towards the state. Because as a
civil society, it must not lose its criticism in monitoring and criticizing the state.

This research is classified as library research. However, this research uses field research and library research as data collection. Primary data were obtained from the results of the 46th and 47th Muhammadiyah congresses which were corroborated by interviews with the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership and Public Policy Institute (PP) and the General Secretary of the Muhammadiyah Central Executive, Prof. Dr. H. Abdul Mu'ti, M.Ed. Secondary data were obtained from books and journals that discussed civil society, especially those related to Muhammadiyah.

Civil Society Concept

Civil society is taken from two directions of "science mecca", namely from the West learning about new political ideas and modern science and the East learning about the Islamic reformer movement and the idea of how to liberate Islam from the shackles of ancient traditions and colonial rule. Aristotle (384-322 BC) understood civil society by using the term koinonia polit (Jb & Darmawan, 2016). This term means the political community as a forum where citizens are directly involved in various economic-political activities and decision-making. Keane calls this term synonymous with the state or political society (Spurk, 2015). Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) used civil society to mean the domination of one community over another (Rosyada et al., 2000, p. 142). It means that in the life of the nation and state, there will always be an organized society that dominates, both in terms of economic, political, human, and natural resources (Wibowo, 2011, pp. 27–35).

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 AD) and John Locke (1632-1704 AD) used the term social contract (Suhelmi, 2004, pp. 165–174 & 181–205). Civil society results from a social contract between people for a specific purpose. He is a protector from afraid people who need protection for their possessions (Suhelmi, 2004). Civil society protects individuals,
especially their rights and property, from state and arbitrary intervention. Civil society must be understood as an independent institution separate from the state (Spurk, 2015).

Adam Ferguson in 1767 emphasized the ethical vision that exists in social life. According to him, the industrial revolution and capitalism appeared in socio-cultural and political changes, especially in Scotland. That change is the stark difference between the public and the individual. In short, the Ferguson Essay, sees civil society (which means human civilization) as the result of progressive evolutionary development (Graham, 2013, p. 514). Thomas Pain (1792) defines civil society as a group that has a diametrical position towards the state, and even tends to be antithetical to the state (Kenny, 2016). Bratton explains two opinions of these thinkers who assert that civil society is not only seen as a state-oriented concept, but also acts as a limit to its power and sometimes even negates it (Spurk, 2015).

G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831 AD) defined civil society as an ideological element. The ideological element is a dominant class that dominates other classes. Hegel sees everything as a result of dialectics. This dialectic starts from the thesis-antithesis and then produces a synthesis. The synthesis then becomes the thesis and met with the antithesis until an absolute idea was reached. One of the examples taken by Hegel was about the state. He called the state an "absolute spirit", thus sanctifying the state and considering the state as a "step of God" on earth (Suhelmi, 2004) Civil society in Hegel's view is structural or part of the state itself.

Alexis de 'Tocqueville (1805-1859 AD) understood civil society as a counterweight to state power. Furthermore, citizens will be able to exercise control over state power because of the capabilities and capacities of civil society. For Tocqueville, presenting civil society as a network of non-political social organizations will strengthen democracy (Fitria & Sutrisnowati, 2013, p. 15). He introduced the idea of enabling civil society to engage in power. This involvement limits state power and guarantees the community's creative energy, but outside the state and still in community activism (Kastrati, 2016, p. 65).
In Indonesia, Muhammad AS. Hikam argues that civil society is a society that occupies space and is independent from the state. Civil society is more flexible in its dealings with the state. Moreover, when faced with common interests, civil society can become partners for the state (Hikam, 2000, p. 82). Ryaas Rasyid argues that civil society consists of the state's productive and autonomous (independent) networks. This network can connect civil society with production sources that enable civil society to meet their needs. In addition to politeness and fraternity as stated by Sukron Kamil (Kamil, 2013, p. 130).

Azyumardi Azra believes that many civil society in Indonesia are based on religion, especially Islam. They consist of community organizations engaged in philanthropy and social humanity. Azra calls it an Islamic-based civil society (Azra, 2020). Meanwhile, Masykuri Abdillah said that civil society manifests independence from the state and various values in people's lives, such as justice, equality, freedom, and pluralism (Jenuri, 2016, p. 2). It means that civil society in the view of Islamic scholars initially had a close relationship with the state. Although later it developed which showed that civil society not only positioned itself as an opposition to the state, but also could be a partner for the state.

**Muhammadiyah's Critical Network Pattern**

Muhammadiyah has two networks, namely formal networks and informal networks. Muhammadiyah’s informal network focuses on ethical values in interacting. Muhammadiyah interacts based on morality formed through the culture of religious people in Indonesia. This is in line with Azyumardi Azra's opinion that Muhammadiyah is a subculture within the national cultural order (Azra, 2004, p. 135). Muhammadiyah puts forward ethical and aesthetic values.

Muhammadiyah shows the diversity of Muslims in it. The formal and informal networks that exist in Muhammadiyah prove the relationship between civil society and Islam. Muhammadiyah emphasizes the existence of democracy, volunteerism, and the balance of power for the balance
between the state and society. The presence of Muhammadiyah as a civil society has become a pillar of democracy enforcement. It has the ability to be a partner, as well as a balancer, and provide oversight for the state.

Long before the Muhammadiyah institution was formed, Ahmad Dahlan prioritized the informal network aspect in responding to the normative text of the Koran contained in the letter Al Ma'un (Rahardjo, 2010, p. 2). Thus, informal networks are very fundamental in the process of the founding of Muhammadiyah, and its development until now. This network was formed on the basis of a common ideology, namely the ideology of Islam, which was later adopted from the thoughts of many Muslim figures. Azra argued that the root of Muhammadiyah's ideology stems from the thought of Ibn Thaimiyah (Azra, 2004). Therefore, this shared ideological vision and mission causes Muhammadiyah to become a large organization in quantity.

Meanwhile, the formal network of Muhammadiyah is structured from central, regional to branch management. If the informal Muhammadiyah network is formed through oral, written, and non-formal communication patterns, then the Muhammadiyah formal network is just the opposite. Formal networks are structured in a formal form like institutional institutions in general. Moreover, this formal network shows the systematization of the position of Islam within Muhammadiyah. Islam is a religion as well as a principle and ideology for Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah calls it a “religion of civilization” (din al-hadārah) (PP Muhammadiyah, 2015, p. 64). Islam stands very firmly in the body of Muhammadiyah, from the principles to the goals of Muhammadiyah, one of which is towards a truly Islamic society.

The chart above shows that there are formal networks, arrangements, and patterns of communication and intervention in Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah is well established in terms of organization. The mechanism has been confirmed and implemented in a professional and orderly manner. However, the problems that can be seen from the chart above are centralization and decentralization. Fortunately, Muham-
madiyah management realized this at the 47th Congress (PP Muhammadiyah, 2015).

Muhammadiyah has a complete structure down to the grassroots. He can exercise control over the state. Not only by Muhammadiyah itself, more than that, it can move people through power society. Power society or people power can be mobilized if the state has gone too far in its arbitrariness, so it is present in making sharp criticisms and alternatives for the state.

The real evidence made by Muhammadiyah is a strong impetus to challenge the constitution. This is done because the constitution is considered not in favor of the people in general, but pro-liberal economy. Under the leadership of Din Syamsuddin, Muhammadiyah won the lawsuit. One of the consequences of winning the lawsuit was the dissolution of BP Migas (Haq, 2015).

Abdul Mu'ti said that there were at least four laws that Muhammadiyah had challenged. However, although Muhammadiyah's output was said to be successful because its lawsuit was granted, its impact on the movement and fulfillment of the government's decision on the Constitutional Court's decision was also very low. For example, the mineral and coal lawsuit, one of which is the dissolution of BP Migas. BP Migas was officially disbanded, but a new institution was formed that was not much different from it. Lawsuits on water resources were granted entirely with the decision to make a new law, but this has not materialized so far. In fact, according to Mu'ti, a lawsuit against the Natural Resources Law has been made since the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president but has not materialized (interview with Abdul Mu'ti, 2020).

Muhammadiyah is also very critical of the Perppu regarding mass organizations because it has the potential to severely limit freedom of organization, freedom of opinion, and so on which are guaranteed in the Constitution. According to Mu'ti, a problem could be resolved in court, but the government issued a Perppu, eventually becoming law. With the Perppu, the government can then dissolve mass organizations, as
happened with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) without going through a court. In fact, to strengthen the community’s position, such problems can be resolved through the courts, not necessarily through the Perppu (Interview with Abdul Mu’ti, 2020).

Muhammadiyah helps the state to become like a “healthy body”. That is the perfect body, which runs all its members in harmony. The state must understand that, even though sometimes as a civil society that comes face to face, Muhammadiyah does not make sharp criticisms without providing alternatives and solutions. On the other hand, the needs of the people that the state cannot meet can be met by Muhammadiyah.

Muhammadiyah has an ideal Islamic view. The ideal Islam in Muhammadiyah thought is Islam that is practiced by Salafushalih, namely Islam that is free from heresy, superstition, and superstition. This is much influenced by religious thinking that comes from the thoughts of the salaf figures, especially Ibn Thaimiyah. Even to a certain extent also influenced by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. Both emphasize the purification aspect of the Islamic creed, opening the door to ijtihad and returning to the Qur'an and hadith (Azra, 2004). These characteristics are also spread in the Muhammadiyah network, so it becomes a civil society that various groups follow. Especially rational-modernist Islam is not thick with ancestral customs and culture, let alone Hindu religious heritage which many previous ancestors followed.

Muhammadiyah is at the forefront as a liaison between the people and the state. Openness of public space (free public sphere) is a means in managing interactions. This gives Muhammadiyah its bargaining power to exercise control over the state. Another example besides the constitutional jihad by Muhammadiyah is the statement that it does not provide direct political support to one of the presidential candidate pairs in the 2014 election and is actively involved in development politics (PP Muhammadiyah, 2010, p. 340). It means, with a strategy like this, Muhammadiyah can “intervene” whoever is elected president without being burdened with “debt” or political opponents for the winners who are not
champions (Fanani, 2015, pp. 187–220). Muhammadiyah can ask the state to think more about the fate of its people rather than the issue of “donor groups” in the election. If the state does not do this, Muhammadiyah can change the direction of its political development.

Based on the pattern and explanation above, it can be understood that Muhammadiyah does several things. First, Muhammadiyah uses formal and informal networks as a driving force for social control. Not only for the country, but also the people. Second, Muhammadiyah positions itself as a liaison between the state and the people, and vice versa, the people and the state. Muhammadiyah holds one control as a civil society that has a strong bargaining power against the state. Third, a formal organizational structure that reaches the grassroots allows Muhammadiyah to easily provide signals, understanding, and various narratives to the community.

Patterns of Spreading Muhammadiyah Criticism

Based on the chart above, it can be seen that Muhammadiyah adopts an up to bottom pattern in spreading its criticism. This distribution is carried out from above through the Central Leadership of Muhammadiyah to the grassroots. This also provides an overview of the acceptance of Muhammadiyah criticism to the lowest level. One of the factors is Islam and civil society's openness. A. S. Hikam said that the acceptance of the younger generation of Islam towards civil society who devoted themselves to and defended the lower classes was increasing. This is because of the open attitude that exists in civil society, enabling activists to penetrate the boundaries of the Islamic community through networks and work programs with groups outside Islam (Hikam, 2000). Thus, the influence of Muhammadiyah’s criticism on the state will be very strong because the spearhead of criticism lies with the central leadership. Meanwhile, branch and grassroots leaders support the critical steps taken by the central leadership.

Aspects of criticism in Muhammadiyah are internalized through various media including Muhammadiyah educational institutions, such as
formal schools from elementary to tertiary levels. Also, through non-formal education run by Muhammadiyah or autonomous organizations under the umbrella of Muhammadiyah (interview with Yono Rekso Projo, 2020). Unfortunately, the education carried out by Muhammadiyah in the context of forming a critical culture is modern mostly education, so it is considered minimal in producing ulama figures.

Muhammadiyah, with its high reforms seems to simplify traditional education, and orients almost all of its reforms in the field of education, especially in modern public schools and madrasas. At its peak, according to Azyumardi Azra, Muhammadiyah lost its educational tradition in the true sense of the word, but only transferred knowledge. Furthermore, the loss of guidance for prospective ulama in Muhammadiyah. Under such conditions, Muhammadiyah proved difficult to produce ulama (Azra, 2004). Moreover, the number of existing Islamic boarding schools is very small when compared to the number of followers and sympathizers of this organization which amounted to 6.3% percent and 14.9% of the Indonesian population (Burhani, 2014). 67 Islamic boarding schools are very inadequate. Especially when compared to the majority of the Indonesian population who adheres to Islam, the existence of Islamic boarding schools does not "meet the ratio" that is ideal.

The pattern of distribution of Muhammadiyah's critical culture, illustrated on the following pyramid pattern (Figure 1).
The figure 1 shows that Muhammadiyah has a structured pattern in spreading its critique. Muhammadiyah criticism requires support from the wider community. Muhammadiyah will not be able to give sharp criticism to the state, if the people do not want to involve themselves in this critical process. At least, there are tens of millions of Muhammadiyah members and “sympathizers” (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2015, p. 3). On the other hand, Muhammadiyah becomes stronger and more confident if the majority of the people or the whole can participate in Muhammadiyah’s critical efforts towards the state. Muhammadiyah can take advantage of the openness of the public sphere, as Manuel Castells puts it (Castells, 2008, p. 78), to make itself a “reliable critic” of the state. Although there is a thick note that the openness of public spaces is also a "gift" from the state. Because the state, as Hegel said, is the embodiment of the absolute spirit and an institution with more power than civil society (Mead, 1882, p. 72). Abdul Mu'ti said that Muhammadiyah’s critical attitude was an inherent part of Muhammadiyah’s *amar ma'rūf nahī munkar*. This has never been changed since the beginning of Muhammadiyah, but what might be different is the actualization of the *amar ma'rūf* and *nahī munkar*. However, the way Muhammadiyah carries out its activities is still guided by the *amar ma'rūf nahī munkar*. Although the dynamics of the implementation of *amar ma'rūf nahī munkar* are very influential on certain people and at certain times and those who lead Muhammadiyah organizations. The actor factor greatly influences the various critical attitudes of Muhammadiyah towards the government or the various realities that exist in society, so it is not always related to the government. What is in the community that is not appropriate, Muhammadiyah will be critical (interview with Abdul Mu'ti, 2020). Abdul Mu'ti seemed to want to point out that Muhammadiyah’s critical attitude was very contextual.

Muhammadiyah carries out its organizational activities in black and white. Consistently say truth as something right, and error as something wrong. Because of this attitude, Muhammadiyah is often seen as if it were against the state (interview with Yono Rekso Projo, 2020). Nevertheless, the relationship of civil society, especially Muhammadiyah with the state
will still be built. It happens because of the attachment that needs each other. A country that adopts a democratic system as a system of government will need civil society in many ways, especially as a partner, because the state cannot meet the complex needs of its citizens.

Meanwhile, civil society needs the state in the context of the regulations/regulations required by it. Apart from that, as Hegel argues, that civil society will need the state as the owner of the highest authority that exceeds it. Nevertheless, based on Ernest Gellner's opinion, civil society does not have a structural relationship with the state, let alone bound to it (O’Leary, 1997, p. 191). This means that even though civil society is independent, it still needs the state as a place to carry out its activities. Regulations made by the state supports this. Regulations that open up space for democracy as a home for civil society.

**The Challenge of Muhammadiyah Criticism**

The first obstacle experienced by Muhammadiyah was that Muhammadiyah was still confined in exclusivity of thought. Azra pointed out that there has been an erosion of the depth of Muhammadiyah's spiritual experience as a result of modest salafism – not to say primitive – which emphasizes the “purity” of worship. As a result, Muhammadiyah's religious experience and spirituality tend to be dry, many people reduce the essence and meaning of religion itself (Azra, 2004). Unfortunately, this has developed for quite a long time within Muhammadiyah as a civil society related to religion. Finally, Muhammadiyah seems so exclusive to people outside Muhammadiyah, it even seems foreign to Muhammadiyah's own “new citizens”.

This exclusive nature can hinder Muhammadiyah in developing the ideas needed by the people and the state. This means that this becomes a serious obstacle when Muhammadiyah as a civil society must criticize the state, but does not have sufficient capabilities because it only holds on to one thought, namely “personal Muhammadiyah-style thoughts”, not Muhammadiyah as a whole and in its entirety. Meanwhile, other
perspectives tend not to be accommodated due to the exclusivity within Muhammadiyah. As a result, the state is too broad and heterogeneous to be criticized using one perspective, namely the “personal Muhammadiyah perspective”, and the people are too many for Muhammadiyah to provide alternatives. Furthermore, religion, especially Islam, is too big to be managed by Muhammadiyah itself.

Azyumardi Azra gave his opinion regarding religion above. For Azra, even though Muhammadiyah has done a lot and the results can be seen and felt as a social and educational organization, this is still unable to meet the community’s religious needs and spiritual pursuits. The persistence of the “popular religion” and the tradition of Sufism that exists in society has made Muhammadiyah experience difficulties in this regard, even though it has carried out reforms for more than a century (Azra, 2004). This sentence emphasizes that Muhammadiyah itself cannot manage the extent of Islamic religious practice in society, so it must involve other parties.

The second obstacle is the accommodation of various Muhammadiyah-affiliated institutions such as the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM), the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP) Ma’arif Institute, and the Reboan Council which are not accommodated properly. This then gave rise to a different pole that was popular among Muhammadiyah. The first pole is referred to as the Right Muhammadiyah group in which there are Muhammadiyah cadres who have a tendency to traditional, conservative thinking styles, and in Khaled Abou Fadl's terms, puritans. The Left Pole is dominated by people who have a tendency to think progressively, are considered liberal and even secular. And third, the middle pole which has a tendency to think moderately. This classification is different from Abdul Mu'ti. According to him, the relatively appropriate grouping of Muhammadiyah as mentioned by Abdul Munir Mulkhan, namely first, sincere Muhammadiyah which is more exclusive. Second, Muhammadiyah Ahmad Dahlan, which is more inclusive-open, and capable of dialogue with various groups, including
Christians, Zending, and others. Third, Muhammadiyah “NU”, which is still closely related to NU traditions, and Fourth, Muhammadiyah Marhaenis which fights for the poor (Interview with Abdul Mu’ti, 2020). The important point of the grouping is the accommodation that needs to be provided by Muhammadiyah. Various differences that exist if not managed properly can become obstacles in implementing Muhammadiyah's critical attitude towards the state, because Muhammadiyah can be trapped only in internal discussions so that it can forget its function as a civil society whose role is to be critical of the state.

The third obstacle is the debate of Muhammadiyah over concepts generally born from the womb of Western thought, such as pluralism. If this is not addressed properly, the title of reformer that has been embedded in Muhammadiyah will be challenged a lot. It is because Muhammadiyah as a modernist movement that developed the principles of combining the thoughts of Ibn Thaimiyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and the thoughts of Sayyid Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rasyid Rida which was quite accommodating to Western science products. Although not all of their ideas were adopted by Muhammadiyah, adaptation or understanding of the products of Western science is very much needed (Azra, 2004). Because, if this is not done, it can make Muhammadiyah weak when dealing with the state because it does not have sufficient ability to develop Western scientific products. Furthermore, currently, the products of Western science are widely consumed by developing countries, so if Muhammadiyah does not accommodate and adapt to these various products, it will have difficulty criticizing developing countries like Indonesia.

The fourth obstacle, Muhammadiyah as a civil society has been successful in quantitatively increasing their charitable efforts (Azra, 2004). On the one hand, this is progress that the state should consider because Muhammadiyah has a strong foundation of independence. Volunteering which is also built as a result of this charity business will become the capital for Muhammadiyah to make sharp criticisms of the state, or even
become an alternative for the state itself. However, on the other hand, this must be paid dearly because it has dragged Muhammadiyah into the abyss of pragmatism and bureaucracy. Max Weber called this trapped in the shackles of rationality built by Muhammadiyah itself (PP Muhammadiyah, 2010). Muhammadiyah is stuck in their charitable affairs, which can weaken its critical attitude toward the state. Even the state, through its various bureaucratic rules, can actually “constrain” Muhammadiyah through their charities. The function of control, checks and balances of Muhammadiyah as a civil society weakens when faced with such matters. It will certainly be a serious obstacle if Muhammadiyah is not able to position itself properly.

The obstacle that is also important for Muhammadiyah as the fifth obstacle is that Muhammadiyah tends to be interested in what is called political achievement rather than intellectual achievement. A strong political pull will put Muhammadiyah in the abyss of practical political pragmatism. This has happened concretely when Muhammadiyah explicitly mentioned supporting Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais, M.A. who was the 'best cadre' and former central leader of Muhammadiyah as well as a reformist figure to be involved in the 2004 presidential election (PP Muhammadiyah, 2010). Although this has become a thing of the past and has been broken by the next generation who clearly stated that Muhammadiyah would not be involved in practical politics but development politics, this is a threat and a serious obstacle for Muhammadiyah. If this happens, political negotiations that lead to power can result in Muhammadiyah becoming a pragmatic civil society that is at the same time bound to power itself. It means that the state, the owner of the highest power, will easily control Muhammadiyah with compensation for a small amount of power given. Therefore, this fifth obstacle needs to be considered and minimized in such a way, so that Muhammadiyah remains consistent in its position as a critical civil society that controls and becomes an alternative for the state. In accordance with the khitah built by its founder, namely KH. Ahmad Dahlan.
Conclusion

This study aims to discuss critical networks, patterns of spreading criticism, and challenges for Muhammadiyah. The results of this study indicate that Muhammadiyah's critical network is divided into two, namely formal and non-formal networks. The pattern of spreading criticism is in the form of a pyramid. Nevertheless, Muhammadiyah faces various challenges such as exclusivity of thought, accommodation to “progressive” institutions affiliated with Muhammadiyah, as well as debates over concepts that are generally born from the womb of Western thought. This research shows that Muhammadiyah as civil society has a productive network in order to carry out checks and balances to the state. As a developing civil society, it still has challenges to overcome.

This research strengthens Ryaas Rasyid's opinion that civil society has a productive network. This research is limited to literature data, although it has been equipped with interviews. Therefore, the researcher suggests to further researchers to conduct further research on the implementation of the criticism network owned by Muhammadiyah by using this type of field research.

References


